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“So much of what is best in us is bound up in our love of family. It remains the measure of 
our stability because it measures our sense of loyalty” 
 















I’ll never forget the room full of faces of the commercial sex workers staring up at me as I 
entered the room. In Kawempe, a small slum on the outskirts of Kampala, Uganda, there are 
few opportunities for these women. However, on this day, they sat quietly at their sewing 
machines, absorbing vocational training in tailoring, aimed at providing them with economic 
options and an alternative to sex work. More than half of these young women were HIV 
positive. This experience, occurring within my first three days in Africa, created a pretty 
strong emotional foundation for my work over the next four months - writing funding 
proposals for a the African Medical and Research Foundation, Uganda. As I set to work 
crafting 200-page grant applications for agencies like the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Centre for Disease Control (CDC), I began to 
come up against political stumbling blocks. The request for proposal would stipulate that our 
project must fall in line with the policy objectives of the donor agency in the US, but also 
complement and work alongside the local National AIDS Control Programme of Uganda. 
How, now, do I reconcile pleasing the donors in the US, who mandate condom distribution in 
all their programs, with Uganda’s policy emphasis on abstinence? Billboards were 
everywhere across the country; your choices were to abstain, or be faithful to your partner. 
When I confronted a colleague with my dilemma she rolled her eyes and sighed, indicating to 
me that I was not the first person to uncover this disconnect.  
 
This was my first experience with external policy pressures coming from above that did not 
match local strategies and grassroots attitudes, but it would not be the last. A little while later 
into my time working in Uganda, I attended a documentary film premier entitled Miss HIV. 
Comparing and contrasting the HIV/AIDS policies and programs of Uganda and Botswana, 
the documentary made a case for local policy making initiatives, rather than donor-driven 
Western ideological transplants such as The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR). While the ideas in this movie ignited a passion within me, they also raised 
handfuls of questions. If the HIV policies of Uganda and Botswana are such polar opposites, 
where did these strategies come, how did they evolve and which one is more effective? This 
issue formed the research question for my Master’s thesis, which made a post-colonial 
argument for the role of political histories in contemporary policy making. In a similar vein to 
Miss HIV, my project disrupted the mainstream trend of global policy making in the public 
health arena, calling for a return to ‘the local’ as the HIV policy focal point. This 
investigation of contemporary HIV policy making through the post-colonial imaginary led 
me to arrive at an entirely new set of questions. While I had touched on global policy making, 
I had not fully engaged with the ways in which global development partners and program 
funder exert control over domestic HIV/AIDS policy.  
 
After a year and a half, I returned to Kampala, only to find all the abstinence and faithfulness 
billboards replaced by messages on sexual networks and circumcision. The policy shift was 
swift and noticeable. I had to know more about how and why these policies were changing so 
quickly, and what the potential impacts on health outcomes would likely be for people at the 
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Background:  For the last decade, discussions about who governs African HIV/AIDS policy 
have revolved around Western donors and their influence over aid recipient countries. 
However, these dialogues are increasingly less relevant due to a plateau in HIV funding from 
the West, and growing financial ownership of the epidemic within Africa. This project tests 
the hypothesis that this shift in HIV financing has prompted African countries to move their 
National Strategic Plans (NSPs) on HIV/AIDS away from global policies, in favour of 
domestically developed approaches. 
 
Methods: Data was collected by analyzing the NSPs of the eight highest-burden African 
countries (i.e. HIV prevalence rates greater than 10 per cent). Based on 34 policies from the 
Global Fund’s 2009 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Toolkit, each NSP was evaluated on 
the basis of its compliance with the Global Fund’s policies, measured on a 5-point scale. This 
was carried out for three successive policies in each country, to also enable me to search for 
change in Global Fund policy compliance over time. 
 
Results: Overall, countries in Southern Africa are shifting their National Strategic Plans 
towards greater alignment with Global Fund policies. However, Botswana and South Africa 
are exceptions, as they have moved their NSPs away from Global Fund policies in the last 
five years. These differences can be explained by each country’s structural and institutional 
context; wealthier countries with better governments comply less with Global Fund policies. 
In addition, idiosyncratic variables such as political culture and the Global Fund Country 
Team also help explain how strongly a country complies with Global Fund policies.  
 
Conclusions: The practical application of this research is well-timed with the abandonment 
of the Global Fund’s previous Round-based grant system and the design of its New Funding 
Mechanism. In particular, my results submit three major recommendations for this process. 
First, the “country bands” formula ought to take into account the economic development of a 
country, since this variable helps to explain why some countries have more country owned 
policies than others. Second, the New Funding Mechanism should allow for health systems 
strengthening concept notes to be submitted independently of disease-specific applications, 
since my results suggest that general health spending leads to more country owned policy and 
program design, but that AIDS-specific spending does not. Lastly, the Global Fund’s Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms should be encouraged to have fewer donor and international non-
governmental seats, since these elements are connected with stronger external influence over 
domestic HIV/AIDS policy. If these three recommendations are heeded, the New Funding 
Mechanism should promote better country ownership over HIV/AIDS policy and 
programming. There may also be implications that are relevant to epidemiological outcomes. 
HIV prevalence is falling in the countries examined in this study, and this decrease is 
logically linked to fewer new infections, since HIV incidence is also falling. While it is 
necessary to also examine behaviour change interventions and their impact, there is a possible 
relationship between the policy findings of this study and these changes in infection rates 

















































The New Global Politics of HIV/AIDS 
 
 
“Donors are either flat-lining or decreasing their involvement in HIV/AIDS. Some donors 
are steadily moving away from treating HIV/AIDS as an emergency, with dedicated flows of 




The number of new HIV infections has fallen by an estimated 19 per cent across the world 
since 1999, when the epidemic peaked (UNAIDS, 2010). At the same time, there has also 
been a 19 per cent decrease in AIDS-related deaths. That said, prevalence rates remain at 
catastrophic levels in many countries in Southern Africa, with one in four people infected in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Additionally, while new infections have declined in 
Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, in other countries such as Zambia and 
Malawi, incidence rates appear to have remained steady, thereby sustaining the current 
epidemic. In the midst of fragile progress in the global fight against HIV/AIDS there has been 
a recent shift in financial and political circumstances. While African domestic contributions 
to funding for HIV/AIDS are increasing, Western donor money is much smaller in relative 
terms. Further, Western priorities are moving away from an HIV-specific focus, towards a 
broader objective to strengthen health systems more generally. What is more, there is 
preliminary evidence in some countries of a divergence in policy between internationally 
designed best practices and recent “African-owned” strategies. Why do some countries in the 
region continue to align their policies with global norms, while others seem to challenge 
them? And what are the potential health consequences of these trends?  
 
Background and Context 
 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the debate about “who governs” policy on HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment centered on the relationship between Western donors and their 
grantees in the Global South. There were three main themes to this debate: aid-recipient 
countries were incentivized to be more accountable to their donors than to their citizens, 
international HIV/AIDS policies were argued to be culturally irrelevant to African realities, 
and the significant amount of money attached to them was said to lead countries to adopt 
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Firstly, critics charge that the demands of large international development partners for 
“upward accountability” diverted state responsibility away from the actual needs of their 
citizens, towards satisfying the agendas of donor institutions (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). This 
was referred to as “confused accountability”, as states toe the political line of the donor, and 
become accountable to the donors instead of their own citizens, also dubbed the “franchising 
out” of state responsibilities (Wood, 1997; Bendaña, 2006). Others have argued that public 
health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) marginalized local governments since the 
apparent neutrality of donors masked their agenda and allow them to carry out their own aid 
policies, performing the same function of control as imperial colonial powers (Ainsworth & 
Teokul, 2000; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Petra & Veltmeyer, 2001; Agg, 2006). 
 
Secondly, there was widespread condemnation in the early 2000s of Western HIV/AIDS 
policies that were said to be culturally irrelevant in African settings. Discussions around 
blanket policies, or what Elizabeth Pisani (2008) called ‘UN cookbooks’, refered to 
international policies (which were connected to funding) that were supposed to be equally 
useful in the Middle East and in Southern Africa. For Pisani, this meant that anything specific 
or useful got deleted. Helen Epstein (2007) put forward a similar contention, noting how 
donors with multi-billion dollars and international consultants offered domestic Ministries of 
Health in affected countries a set menu of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs. In 
her opinion, if health officials in high burden countries had more time and money, they would 
have been able to refuse these donors and create HIV/AIDS policies and programs that were 
better suited to their specific cultural histories and realities.  
 
Lastly, critics suggested that African countries were pressured to alter their domestic policies 
in order to please their international donors. Scholars often referred to Uganda, where the 
national government initially believed that the HIV policy-making apparatus in the country 
should predominantly be comprised of individuals appointed by foreign institutions such as 
the World Health Organization (Parkhurst, 2005). Similarly, Helen Epstein (2007) noted that 
few African leaders seemed interested in HIV/AIDS and preferred to leave policy-making to 
foreign consultants.  
 
Foreign control seemed particularly dangerous to some critics who warned that the emphasis 
on abstinence in Uganda might have been motivated by a desire to please the Bush 
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Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (with one third of prevention funds earmarked 
for abstinence and faithfulness programs) (Pisani, 2008). In particular, the United States 
stood accused of working through specific types of civil society groups such as faith-based 
organizations, to achieve American economic and political policy goals (Hulme & Edwards, 
1997). As such, the main characteristic of the 1990s debate on Uganda was that foreign 
donors created enabling environments for free market capitalism and economic growth, 
allowing the United States to sidestep the Ugandan state to achieve American goals abroad 
(Igoe & Kelsall, 2005). With American political ideals and economic gains at the forefront of 
PEPFAR-funded initiatives, donor-recipient relationships were heavily criticized for their 
tendency to focus on donor-identified problems, instead of locally acknowledged needs 
(Dicklitch, 1998).  
 
In light of the new global politics of HIV/AIDS, with changing financial and political 
realities, these kinds of debates may no longer be as relevant. 
 
The Research Problem: Funding Plateaus and Shifting Priorities 
 
The criticisms, however relevant at the time, have now been overtaken by new developments 
that began to emerge roughly five years ago. First, there have been significant shifts in 
financial priorities, with stagnant amounts money for HIV/AIDS coming from the Global 
North, despite increasing needs in African countries. To fill this gap, more funding is being 
generated domestically within affected countries. Second, there have also been political 
changes, with policy agendas in the North shifting away from an HIV/AIDS specific focus 
and towards a broader emphasis on strengthening health systems more generally. Within this 
context, there are several examples in Africa where local policies have begun to diverge from 
the strategies of international donors.   
 
Funding Plateaus   
 
Around 2008, global donors began re-constituting their financial contributions to HIV and 
AIDS. This was the result of many factors, including the global economic crisis, evidence of 
more effective health spending options (such as childhood immunization and malaria bed 
nets) and UNAIDS’ statement that “global HIV incidence likely peaked in the late 1990s” 
(UNAIDS & WHO, 2007, p. 6). Consequently, in many Southern African countries fiscal 
assistance from donors for HIV/AIDS programs either decreased or reached a plateau 
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Figure 1.1:  Total International AIDS Disbursements 2002-2012 (Kates, Wexler & 
Lief, 2013) 
International funding for HIV rose from 2002 to 2008, but after that it began to plateau. To 
put this shift in perspective, HIV/AID funding was six times higher in 2008 than it was in 
2002, before it levelled off in 2009. The drop of available HIV funding from US$ 7.6 billion 
in 2009 to US$ 6.9 billion in 2010 represents a 10 per cent drop, which was the first time 
funding decreased in more than a decade (Kates et al., 2011). UNAIDS and the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (KFF) attribute this decline in HIV funding to reductions in development 
assistance, which they said was primarily result of a slower disbursement rates from  donor 
governments  in 2010 (Figure 1.1). For example, US HIV/AIDS funding fell from US$ 4.4 
billion in 2009 to US$ 3.7 billion in 2010. Evidently, Congress applied new restrictions to 
PEPFAR with regard to eligibility for funding during the 2008 reauthorization process. While 
it is true that the US makes up the vast majority of international HIV/AIDS funding, it is not 
the only country involved in this global funding plateau; Australia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden have also cut levels of HIV/AIDS disbursements 
(PlusNews, 2011, August 17).  The most recent data available on financial commitments 
(from 2012) show a slight increase in disbursements, but a decrease in commitments. 
According to The Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and UNAIDS (Kates, Wexler & Lief, 2013, p. 
13), “donor funding has plateaued since the onset of the global economic turndown in 2008, 













UNITAID, World Bank and European Union  
 
One of the more significant global donor institutions curtailing its HIV/AIDS support is 
UNITAID, an initiative housed within the WHO which raises money through levies on airline 














 (ARVs) in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Malawi by 2012 (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010). Moreover, via the Clinton 
Health Access Initiative (CHAI), UNITAID has been trying to redirect the 1,100 patients it 
financially supports for second line treatment to the Global Fund since 2009. At the same 
time, UNITAID/CHAI financing for paediatric medical supplies, which supports 5000 
treatment initiation slots, was not renewed for 2011.  
 
Similarly, the World Bank’s Treatment Acceleration Project (TAP) program ended in 2008, 
and its Multi-country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa (MAP) has been discontinued in several 
countries, with no realistic opportunities for host governments to sustain the programs. 
Consequently, 11 per cent of UNAIDS, World Bank and World Health Organization staff 
surveyed in 71 countries in March 2008 experienced cutbacks for their HIV/AIDS projects on 
the ground. Additionally, 31 per cent expected to face funding challenges in the coming year 
(Wenner, 2009). Most of these cost cut-backs are related to funding for ARVs, which can be 
the most expensive component of HIV/AIDS programs in many countries. For instance, in 
Malawi, 65 per cent of overall HIV/AIDS program costs go towards drug procurement 
(Jouquet et al., 2009). For this reason, cessation of funding for HIV/AIDS - and for treatment 
especially – has profound consequences for high-burden countries.  
 
While responsibility for some World Bank programs has been shifted to other sources of 
funding, this is not the case for all donor initiatives. For instance, several European Union 
(EU) member state aid agencies have raised the alarm on the depleted number of European 




Since funding from the American government makes up more than half of the total global 
money available for HIV/AIDS (Figure 1.2), the leveling off of funding commitments from 
PEPFAR has one of the most severe effects on the global financial politics of HIV/AIDS. The 
program began in 2003, promising US$ 15 billion over 5 years, making it the largest financial 
commitment for public health by any one country in history (Denny & Emanuel, 2008).  
PEPFAR’s founding principles emphasized treatment, with programs supporting more than 
2.5 million people with ARV treatment; these 2.5 million on PEPFAR-funded treatment 
                                                          
1
 Second-line treatment is the regimen that people require once they become resistant to first-line drugs. This 
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Figure 1.2:  International HIV/AIDS Disbursements 
in 2012, by Donor Governments (Kates, 
Wexler & Lief, 2013).  
programs represent more than half of all people on treatment, globally (Dickinson, 2010, 
June 25). In addition, one quarter of all PEPFAR funding was dedicated to prevention 
programs (abstinence, faithfulness and condom use). Given this, the fact that PEPFAR 
reduced its funding for ARVs in 2009 and 2010
2
 and froze its overall HIV and AIDS budget 
for 2009-2014 holds enormous consequences (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010). The 2009 
PEPFAR budget of US$ 1.38 
billion was a US$ 180 
million decrease from 2008’s 
US$ 1.56 billion pledge. Of 
that US$ 180 million 
decrease, US$ 83 million of 
it was a cut in ARV funding. 
What this means is that there 
will be a significant number 
of new patients that need 
ARVs who will not be able to 
receive their medicines 
through PEPFAR. With 2.4 
million new patients put on 
PEPFAR treatment from 
2006-2008, only 1.6 million 
will be added to the program from 2009-2014.  
 
More recently, the 2013 budget from the Obama Administration contains further PEPFAR 
cuts. Since the program has been included into the broader Global Health Initiative (total 
budget of US$ 880 million in 2012), PEPFAR’s 2012 funding has fallen (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012, February 13). The White House’s budget request for fiscal year 2013 
shows a 10.8 per cent drop in PEPFAR funding, budgeting for only US$ 453 million. For its 
African beneficiaries, these cuts drastically alter the financial realities for planning and 
implementing HIV/AIDS policies and programs. In Mozambique, PEPFAR has announced 
that it will slash ARV supplies by 10-15 per cent each year from 2010-2014 (Médecins Sans 
Frontières, 2010). In South Africa, PEPFAR-funded programs have been ceasing initiating 
new patients for treatment, with more than 240 patients refused treatment in Mpumalanga 
                                                          
2
With the exception of Uganda, where recent appeals from healthcare providers has prompted the fund to 
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province between November 2009 and February 2010. Similarly, in Uganda, the American 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sent a letter to PEPFAR-supported facilities warning 
them not to initiate new patients on treatment unless they were sure they could continue the 
regimen without further donor support in the future (PEPFAR, 2009). For this reason, 
treatment opportunities at some sites in Zimbabwe, Uganda and South Africa are only 
available for pregnant women or young children (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010).     
 
It should be noted that in some contexts, PEPFAR’s funding cuts for HIV/AIDS should not 
be strictly characterized as donor abandonment. In South Africa, the US government has 
entered into a five-year (2012-2017) transition agreement with the South African government 
to make sure that PEPFAR’s funding reductions can lead to an effective hand-over of the 
response through dialogue and increased technical support (Brundage, 2011). Similar (though 
less financially significant) transitions are also underway with PEPFAR in Botswana and 
Namibia. Though these transition periods are preferable to some of the more drastic funding 
cuts that are happening elsewhere from other donors, this still represents uncharted territory 
for PEPFAR; South Africa has been its biggest portfolio with over US$ 3.1 billion spent there 
since 2004. Both partners are also aware of the complexity of such a transition and the 
potential threats it holds for interrupted service delivery, civil society backlash and damage to 
South Africa-US relations (Brundage, 2011). 
 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
 
If the shrinking HIV/AIDS budgets from UNITAID, the World Bank, the European Union 
and PEPFAR are regarded as significant funding cuts, no public health austerity measure 
compares in size and impact to that of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (hereafter referred to as the Global Fund). The Global Fund is most commonly a 
financing organization which makes on-budget donations (multi-lateral aid channelled 
directly to governments, rather than to non-state entities such as NGOs or faith based 
organizations). Launched in 2002, the Global Fund is one of the world’s largest funders of 
HIV, totalling 864 grants, worth US$ 21.9 billion (Global Fund, 2011). Of this amount, 
approximately half (over US$10 billion) was granted to African governments. Resources 
available for the Global Fund grew by approximately 8 per cent per year between 2008 and 
2010, reaching a peak of nearly US$ 3.6 billion in 2010 (Usher, 2011). Since then, however, 
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Figure 1.3:  Frozen & Decreasing Global Fund 
Contributions (Usher, 2011).  
10, the US contribution to the Global Fund was frozen and the White House proposed a US$ 





In addition, Ireland and the Netherlands reduced their financial involvement in the Global 
Fund, while donations from France and Italy fell behind schedule. This means that the 
amount originally promised to the Global Fund was not met by actual donation. In the past, 
donors honoured 100 per 
cent of their commitments 
to the Global Fund. From 
2001 to 2005, every single 
pledge to the Global Fund 
was paid. Since then, from 
2006 to 2011 US$ 645 
million in pledges was not 
paid (Rivers, 2012). For 
instance, in 2010, countries 
only gave 80 per cent of the 
amount they originally 
promised. In 2011, the 
number of confirmed pledges from donor countries for the period of 2011-2012 shrunk from 
US$ 9.7 billion to US$ 8.2 billion (Rivers, 2011, November 21).  
 
As a result of unconfirmed contributions or those dispersed behind schedule, the Global 
Fund’s Round 11 available budget declined from US$ 1.6 billion (in May 2011), to US$0.8 
billion (in September), to US$ 0.6 billion (in November). Consequently, in November 2011 
the Global Fund announced that round 11 of grant approvals would be cancelled (Zumla, 
2012). The next opportunity for countries to apply for Global Fund grants will not be until the 
next replenishment period, in 2014-2016. According to Jeffrey Sachs, the Global Fund Board 
decision to postpone Round 11 marks the sharpest setback to the Millennium Development 
Goals since their adoption in September 2000 (Donnelly, 2011). 
                                                          
3
 See the next page for countries’ re-commitment to the Global Fund leading up to the fourth replenishment 
meeting in the last quarter of 2013. These contributions have helped to stabilize global spending on HIV/AIDS 
since the initial decline. However, the spending cuts which occurred from 2008-2010 are still highly significant 
in how they changed the landscape of the new global politics of HIV/AIDS. As a result, many countries have 
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This funding decline (and subsequent Round 11 cancellation) is partly due to the global 
economic downturn. After the markets crashed in September 2008, countries have had fewer 
resources available to contribute to the Global Fund. However, the decrease in commitments 
to the Global Fund could also be the result of a loss of confidence in grant oversight, since 
investigations revealed that millions of dollars were mismanaged by recipient countries 
(Rivers, 2011).
4
 Additionally, there have been internal management conflicts. In January 
2012, Global Fund Executive Director Michel Kazatchkine announced that he would be 
stepping down after a disagreement with the Board’s decision to appoint a new General 
Manager (Cohen, 2012, January 24).  
 
Third, decreases in commitments to the Global Fund may also be seen as a result of large 
quantities of unspent money, both from the Global Fund and from other partners. For 
example, in 2008 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe released US$ 7.3 million in unspent Global 
Fund money that it had been holding during the country’s economic collapse (Punitha, 2008, 
November 8). Similarly, in Kenya, nearly US$ 500 million of PEPFAR money went unspent, 
due to inefficient bureaucracies and reductions in the cost of ARVs (Chonghaile, 2012, April 
27). In Namibia, too, US$ 57 million of PEPFAR money has recently been found to have 
gone unspent (Ashipala, 2012, April 27). In the last fiscal year in South Africa, too, there 
have been reports of ZAR 31.7 million (~US $ 4.2 million) of unspent funds, which were 
earmarked for NGOs working in the field of HIV prevention and support of vulnerable 
families (Brown, 2012, December 4). This is certainly a relevant factor in why countries may 
be cutting back on their contributions to the Global Fund, taken in combination with the 
financial crisis in 2008 and with widespread reports from the Global Fund’s Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) on mismanagement of Global Fund recourses in country. 
 
It should be mentioned that since the cancellation of Round 11, the international community 
has tried to increase its Global Fund support. In January 2012, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation contributed US$ 750 million to the Global Fund, which was more than the total 
amount that the foundation had pledged since the Global Fund was begun 10 years ago (US$ 
650 million) (Rundle, 2012, January 26). Moreover, the White House has requested a budget 
increase for 2013 for Global Fund contributions, from both the Global Health Initiative 
(+US$ 350 million/+26.9 per cent) and the State Department (also +US$ 350 million/ +26.9 
per cent) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). In addition to the American efforts to re-charge 
                                                          
4
 While the dollar amount of corruption is only about 1 per cent of total Global Fund money dispersed, the 
barrage of media attention and the shake to contributing countries’ confidence indicates the implied severity of 
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the Global Fund, on 13 March 2012 Japan made a US$ 340 million contribution, the highest 
amount Japan has ever pledged to the fund (Hurst, 2012, March 13). Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark and Iceland also pledge a combined US$ 750 million, which is $150 
million more than they have previously donated (Garmaise, 2013, September 6). Most 
recently, the UK pledged US$ 1.6 billion to the Global Fund (Faison, 2013, September 23).  
 
These pledges are encouraging and are contributing towards the stabilizing of international 
HIV/AIDS funding. However, the gap between what has been committed and what is needed 
remains large. The future of the Global Fund is still uncertain and the cancellation of Round 
11 marked a significant turning point in the financial and political realities facing HIV/AIDS 
programs in Africa. It is a wake-up call for many governments in high-burden countries, and 
will certainly effect budgeting and policy-making in the near future. Indeed, some leaders 
have noted that the cancellation of Round 11 might have come at the right time, prompting 
countries to step up and begin acting on their promises about the financial sustainability of 
their own HIV/AIDS programs (Muleshe, 2012, March 12). As a result, financial 
commitments from affected countries are increasing.  
 
Increased Domestic African HIV/AIDS Funding 
 
Given the growing gap between in-country needs and the available donor funds, the onus is 
on African governments to fill the gap. Responding to the need for more resources for 
HIV/AIDS, there has been a dramatic increase in financial contributions for HIV/AIDS 
programs from within Southern Africa (Figure 1.4). African domestic spending (defined as 
public spending independent of Global Fund aid, bi-lateral aid or multi-lateral aid) on HIV 
and AIDS efforts in affected countries rose from $500 million in 2000 to $2.5 billion in 2004 
and $4.3 billion in 2008 (Bonnel, 2009). Lesotho is a prime example, where domestic funding 
for HIV/AIDS programs made up only 18.7 per cent of total available funds in 2006-2007. 
Then, in 2007-2008, Lesotho’s domestic contribution rose to 37.2 per cent of the total amount 
of HIV/AIDS funding. Lesotho’s domestic financing continued to rise in fiscal year 2008-
2009, when for the first time domestic contributions made up the majority of HIV/AIDS 
program funding in the country, reaching 56.9 per cent of total funding (Lesotho National 
AIDS Commission, 2008). Similar upward trends are evident in Zimbabwe, where domestic 
funding leapt from 16.4 per cent in 2005 to 49.0 per cent in 2006. More recently, Kenya’s 
2010/2011 national budget has - for the first time ever - allocated money for local ARV 
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Figure 1.4:  Domestic African Resources for HIV/AIDS (US$ billions) 
(UNAIDS, 2013b)  
 
These changes in domestic African spending are often based on an imperative for African 
countries to begin making up the shortfalls in donor money by reallocating public funds 
(Bodibe, 2010, October 28). Jeremy Youde (2010) suggests increases in foreign aid for 
HIV/AIDS, frees up domestic resources and allows them to be spent on other health care 
needs. By the same logic, decreases in foreign aid for HIV/AIDS will move national 
treasuries to re-allocate funds from other areas of health back towards HIV/AIDS to fill the 
donor gap. For example, in 2010, South Africa’s budget included an increase of ZAR 8.4 
billion (~US$ 1 billion) for ARVs, which should add an extra 100,000 people to treatment 
regimens (Odendal, 2010, February 26; Langa, 2010, March 11). There was also an 
additional ZAR 100 million (~US$ 12 million) included in the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework for HIV prevention in 2010, which forms part of a larger commitment from the 
South African government of ZAR 1.5 billion (~US$ 18.5 million)  for HIV programs from 
2010 to 2013.  
 
Additionally, in the wake of Swaziland’s funding crisis which resulted from Global Fund 
rejection of its Round 10 application, South Africa stepped in to support the Swazi 
government with a US$ 313 million loan, the first US$ 104 million infusion to go directly to 
health and education (PlusNews, 2011, November 15). This loan represents substantial 
financial ownership of the HIV epidemic coming from within Southern Africa, especially 
when compared PEPFAR’s US$7 million emergency funding for Swaziland, which was only 
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Rwanda has also increased its financial contributions to global HIV/AIDS efforts, by 
pledging US$ 1 million to the Global Fund in 2010 (The New Times, 2010, September 30). 
The donation came from the Rwandese financial institution, Access Bank, demonstrating the 
mounting commitment of the African private sector to filling the gap left by stagnant Western 
donor funding. Along with South Africa and Rwanda, Tanzania has also increased its 
domestic spending on HIV/AIDS. In December 2010, Vice President Dr. Mohammed Gharib 
Bilali announced that Mbeya, Iringa and Dar es Salam regions (those with prevalence rates of 
five per cent or higher) would be allocated more money from the federal government, 
through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for HIV programming (Lucas, 
2010, December 1).  
 
In addition to increased African financial commitments for HIV/AID programs, there is also 
a movement towards producing ARV pharmaceuticals locally, which is another form of 
HIV/AIDS domestic investment. In Uganda, Quality Chemical Industries has partnered with 
Indian generic drug manufacturer, Cipla, to produce ARVs locally. Carel IJsselmuiden, 
director of the Council on Health Research for Development (COHRED), notes how African 
countries increasingly are electing to take charge of their own public health situation 
(McColl, 2010). McColl (2010) also indicates that local pharmaceutical production is an 
example of the momentum behind Africans increasingly driving the HIV/AIDS agenda. 
Similarly, Tanzania’s first locally manufactured ARVs began to be produced midway through 
2012, at the country’s new pharmaceutical plant in Arusha. While the plant was built using a 
grant from the European Union of about US$ 6.6 million, it is significant that the Tanzania 
Pharmaceuticals Industry (40 per cent government owned) has contributed US$ 963,000 to 
the project (PlusNews, 2012, March 6). A similar investment is occurring in South Africa, 
where the government is investing ZAR 1 billion (~US$ 113 million) to build a 
pharmaceuticals plant, which will locally produce ARV ingredients by 2016 (Aboobaker, 
2012, February 13). 
 
Broader Donor Policies and Diverging African Strategies 
 
While the cuts in HIV/AIDS financial support from Western donors have been widely 
covered by the news media, there has also been significant political change in Western donor 
policies that may be equally important. International policies on health from donors like 
PEPFAR and The World Bank used to speak in a straightforward way, specifically about 
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to refer to broader strategies of health systems strengthening (HSS) or capacity building. One 
by one, major international donors have changed their policy frameworks to focus on broader 
issues of health development, rather than HIV/AIDS. In particular, this has come to include 
more indirect interventions, commonly referred to as ‘efficiency improvements’ (Médecins 
Sans Frontières, 2010; Jouquet et al., 2009).  
 
Another example of the changing environment of HIV/AIDS is the recommendation from the 
Institute of Medicine, in which it was urged that PEPFAR should move from emergency 
relief for HIV towards capacity building for sustainability (Institute of Medicine, 2007). 
Following these recommendations, discussions within the White House on reauthorizing 
PEPFAR progressively revolved around expanding human resources, improving labs, 
increasing patient information and making procurement more efficient, instead of targeted 
HIV interventions (Moore & Morrison, 2007). These rhetorical changes in health 
development were confirmed in January 2010 when US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, 
consolidated the shift in focus from HIV/AIDS towards broader health priorities with a US$ 
63 billion commitment to health systems strengthening over six years (Clinton, 2010, January 
6). Bongaarts and Over (2010, p. 10) have called this a “significant shift from the previous 
administration’s approach.” As a result, under PEPFAR II, HSS and improvements to human 
resources for health are a much stronger focus area. Pursuant to this diverted emphasis away 
from HIV/AIDS, towards other interventions, PEPFAR treatment for 3,000 adults in 
Zimbabwe was re-channelled to reach only mothers in 2011 (Médecins Sans Frontières, 
2010).   
 
In the same manner as the World Bank and PEPFAR, in April 2007, the board of the Global 
Fund began considering funding comprehensive country health programs (Ooms et al., 2008). 
As a result, the new International Health Partnership Plus was launched in September 2007, 
which some speculate will lead the Global Fund to embark on a much broader health mandate 
as well. Many donor countries to the Global Fund, along with several grant-recipient 
countries, have echoed these sentiments, asking that Global Fund money also be used for 
HSS and maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH). It seems that Millennium 
Development Goal #6 (HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other major diseases) is increasingly losing 
political favor to Millennium Development Goal #4 (child mortality) and Millennium 
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An important reason for this this change in the political focus of public health aid may have 
arisen out of the 2005 Paris Declaration, where donors committed to improve effectiveness of 
their development aid. Following this, and fuelled mounting exposure about the 
disproportionately high cost of funding HIV/AIDS, there is a growing tendency to donate 
money towards health more generally, rather than HIV/AIDS specific projects or programs. 
For instance, The Lancet published an article disclosing that the financial assistance for 
HIV/AIDS was 23 per cent of total health aid in 2007, when the percentage of AIDS deaths 
in the world was less than 5 per cent (Bongaarts & Over, 2010). Further, in some African 
countries, foreign donor funding for HIV/AIDS was greater than the total budget of the 
Ministry of Health (Shiffman, 2008). Based on this evidence, it may be that allocating fewer 




Emerging out of such aid-effectiveness questions, the costs of HIV/AIDS programs were 
increasingly compared to other life-saving interventions. In 2008, scholars began urging that 
cost-effectiveness (lives saved per dollar spent) was an ethical responsibility of public health 
development partners (Denny & Emmanuel, 2008). The Disease Control Priorities Project 
released a list of the most cost effective medical public health interventions (defined in terms 
of dollars per year of life saved) (Jamison et al., 2006). This report made it clear that bed nets 
for malaria prevention were the most cost effective initiative, with aspirin or beta-blockers for 
myocardial infarction, household spraying for malaria, tax for tobacco and Bacillus Calmette-
Guérin (BCG) vaccine for tuberculosis (TB) were among the most cost-effective (Bongaarts 
& Over, 2010). These programs are all more cost-effective than condom distribution for 
HIV/AIDS prevention. Further, antiretroviral therapy was, in some cases, the least cost-
effective life-saving measure, with short-course chemotherapy for TB, family planning for 
unwanted pregnancies, improved care for maternal health and basic sanitation for diarrheal 
disease all proving to be more cost-effective interventions. These data, published by Ezekiel 
Emanuel, a senior advisor in the White House, were used to make the point that extending 
funding for PEPFAR should be discouraged, since more lives could be saved by spending 
money on other issues, such as respiratory and diarrheal illnesses (Denny & Emmanuel, 
2008). Bongaarts and Over (2010) agree, arguing that donors should focus more on childhood 
immunization, malaria, tuberculosis, maternal mortality and family planning, since these 
interventions save many more lives per dollar spent than anti-retroviral drugs do. 
                                                          
5
 It is not the objective of this introduction to comment on the normative implications of the financial and 
political changes in the donor landscape for HIV/AIDS. Rather, my aim is to describe the context within which 
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Growing Policy Divergence  
 
There also appear to be growing a divergence in the policy-making process between African 
governments and international donors. For example, Swaziland’s 2000-2005 National 
Strategic Plan, excludes any policies aimed at commercial sex workers (CSWs), in line with 
PEPFAR’s long-standing refusal to fund any HIV/AIDS proposal seen to provide support for 
prostitution. However, in Swaziland’s more recent national strategic plans (2006-2008, as 
well as 2009-2014) the policy diverges politically from PEPFAR regulations and includes 
CSWs as a target at-risk group (Mathabela & Odido, 2010). Additionally, in line with 
UNAIDS’ top target populations, in its newly reviewed (March 2009) list of indicators, men 
who have sex with men (MSM) were identified as a group that is particularly vulnerable to 
infection in Zimbabwe’s 2006-2010 NSP (UNAIDS, 2009). In another move away from 
UNAIDS protocol, the 2011-2015 Zimbabwean NSP mentions only that no surveillance of 
MSM exists, because the government of Zimbabwe expressly refuses to plan HIV prevention 
programs for these populations since “these groups have no legal status in Zimbabwe” 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2010, p. 15). 
 
A third example of divergence between African policies and global norms is Uganda’s 2010 
draft policy on when children ought to be informed of their HIV positive status. While the 
international policy (according to Human Rights Watch and the UNHCR [UN Refugee 
Agency]) is that children as young as age six may be informed of their status, Uganda’s age 
remains higher than that (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The previous policy in Uganda 
legislated that children must be 12 years old, and this policy review is only lowering that age 
to 10, not 6 as international policy stipulates. Kenya is also politically divergent from this 
global norm, remaining steadfast that it must be the responsibility of the legal guardian to 
inform the child, whenever the parent sees fit. 
 
In sum, there are three main elements that make up the new global politics of HIV/AIDS: 
First, relatively declining levels of international donor support is coupled with increasing 
resources coming from within affected countries; Second, the political focus of international 
heath agendas is shifting away from HIV/AIDS specific interventions, towards broader health 
systems policies; Third, there is at least some evidence of policy divergence, as some African 

















Given the previous discussion, the first major research question that I ask in this study is who 
governs HIV/AIDS policy in Southern Africa?
6
 With the recently changing financial and 
political realities of the new global politics of HIV/AIDS, will African governments react by 
pursuing policies that may respond to local imperatives and diverge from global protocol? 
 
In addition, I ask a second major question which follows from the first. After investigating 
who governs, I am also driven to know why. Specifically, are there predictable institutional or 
structural factors which make one country more likely than another to comply with or diverge 
from global HIV/AIDS policy than another? Exploring this trend sheds light on why certain 
countries may comply more with global HIV policy than others.   
 
At this point, the next obvious question would be ‘so what’? Do HIV/AIDS policies make 
any difference in terms of actual health outcomes? If African countries diverge from global 
policy, or comply with it, do these policy decisions affect HIV infection rates? The 
mainstream argument in the literature is that domestically designed policies are more 
effective because they are more contextually informed than those developed in the Global 
North. However, there is a tendency for the literature to argue anecdotally that locally 
designed policy is always more effective, without much scientific evidence for this claim. As 
such, given the lack of evidence it could just as reasonably be true that policies put forward at 
the global level – by leading experts at UNAIDS, WHO or the Global Fund – might be more 
effective and should therefore be adopted. Based on this uncertainty, the ‘so what’ question is 
important. But, showing that policy is related to epidemiological outcomes is a difficult 
endeavor. Justin Parkhurst (2008) suggests a five-step model that requires evidence in the 
following order: (1) falling HIV prevalence, due to (2) falling HIV incidence, due to (3) 
changes in behavior, due to (4) behavior change interventions, due to (5) HIV prevention 
policies. Within the scope of this study I am able to provide evidence for step 1, step 2 and 
step 5, but not for steps 3 or 4. As a result, my objective is to offer some initial tentative 
observations about which type of policies might be better, in order to inspire future research 
into the debate about global versus domestic HIV/AIDS policy efficacy.     
                                                          
6
 It should be stated at the outset that this question was operationalized by focusing on the influence of the 
Global Fund and its influence over domestic National Strategic Plans in Africa. The methodology behind why 
the Global Fund was selected as the independent variable is detailed in Chapter 2. My model for measuring 
donor influence could be subsequently applied to the other donors discussed in this chapter. It could also be a 
useful tool for other researchers, or for donor organizations themselves, to assess the influence they have over 














In answering my first question I expect to find that after 2008, African national HIV/AIDS 
policies will be less likely to be aligned with donor policy. The logic behind this hypothesis is 
based on the new global politics of HIV/AIDS, where money from Western donors is 
leveling off while in-country needs continue to grow. As African governments commit more 
and more domestic resources to fill this gap, it is logical that they will have greater ability to 
direct policy-making in their countries. Before the new global policies of HIV/AIDS, African 
governments were much more dependent on global donors, and therefore less able to control 
their own policy and program agenda.    
 
For my second question, I anticipate finding variation across countries in the degree to which 
African governments move their strategies away from global policies, and that this variance 
can be accounted for by both structural and institutional variables. First, with respect to 
structural economic variables, I expect to find that wealthier countries who spend more 
domestic public funds on HIV/AIDS and accept less foreign aid will diverge to a greater 
degree from international policy protocols than those countries that depend on donors. A 
country’s economic independence is connected with its ability to design locally relevant 
policies (Parker et al., 2000; Epstein; 2007; Pisani, 2008). As such, it follows that wealthier 
countries will diverge from global HIV/AIDS policies more than poorer ones. Second, with 
respect to institutional variables, I expect to find that greater policy divergence will be 
exhibited by better-governed, more democratic states with greater political accountability and 
political stability. Stronger governance is connected to more domestically designed health 
policy-making, since effective states are more likely to demonstrate greater political 
commitment to issues such as HIV/AIDS (Parker et al., 2000; Baldwin, 2005; Menon-
Johansson, 2005; Heald, 2006; Biesma et al., 2009; Altman & Buse, 2012).  
 
For the question of ‘so what’ (which I offer some interesting initial evidence for in the 
implications section of Chapter 7) I hypothesize that divergence from global policy norms 
will be associated with better epidemiological outcomes. This reasoning comes from the 
mainstream logic that local policies are more effective than imported ones because they are 
more culturally relevant (Green, 1988; Asiimwe-Okiror et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 2001; 
Campbell, 2003; Hogle, 2002; Low-Beer and Stoneburner, 2004; Cohen & Tate, 2005; 
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Significance of Study: Democracy and HIV/AIDS Policy Effectiveness 
 
Aside from an academic rationale based on Alex De Waal’s (2003) view that the political 
science of HIV and AIDS policies is intellectually under-capitalized, this study deals with a 
significant real-world problem. There are two main grounds for justifying the value of this 
project: First, the implications for democracy and development and; Second, new ways of 
measuring political commitment and AIDS governance.   
Democracy and Development  
 
If I find that global institutions continue to heavily influence local HIV/AIDS policies in 
Africa, this will have significant implications for democracy, especially in contexts of a 
developing country. Milton Friedman (1958) argues that donor funding obstructs democracy 
and civil liberties since funding economic productivity in the public sector is not helpful in 
fostering democracy and freedom. Similarly, according to Adam Przeworski’s (1991) 
research in Eastern Europe and Latin America, economic reform policies are generally forced 
on developing country governments by international organizations that control the finances, 
such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. More broadly speaking, policy 
changes are generally a strategy of control from above, not from broad consensus and 
participation from domestic stakeholders. As such, governments resort to ruling by decree to 
meet international deadlines, as evidenced by economic reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru. Democracy is thus potentially substantially weakened as people seem to 
get a regular chance to vote, but not choose.  
 
In addition, if I find that HIV/AIDS policies in Africa remain heavily compliant with global 
agendas then this top-down process renders African governments less responsive to the wants 
and needs of their citizens. According to Mick Moore (1998), foreign aid has a negative 
impact on state responsiveness to its citizens by weakening democratic systems of taxation 
and service provision. Moore says that foreign assistance comes between governments and 
the demands on their citizens since donor money is an ‘unearned’ source of state income. As 
a result, he argues African governments never develop the capacity to raise public funds 
through taxation and provide good public services in return. Without developing this 
democratic tradition, government responsiveness to its internal constituencies is significantly 
weakened. Putzel (2004) follows the same logic with respect to HIV/AIDS donor funds. He 
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argument has been made, generally, about how democracy evolved in the West. With 
England as the prime example, political shifts from monarchies to democracies were chiefly 
fuelled by the state’s need for tax revenues, often for fighting wars (Tilly, 1990; North, 
1990). As foreign aid stunts this precondition for democracy, if I find donors to be continuing 
to exert control then the significance for democratic development is that African states will 
continue to be accountable to Western donors, and not to their citizens.  
 
Indeed survey research has shown that Africans consistently rank HIV/AIDS very low on 
their list of priorities they want their elected governments to address, choosing rather to see 
government action on employment, food security and crime (Whiteside, Mattes, Willan & 
Manning, 2004).  
 
Donor influence also retards the development of a strong and healthy civil society. Without a 
strong civil society as external watchdogs, government accountability is weakened. Julie 
Hearn (2001) argues that Western donor support to African policy-oriented non-
governmental organizations weakens democracy by creating a false ‘partnership’ whereby 
civil society has very little power since it is dependent on outside funding. The result is a 
system where civil society and citizens are incentivized to accept the status quo, rather than 
challenge it. 
 
However, if I find the opposite – that donors are exerting less control over HIV/AIDS policy-
making in African states then the opposite result may be true. It could signify the 
development of a more accountable and democratic state system emerging in Southern 
Africa.  
 
Political Commitment and AIDS Governance 
 
The results of this study are also significant for measuring political commitment. On July 3, 
2004, the lead editorial of the Lancet observed that when it comes to fighting the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, “Perhaps the most important factor is the willingness of political leaders to 
acknowledge the crisis and implement needed interventions” (“HIV/AIDS: not one epidemic 
but many”, 2004, p. 1). Similarly, Patterson (2001) notes that for the last two decades, 
International AIDS Conferences have been dominated by call for stronger political 
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But defining political commitment and good AIDS governance is a challenge. Bor (2007, p. 
1586) defines political commitment as “the extent to which top-level government leaders 
(viz. heads of state and their appointees) support AIDS as a priority on the national agenda.” 
Others prefer a broader understanding which includes the private sector, civil society, and 
local government.  
 
To assess political commitment there are some measurement tools available. Bor (2007) uses 
the ‘political support’ component of the 2003 AIDS Program Effort Index (API). There are 
also other suggested measures of political commitment such as the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) Declaration of Commitment Indicators 
and the AIDS Policy Aggressiveness Indicators (Lieberman, 2011). Furthermore, there is a 
literature that uses expressed commitment, institutional commitment and budgetary 
commitment as other measure of AIDS leadership (Fox et al., 2011).  
 
Building on existing efforts, this study develops a new indicator – the level of domestic AIDS 
policy compliance with global protocol. I have developed a new measurement tool for 
assessing political commitment, which may contribute towards research efforts to understand 
what good AIDS governance is, and what contextual factors make certain types of 
governance more likely. Based on the literature (Bor, 2007; Fox et al., 2011; Lieberman, 
2011) there is a need for more tools which can measure political commitment in ways that are 
empirically testable. Therefore, one of the key contributions of this study is the creation of a 
new statistical measurement of AIDS governance.   
 
In addition to developing indicators on AIDS policy compliance, this thesis also contributes 
significantly to debates about which contextual factors inspire or impede different types of 
political responses. In answering my second question, about why certain countries comply 
more with international HIV/AIDS policy than others, I test a number of structural and 
institutional variables which have previously been posited to affect political decision making. 
The results of these tests are significant because they help us to understand which contexts 
will beget certain kinds of political commitment to AIDS. 
 
Why does measuring political commitment and AIDS governance matter? Strand (2007, p. 
219) says a comparative research agenda will be able to answer such questions as “which 
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sustaining a treatment programme?” It is difficult to say whether compliance with global 
policy, or divergence from it, represents better political commitment or stronger AIDS 
governance. Without being able to definitively connect policy compliance with 
epidemiological outcomes in this study, I cannot conclusively say which is better for health 
outcomes. However, the section in Chapter 7 on “Policy Efficacy” implications offers some 
intriguing initial and tentative evidence. My aim here is to provide a platform and an 
incentive for future researchers to investigate the potential relationship between AIDS policy 




It is clear from the preceding chapter that since 2008, there have been significant shifts in the 
global politics of HIV/AIDS. These shifts include financial changes, such as less donor 
money available compared to the relative need, met by increased African domestic spending. 
There is also a change in the political focus of Western donors, with priorities moving away 
from HIV/AIDS-specific discussions towards broader health systems strengthening and 
capacity building. Lastly, there is preliminary evidence of diverging HIV/AIDS policy 
agendas of African governments and global institutions. These financial and political shifts 
(referred to collectively in this project as the new global politics of HIV/AIDS) are 
hypothesized to lead to changes in African domestic policy-making.        
 
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I will provide more detail on exactly how the term ‘global 
policy’ was operationalized by selecting the Global Fund’s 2009 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Toolkit as the independent variable. In this chapter I will also discuss precisely how I 
measured policy change, so that this method can be easily replicated by other researchers 
who may be interested to measure the influence of other donors in the HIV/AIDS or public 
health field.   
 
Next, in Chapter 3 I will present the first part of my results. Here, I will highlight the 
aggregate trends in policy compliance in the region, revealing which countries comply with 
global policy and how this changes (or does not change) over time. In this chapter I will also 
reflect on how these findings contribute new knowledge and understanding, as well as relate 
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In Chapter 4 I illustrate how and why this aggregate policy change happens by examining in 
detail individual policy changes over time in the written policy documents.  
 
In Chapter 5 I investigate the potential causes of policy by examining relationships between 
HIV/AIDS policy change and contributing contextual factors. Specifically, I look at two sets 
of explanatory variables – structural economic variables and institutional political variables.  
 
In Chapter 6, I present qualitative data from 82 key informant interviews conducted in 
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as the 
Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva. Data from these interviews help to illustrate the causal 
mechanisms suggested by the statistical analysis in Chapter 5.  
 
Lastly, in Chapter 7 I finish with a number of recommendations for the Global Fund’s New 
Funding Mechanism, based on the results of this research. The New Funding Mechanism is 
set to be fully implemented in late 2013, once the Global Fund ascertains availability of funds 
for the 2014-2016 cycle. For each of these recommendations, I also suggest how the change 
makes sense in the context of the new UNAIDS (2011) Investment Framework.  
 
I then inspect potential consequences of changes in policy compliance. I do this by measuring 
the association between change in HIV/AIDS policy and change in epidemiological trends. 
Due to the difficulties in demonstrating the impact of policy on HIV infection rates, as well 
as the small number of cases in this project, the results of this analysis are not conclusive or 
definitive. Instead, they are meant to provide direction for future research into the 
























Evaluating National Strategic Plans based on Global Policy Indicators: 




“There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas. [...] Discovery contains an 





As the purpose of this study is to measure HIV/AIDS policy and policy change quite closely, 
a quantitative methodology was selected to achieve this. The methodology and research 
design was chosen based on the three fundamental research goals of this study: first, to 
determine the level of influence global policy has over HIV/AIDS strategies in Southern 
Africa; second, to explain why some countries might comply more heavily with global policy 
than others; and third, to see what associations changes in compliance or divergence with 




Since my intention is to understand the politics of HIV/AIDS policy-making in countries 
significantly affected by the epidemic, the criterion for inclusion is a high level HIV 
prevalence. I have set HIV/AIDS prevalence of greater than 10 per cent as the rule for the 
inclusion of a country. Table 2.1 displays all the Anglophone countries with HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates higher than 10 per cent (I am not proficient in Portuguese). Countries with 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates lower than 10 per cent were excluded for two reasons. First, there 
is a natural cluster of countries with prevalence rates above 10 per cent, since prevalence 
rates drop off quite steeply after that with the next highest rates found in Uganda (6.5 per 
cent) and Kenya (6.3 per cent). Secondly, there is also a logical geographical grouping since 
the epidemic and policy landscape in East Africa is at a very different point in its life cycle 
than Southern Africa. For instance, when Uganda was faced with a wide-spread generalized 
epidemic in the early 1980s, HIV/AIDS was only starting to appear along truck routes and in 
mining communities in Southern Africa. For this reason, comparing the contemporary 
epidemic and policy response in Eastern African and Southern Africa would ignore 
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Kenya  6.3% 





Operationalizing the Concept of ‘Global Policy’ 
 
I understand the concept of ‘Global Policy’ as the policy of the largest donor that channels its 
funds through the national government of a recipient country (sometimes termed “on-budget” 
funding).
7
 I look at donors which give money to national governments because I am 
measuring the effect of donor money on national policy. Money given to governments would 
have a larger influence over national policy than money that goes directly to non-
governmental organization (such as funds from USAID, which do not go to governments). 
The UNAIDS 2010 Global Report disaggregates external HIV/AIDS funding into five 
categories: Bilaterals, Global Fund, the UN, all other multilaterals and all other international 
sources.
8
 Before 2010, the UN and other multilaterals where grouped together in the same 
category. Then, in the most recent UNAIDS Global Report (2012), spending is only 
disaggregated into Public, Bilaterals, Development Banks, Global Fund, Multilaterals and all 
other (multilaterals and international).  
                                                          
7
 This excludes PEPFAR, since it only funds non-governmental organizations.   
8
 I have chosen to use The UNAIDS 2010 Global Report as the source for spending data because its 
disaggregation of data into five categories is the most useful. The 2011 UNAIDS Epidemic Update does not 
include AIDS spending data by country and the UNAIDS 2012 Global Report only disaggregates spending data 
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In order to achieve the most even and effective funding breakdown, I used the 2010 report 
breakdown categories and the data from the UNAIDS 2010 report. However, there is data 
missing for both Namibia and Zambia. For Namibia, I used the 2010 National AIDS 
Spending Assessment (Government of Namibia, 2010) and for Zambia, I used the data 
available in the 2008 UNAIDS Global Report. 
 
Based on this spending data, the Global Fund is clearly the largest individual donor across the 
countries in this study. A complete chart of Global Fund disbursements to the countries in my 
study, as well as the total amount of funding to date, may be found in Appendix A and B.  
 








UN and all 
other 
Multilaterals   
All other 
international 
sources or not 
specified   
Botswana (2008) 67.4% 21.3% 0% 0.4% 10.9% 
Lesotho (2007) 56.9% 18.5% 8.9% 5.1% 10.6% 
Malawi  (2009) 1.4% 26.4% 54.7% 8.5% 8.9% 
Namibia  (2009)
9
 48.3% 33.1% 14.7% 2.5% 1.4% 
S. Africa (2007) 72.7% 26.3% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 
Swaziland (2006) 39.6% 5.8% 31.0% 9.7% 13.6% 
Zambia (2006)
10
 15.3% 60.9% 12.9% 7.0% 3.9% 
Zimbabwe (2009) 19.5% 21.4% 17.1% 1.1% 40.9% 
 
                                                          
9
 Source: Government of Namibia, Health Systems 20/20 Project, World Health Organization, and UNAIDS. 
(2010). Namibia Health Resource Tracking: 2007/08 & 2008/09. Bethesda, MD: Health Systems 20/20 project, 
Abt Associates Inc.  
10
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The Global Fund clearly represents the largest individual donor which supports government 
in each of the countries in the study population (Table 2.2). Since the Global Fund is the 
largest individual donor, I use the most recent edition (Third Edition, February 2009) of the 
Global Fund HIV Monitoring and Evaluation Toolkit as the basis for data on ‘Global Policy’.  
The Toolkit includes “25 indicators related to the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS required for monitoring the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
and 15 additional recommended indicators” (Global Fund, 2009, p.67). The way the Global 
Fund selects these policies is based on a collaborative process which includes international 
organizations, bilateral agencies, nongovernmental and private organizations and other major 
partners. In particular, the following organizations are acknowledged with providing input 
into the Global Fund’s 2009 M&E Toolkit: The United States Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the Global Fund, the Health Metrics Network, the Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership, the Stop TB Partnership, UNAIDS, WHO (including the Global Malaria 
Programme, the HIV/AIDS Department and the Stop TB Department), the World Bank, the 
United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Office of the United States 
Global AIDS Coordinator) and the United States Agency for International Development, the 
President’s Malaria Initiative and MEASURE Evaluation. This collaborative effort means 
that the Global Fund’s selection of policies is based on “those used across organizations, 
promoting a common understanding of M&E within and among the three diseases and health 
systems strengthening as well as the use of a common set of indicators” (Global Fund, 2009, 
p. 5). 
 
Since this Third Edition (2009) Toolkit will be used to measure compliance of policies 
written before 2009, it is relevant to mention that the Third Edition does not differ 
dramatically from its earlier versions: “the third edition of the M&E toolkit does not 
introduce a new reporting framework but rather fine-tunes and enhances the second edition of 
the toolkit. The toolkit uses the same measurement framework as developed in the first two 
editions (published in June 2004 and January 2006)” (Global Fund, 2009, p.7). 
 
The Global Fund says that it supports existing national strategies of recipient countries, but it 
also emphasizes the fact that grant negotiation and management will occur “in a way that 
allows for optimal alignment with national processes while maintaining the principle of 
performance-based funding” (Global Fund, 2011, p. 126).  What this means it that while the 
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adequately reflects the Global Fund’s policy agenda. It is clearer that national strategies must 
be favourable for the joint assessment, which will only occur if the “national strategy is based 
on a sound situational and response analysis of the context (including political, social, 
cultural, gender, epidemiological, legal, and institutional determinants)” (Global Fund, 2011, 
p. 128). The national policy must also contain a “plan for monitoring and evaluation that 
includes clearly-described output and outcome/impact indicators, with related multi-year 
targets that can be used to measure progress and make performance based decisions” (Global 
Fund, 2011, p. 129). So, in other words, the Global Fund says that they will support locally 
devised programs and national strategies, but only if those national strategies are in line with 
their policy principles and involve their M&E indicator-based outcomes. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a significant amount of pressure placed on recipient 
countries to oblige to these Global Fund policies. 
 
While the Toolkit says it has 40 policies (25 UNGASS and 15 other) is actually contains 54 
policies if one also counts the sub-sections of policies which often refer to difference 
populations. For instance, under the policy on prevention, there are four sub-policies 
including injecting drug users, sex workers, men who have sex with men and youth. The 
Toolkit has a range of different policies on prevention, treatment, care and support, 
collaboration between TB and HIV, supportive environments, impacts and outcomes. Of 
these 54, many of the indicators are strictly epidemiological, such as Global Fund Indicator 
HIV-I1 “Young women and men aged 15–24 years who are HIV infected (percentage) (HIV-
I1)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 75). These were excluded from use in this study, because these 
indicators do not tell you anything about policy compliance or divergence, only about 
epidemiological realities. Indicators that were included had to do with a specific policy 
objective. For instance, Indicator HIV-O3, “Women and men aged 15–49 years who have had 
sexual intercourse with more than one partner in the last 12 months (percentage)” (Global 
Fund, 2009, p. 75) was included, because adherence to this suggests a policy focus on 
promoting faithfulness and deterring multiple concurrent partnerships. After careful review of 
the 54 indicators, 34 were selected for inclusion in this project’s framework. Therefore, the 
operationalization of Global Policy was narrowed down to mean 34 specific indicators from 
the Global Fund’s 2009 HIV M&E Toolkit. The table below lists all 34 policies selected for 
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Table 2.3: List of Global Fund Indicators Used to Measure Policy Compliance 






Global Fund M&E Indicator (2009) 
Prevention  
HIV-P1 
Young women and men aged 15–24 who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual 
transmission of HIV and who reject the major misconceptions about HIV transmission 
(percentage) 
HIV-P4a 
Most-at-risk populations reached with HIV prevention programs (percentage)  
injecting drug users 
HIV-P4a 
Most-at-risk populations reached with HIV prevention programs (percentage)  
men who have sex with men  
HIV-P4a 
Most-at-risk populations reached with HIV prevention programs (percentage)  
sex workers  
HIV-P4a 
Most-at-risk populations reached with HIV prevention programs (percentage)  
young people aged 10–24 years 
HIV-P5 Schools that provided life skills–based HIV education in the last academic year (percentage) 
HIV-P7 
Condoms available for distribution nationwide during the last 12 months (number)  
male condoms  
HIV-P7 
Condoms available for distribution nationwide during the last 12 months (number)  
female condoms  
HIV-P7 
Condoms available for distribution nationwide during the last 12 months (number)  
private sector  
HIV-P7 
Condoms available for distribution nationwide during the last 12 months (number)  
those distributed free of charge 
HIV-P8b 
People who received testing and counseling services for HIV and received their test results 
(number) Testing and Counceling for Women and Men (15-49) 
HIV-P8b 
People who received testing and counseling services for HIV and received their test results 
(number). Testing and Counceling for Most-at-risk populations 
HIV-P8b 
People who received testing and counseling services for  HIV and received their test results 
(number). Testing and Counceling for Young women and men aged 15–24 
HIV-P11 Pregnant women who were tested for HIV and who know their results (percentage) 
HIV-P12 
HIV-positive pregnant women who received antiretrovirals to reduce the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission (percentage) 
HIV-P13 
Infants born to HIV-infected women who receive an HIV test within 12 months of birth 
(percentage)  
HIV-P14 
Infants born to HIV-infected women starting on co-trimoxazole prophylaxis within 2 months of 
birth (percentage) 
HIV-P15 Health facilities with post-exposure prophylaxis available (percentage) 
HIV-P16 Cases of sexually transmitted infections treated (number) 
HIV-P17 Donated blood units screened for HIV in a quality assured manner (percentage) 
Treatment  
HIV-T1 
Adults and children with advanced HIV infection (currently) receiving antiretroviral therapy 
(percentage) 
HIV-T2 
Health facilities that offer antiretroviral therapy (prescribe and/or provide clinical follow-up) 
(percentage) 
HIV-T4 
Facilities providing antiretroviral therapy using CD4 monitoring in accordance with national 
guidelines or policies, on site or through referral (percentage) 










Page 43 of 210 
 
HIV-CS1 
Adults and children enrolled in HIV care and eligible for co-trimoxazole prophylaxis (according 
to national guidelines) currently receiving co-trimoxazole prophylaxis (number and percentage) 
HIV-CS2 
Adults and children living with HIV who receive care and support services outside facilities 
(number) 
HIV-CS3 
Orphaned and vulnerable children aged 0–17 years whose households received free basic external 
support in caring for the child (percentage) 
Collaborative Activities  
TB/HIV-1 
Adults and children enrolled in HIV care who had TB status assessed and recorded during their 
last visit among all adults and children enrolled in HIV care in the reporting period (number and 
percentage) 
Supportive Environment  
HIV-SE1 National Composite Policy Index 
HIV-SE2 Enterprises implementing an HIV workplace program (number and percentage) 
HIV-SE3 Municipalities with at least one human rights network functioning (number and percentage) 
Outcome Indicators  
HIV-O1 
Young women and men aged 15–24 years who have had sexual intercourse before the age of 15 
years (percentage) 
HIV-O3 
Women and men aged 15–49 years who have had sexual intercourse with more than one partner 
in the last 12 months (percentage)  
HIV-O8 
Injecting drug users reporting the use of sterile injecting equipment the last time they injected 
(percentage) 
HIV-O9 Current school attendance among orphans and among non-orphans (percentage) 
 
Based on these 34 indicators, a number of clarifying points need to be made. First, the 
categories for the indicators are those listed in the Global Fund Toolkit; I did not change or 
reorganize indicator names, categories or codes. The reason for this was to make this 
methodology more straightforward for other researchers to use in future. The Global Fund’s 
headings such as “Collaborate Activities” or “Outcome Indicators” are not very clear, but by 
way of Table 2.3 I aim to be transparent about which specific indicators they contain. Third, 
compliance with these indicators was measured strictly by adherence as stated in national 
policies, not on implementation or on any other factor. Ideally, measuring roll-out of policies 
would provide a better picture of policy compliance, but that is beyond the scope of this 
study. Fourth, I made a number of logical inferences about how certain indicators speak to 
policies and policy objectives. For instance, indicator HIV-PI4 logically suggests that testing 
for infants who are born to HIV positive mothers is a policy priority of the Global Fund. 
Some indicators are a little less intuitive; indicator HIV-O1 is taken to mean that abstinence 
is an encouraged area of policy focus, just as indicator HIV-O3 suggests partner reduction or 
faithfulness as policy proprieties. The benchmarks for compliance are detailed in the 
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Measuring Policy Compliance, Divergence and Change 
 
I measure policy compliance, divergence and change by looking at 
how similar National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plans are to the Global 
Fund policies. Since I want to measure donor influence on African 
governments, National Strategic Plans were chosen as data sources 
for the dependent variable because they are published by the 
National AIDS Commission of each country, which is a government 
body sometimes housed under the office of the President or Prime 
Minister.  
 
I then use an ordinal rank-order scale to measure compliance. Put 
simply, each policy indicator receives a 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. A ranking of 
“0” means that the National Strategic Plan does not, in my 
judgement, comply with the Global Fund policy at all. If the 
indicator receives a “1”, it means that the National Strategic Plan 
promotes the Global Fund policy just a little. A ranking value of “2” 
means the Global Fund policy is followed to a moderate degree. A ranking of “3” denotes 
that the Global Fund policy has been adhered to quite a lot. Lastly, the highest indicator code 
– a “4” – represents indicators that comply with Global Fund policy very heavily (Table 2.4). 
 
In order to minimize the subjective element of this scale, I employ a systematic set of 
decisive rules, and define them here to promote transparency. This is critical to enable future 
researchers to replicate or expand this research.  
 
The lowest ranking – 0 – is the most straightforward. There are two instances in which an 
policy can receive this value. First, if there is no mention of the Global Fund policy, a 0 is 
clearly appropriate (Table 2.5). The second instance is when the country’s policy states that it 
does not follow international policy protocol. This is sometimes the case for policies 





Q: To what degree does 
the National Strategic 















Table 2.4: Scale for 
Measuring 
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Global Fund Policy 
 
NAMIBIA HIV Medium 
Term Plan II (1999-
2004) 




Women and men 
aged 15–49 years 
who have had sexual 
intercourse with more 
than one partner in 
the last 12 months 
n/a 0 
This indicator 
receives a 0 because 
the NSP does not 
mention the global 
policy at all.  
 
In order to receive a 1, the indicator must only be mentioned once, or twice, and must not 
contain age brackets, time lines or other data to go with it. If any one of those three is 
included, the country received a ranking of 2. An example of a ranking of 1 can be seen in 
Swaziland’s first National Strategic Plan (2000-2005) under indicator HIV-O3, Multiple 
Partners. The Global Fund policy stipulates inclusion of “Women and men aged 15–49 years 
who have had sexual intercourse with more than one partner in the last 12 months” (Global 
Fund, 2009, p. 75). A little bit in line with this, Swaziland’s NSP policy says it will 
“Strengthen advocacy on [...] fidelity” (Swaziland HIV/AIDS Crisis Management and 
Technical Committee, 2000, p. 26). The value explanation here is clear; there is a mention of 
the policy, but no age bracket, no time-line and no data on how many people this speaks to in 
the country. This is important since many of the Global Fund policies express the need for 
age brackets, timelines and baseline data, which are later used for M&E purposes. Table 2.6 
is an example of how a 1 ranking was coded.  












Women and men aged 15–
49 years who have had 
sexual intercourse with 
more than one partner in 
the last 12 months 
"Strengthen 
advocacy on [...] 
fidelity" (Page 26).  
1 
This indicator receives a 1 
because there is a little 
mention of the global policy 
(once) but the age bracket, 
time-line and supporting data 
are absent.  
 
A policy receives a 2 if that policy is mentioned once or twice and has an age bracket but no 
time-line or data. It also receives a 2 if a policy is mentioned more heavily (mentioned many 
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characteristics. A 2 may also indicate that the National Strategic Plan mentions the Global 
Fund policy once or twice and provides an age bracket, but not in the same way as the Global 
Fund. The broad nature of this ranking means it could be described as a default ranking 
between what I know is a 1, and what I know is a 3. Between these two definitions, large 
variation among the 2s necessarily exists. As you can see below in Table 2.7, the local policy 
is clearly more compliant with the global policy than the example in Table 2.6, but there are 
still a number of significant components missing, such as the age bracket, the time window 
and supporting data.   






National Policy on HIV/AIDS for 
Zimbabwe 1999 












partner in the 
last 12 months 
"Promote sexual and family 
responsibility by integrating it into all 
programmes, particularly those 
targeting men and adolescent boys. 
Discuss consequences of multiple 
sexual partnerships and high-risk sexual 
behaviour" (Page 29). And "Educate 
individuals to refrain from high-risk 
behaviour such as multiple partners, 
unprotected sex, alcohol and drug 
abuse" (Page 30).  
2 
This indicator receives a 
2 because the policy 
does mention the idea 
of the policy to a 
moderate degree, but 
there is no age bracket 
or time window and no 
data to support the 
policy.  
 
A country’s policy receives a 3 if it contains the language of the Global Fund policy, but is 
missing just one element of data. The missing data can range from neglecting to include an 
age bracket, neglecting to include outcome data, or omitting the time frame that should be 
specified. For example, a lot of the Global Fund policies require that a policy target youth 
(15-24) or children (0-17) or the general population (15-49). Additionally, some Global Fund 
policies specify outcome data, such as the percentage or number of people reached with an 
intervention. Lastly, timeframe data is often expressed by the Global Fund policy, wanting 
the policy to reflect the last 12 months. If any one of these three is missing, or augmented, the 
indicator will receive a 3 (instead of a 4). In some instances, indicators show an expanded age 
bracket or timeframe that is larger or smaller than the Global Fund policy.  
The example below (Table 2.8) shows how a 3 is assigned to an indicator which matched the 
policy language, provides the time frame and the supporting data, but is missing only one 
element. In this case, the indicator received a 3 and not a 4 because the age bracket was 
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Global Fund Policy 
Lesotho National HIV 
Strategic Plan (2000-2003) 




Women and men aged 
15–49 years who have 
had sexual intercourse 
with more than one 
partner in the last 12 
months 
"To reduce the percentage of 
young men and women who 
have had two or more sexual 
partners in the last 12 months 
to 20% by 2011 among men, 
and to 15% by 2011 among 
women" (Page 51-52).  
3 
This indicator receives 
a 3 since the strategy 
does promote the 
policy quite a lot, but 
there is no age bracket 
specified.   
 
A score of 4 is given when African policies have the Global Fund policy language, along 
with all of the age, time and data components. If any one of these is missing, it is a 3 and not 
a 4. Below is an example of a 4 value, where the policy language is there, along with the age 
bracket, time frame and supporting performance data.  
 




Global Fund Policy 
 
Zambia National HIV 
Strategic Framework               
(2011-2015) 




Women and men aged 
15–49 years who have 
had sexual intercourse 
with more than one 
partner in the last 12 
months 
"Percentage of adults 
aged 15–49 years who 
had more than one sexual 
partner in the past 12 
months" at Male: 19.7% 
and Female: 1.6% at 
baseline 2007 (Page 68).  
4 
This indicator gets a 4 since 
the global policy is 
emphasized very heavily; 
there is an age bracket, a 
time frame and supporting 
data to go with it.  
 
I should note that there were minor exceptions made to this rule for policies that came out 
before the first Global Fund M&E framework in 2004. That is to say that when analyzing a 
policy from the 1990s, if multiple partnerships were emphasized very heavily in language, 
they could still potentially be awarded a 4 (since there is no way they could match a global 
policy perfectly that had yet to be written). In the example below (Table 2.10), the indicator 
was given a 4 even though there was no age bracket specified. This is because this policy 
came out in Botswana before the Global Fund M&E Toolkit was written, and before the 
UNAIDS Declaration of Commitment (where the global indicator comes from). For this 
reason, Botswana is clearly quite in line with global policy to have all of the elements of the 
policy, including language time frame and performance data, even before global policy from 
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men aged 15–49 
years who have 
had sexual 
intercourse with 
more than one 
partner in the 
last 12 months 
“Several factors are thought to have 
contributed to the rapid spread of HIV in 
Botswana. Among them are [...] sexual 
behaviour patterns which include having 
multiple partners" (Page 2). Additionally, "40 
to 50% of interviewed young men reported 
having had more than one sexual partner in 
the previous 12 months, and multi-partner 
behaviour among males was significantly 
more frequent than among females" (Page 2).  
4 
This indicator 








data for it. 
 
In sum, I have set clear guidelines for assigning ranks to how compliant a country’s policy is 
with the Global Fund Toolkit. This ranking method can easily be replicated to a reasonable 
degree of consistency by other researchers, either in the same study population or in another.  
 
National Strategic Plans 
 
With the dependent variable defined (the 34 indicators selected from the Third Edition 
[February 2009] of the Global Fund HIV Monitoring and Evaluation Toolkit), and the 
measurement of policy compliance clearly delineated, the next methodological step is 
deciding which policies to analyze. According to King, Keohane and Verba, disciplined 
qualitative researchers carefully attempt to analyze concrete documents such as constitutions, 
laws and policies, rather than merely reporting what observers say about them (King, 
Keohane & Verba, 1994, p.44). For this reason, this dissertation will rely heavily on a first-
hand primary document evaluation of formal written government policy, rather than using 
secondary sources which assess policy. All civil society policy or policy designed by other 
government branches (other than the National AIDS Councils), were excluded from 
consideration. This means that only National Strategic Plans, Frameworks, or Policies that 
come from the federal government’s National AIDS Councils were measured.  
 
It is important to recognize the importance of who actually writes national policies and 
strategic plans on HIV. In many cases, foreign consultants are hired to do the majority of the 
writing and funding partners are called in to review parts or all of the policy. For instance, in 
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acknowledged as the lead strategic planning consultant hired by the Botswana National AIDS 
Coordinating Agency. In addition, partners such as PSI and PEPFAR are credited with 
making key contributions to drafts. In Swaziland’s National Strategic Framework for HIV 
and AIDS (2009-2014) the lead consultant writing the document was Simon Muchiru, and the 
World Bank is credited with conducting the final edit. Namibia’s National HIV Strategic 
Framework (2010-2015) is the only policy in this study that gives credit the Global Fund for 
financial and technical support in its acknowledgments. While some countries are transparent 
in their NSPs about who wrote and contributed to them, others are not. This is true of the 
most recent NSPs from Malawi and Lesotho where no names are listed. While the National 
Strategic Plans are ultimately owned by the National AIDS Councils – a government body – 
it is important to recognize the various influences that come into play during the writing 
process. For the most part, the design of a National Strategic Plan is government led and 
highly consultative (Namibia’s most recent NSP indicates that approximately 6000 people 
deserve credit for contributing to the policy), so individual influence from the personal 
viewpoints of hired consultants or the advocacy agendas of other contributors tend to be 
limited. However, it is still a relevant factor, and one that will be included in the analysis later 
in this thesis.    
 
Measuring Policy Changes 
 
Next, in order to show change, or an observable trend, at least three points in time needed to 
be analyzed. Governments release new National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plans every five or six 
years. To measure change, I selected three National Strategic Plans
11
 from each country. The 
process of measuring policies against the 34 indicators in Appendix C, using the 5-point scale 
in Table 2.2, was carried out for two successive national policies before the 2008, when I argue 
the new global politics of HIV/AIDS roughly began, and one after. These points in time will 
henceforth be described as T1 (before 2003), T2 (between 2003 and 2008) and T3 (after 2008).  
 
Looking at change between two policies before this event helps to control for policy changes 
that might have been occurring anyway. For instance, it would be wrong to suggest that the 
global HIV/AIDS politics in 2008 caused African policy divergence if that country had been 
slowly moving away from global policy for a decade before. Put differently, to conclude that 
the new global politics of HIV/AIDS had an effect on policy in Zimbabwe would not be 
                                                          
11
 In the absence of available National Strategic Plans (some countries do not yet have 3 that satisfy the time 
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accurate unless Zimbabwe actually conformed to Global Fund policy until 2008, after which it 
began to diverge. Therefore, in order to confirm the hypothesis of this project (that policy-
making agendas of global donors and institutions exert less influence over domestic 
HIV/AIDS policies post-2008), countries will have to become increasingly compliant, or 
remain constant, with global policy from T1 to T2, then move away from T2 to T3. 
Otherwise, the hypothesis will be rejected.  
 
Most National Strategic Plans are available online, with some coming directly from the 
National AIDS Councils if they were not yet available or not publicly posted. A complete list of 




This process outlined above describes how I answer my first question asked in this project. 
But, I also ask: what political and economic factors make a country more or less likely to 
follow or move away from international protocol? In order to answer this second question, I 
collect data for two specific sets of explanatory variables – structural economic variables and 
institutional political variables. These two sets of variables are then plotted against policy 
compliance data to test for any significant relationships between them. A complete list of 
variables examined can be found in Appendix E.  
 
My rationale for selecting these specific kinds of variables to test the causes of HIV/AIDS 
policy is based on a body of literature that debates the relationships among these factors. To 
further explain the selection of these explanatory variables, I will give a brief overview of the 
literature which discusses the effects of economic and political factors on HIV/AIDS and 
HIV/AIDS policy-making, followed by the literature which debates the impact of different 
policies on epidemiological outcomes.  
 
Structural Economic Variables 
 
The first set of variables that I examine largely has to do with a country’s economic situation. 
These include indicators of overall wealth (such as gross national product per capita, gross 
domestic product per capita, government revenue, etc.) and spending or budgetary patterns 
(such as resource allocations for health and donor funding). There is a tradition in AIDS 
literature of testing the connection between economic factors and the variation among 










Page 51 of 210 
 
One frequently tested economic variable is the way which donor aid affects HIV policy-
making. James Putzel (2004) posits that donor dependency is a highly significant economic 
variable which affects how countries respond politically to HIV. He suggests that donor 
pressure to establish National AIDS Councils compromised the effectiveness of previous 
state-led responses. Similarly, Jacob Bor (2007), who examines economic explanations for 
HIV policy-making, finds that official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) was the most significant economic variable for explaining 
trends in the 2003 AIDS Programme Effort Index. The way in which donor aid impacts 
HIV/AIDS policy-making has also been explored by Suzette Heald (2006, p. 6), who points 
out that the change in policy in Botswana from the mid-1980s to the late1990s was largely a 
result of “all the major donors pull[ing] out after 1995, on the grounds that the relative wealth 
of Botswana allowed it to underwrite its own programmes.” Per Strand (2007) also suggests 
that donor dependency is a logical economic variable which may help explain governance 
responses to HIV in Africa. Parkhurst and Lush (2004) also find that dependency on donors 
may be a factor which affects the way in which HIV/AIDS policy is developed. They seek to 
explain the differing HIV/AIDS policy responses in Uganda and South Africa, arguing that 
weaker ties with the international donor community allowed the South African government 
more control in the development of HIV prevention policy.  
 
In addition to donor aid, other economic factors such as GDP, foreign direct investment and 
government expenditure have also been shown by Bor (2007) to be significant predictors of 
how a country will devise HIV policy responses. Nicoli Natrass (2006) also finds that per 
capita income is a significant predictor of political commitment, particularly with respect to 
treatment policies. Strand (2007), too, indicates that the availability of resources, particularly 
resource constraints in Southern Africa, are logical predictors of AIDS governance decisions.  
 
Along with wealth in general, the distribution of wealth has also been posited as a relevant 
economic variable which can help to explain HIV policy decisions. Bor (2007) finds that 
income inequality (as measured by gini coefficients) stands out as one of the stronger 
determinants of political commitment to HIV. He says that the “Distribution of economic 
resources is linked to the distribution of political resources, and thus to policy outcomes” 
(Bor, 2007, p. 1592). Similarly, Nattrass (2006) also examines whether income inequality is 
related to political commitment to treatment policies, though she finds that it is not 
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Epstein (2007) notes how economic factors play a role in the efficacy of fidelity policies. She 
says that Uganda’s fertile land and farming economy means that people are more likely to 
live with their families than those in South Africa, where the mining industry leads to 
fractured families where men work far from their wives and the family homestead. She calls 
this the “social cohesion” factor where economic (and political and historical) factors are 
linked with government policy choice. Epstein (2007, p. 198) also suggests that levels of 
economic underdevelopment in Africa also affect the degree to which countries policies may 
pander to global donor policies: 
 
 
Now that AIDS is a multibillion-dollar enterprise, donors with vast budgets and highly 
articulate consultants offer health departments in impoverished developing countries a set 
menu of HIV prevention programs, which consists of either abstinence education or condom 
social marketing or HIV testing and other services. Beleaguered health officials have no time, 
money, or will to devise programs that might better suit their cultures. 
 
 
Another perspective on the connection between economic drivers and the choices a country 
makes in terms of its HIV/AIDS policy is offered by Anthony Butler. Looking to explain 
South African AIDS policy, Butler (2005, p. 607) argues that South Africa’s early HIV/AIDS 
policies, which he calls a “cautious approach”, can be partially explained by the 
government’s economic calculations of the costs of scaling up their policies.  
 
It is clear that there is rich scholarship of tracing the pathways between the economic 
development of a country and its HIV/AIDS epidemic and/or the nature of the policy 
response. Using this work as a platform, this project extends the nature of the debate to test 
whether indicators of a country’s economic situation can predict whether it will align its 
national strategic plan with Global Fund policies.  
 
Institutional Political Variables 
 
The second set of variables that might help to explain trends in HIV/AIDS policy trends are 
political variables. As with economic variables, many other scholars have demonstrated the 
relationship between governance variables and HIV/AIDS policy-making. Alex de Waal 
(2003, p. 255) says that “the AIDS industry is a prisoner of political circumstance”, arguing 
that power dynamics among political actors largely dictate which policies gain legitimacy and 
when. Similarly, Suzette Heald (2006) delineates three distinct ‘phases’ in Botswana’s 
HIV/AIDS policy over time, which evolved in large part due to institutional factors such as 
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Anatole S. Menon-Johansson (2005) suggests that stability in a political regime is linked with 
the kinds of HIV/AIDS policies in the country. He points to Cuba as an example of a country 
that was one of the first in the Americas to launch policies around care and support for those 
living with HIV, attributing this to the strong political commitment to health by the 
government. He contrasts this with Haiti, where he indicates that political instability along 
with other governance factors are related to a lacking health policy response. Allen and Heald 
(2004) also assert that political stability is related to HIV/AIDS policy-making tendencies. In 
comparing HIV/AIDS policies from Uganda and Botswana, they argue that political upheaval 
in the former versus decades of stable governance in the latter contributed to which policies 
prevailed and how well they worked. Contrary to those arguments, Bor (2007) findings show 
that political stability (as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators) has a very low 
and statistically insignificant correlation with HIV policy-making.      
 
Others debate what kinds of governance regimes produce the best HIV/AIDS policies. 
Kondwani Chirambo (2008) suggests that authoritarian regimes, or those that are nominally 
democratic, tend to demonstrate better responses to HIV/AIDS epidemics. In agreement, 
there are also those who indicate how democracies are not necessarily effective HIV/AIDS 
policy-makers especially if they are fledgling regimes. Wouters et al. (2010) show how the 
slow development of program infrastructure, along with inexperienced new public officials 
can render younger democracies as ineffective HIV/AIDS policy-makers. These sentiments 
are echoed by Schneider and Stein (2001), Ngwena and Van Rensburg (2002), Butler (2005) 
and Pelser et al. (2004). Strand (2007) also makes the argument that the type of governance 
model is a key explanatory variable for understanding differing AIDS policy responses in 
Africa. He looks at three types of AIDS governance he posits to be the most important factors 
in shaping the HIV policy response, two democratic (idealistic, authoritative) and one non-
democratic (authoritarian). Lastly, Parkhurst and Lush (2004) indicate that institutional 
variables such as the existing bureaucratic system and health care infrastructure help to 
explain the differing HIV/AIDS policy responses in Uganda and South Africa.     
 
Also testing how governance models affect HIV/AIDS policy making is Kim Yi Dionne 
(2011). She argues that the leaders’ expected length of time in office is a relevant variable 
that helps to explain which countries have more comprehensive HIV/AIDS policies than 
others. According to Dionne, leaders with shorter time horizons have more comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS policies than those with longer foreseeable years in office. This is connected to 
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logically to believe democratic regimes to have shorter time horizons for leaders than 
authoritarian ones. It is also related to political incentives, which others have shown to be a 
relevant explanatory factor in HIV policy decisions. Evan Lieberman (2009) says the desire 
for political survival has often led to less comprehensive HIV policy responses. He says 
governments introduce policies on sex, sexuality and drugs at their peril, as there is likelihood 
that many of their constituents will not like the messages received, and therefore dislike the 
messenger. Putzel (2004) agrees that political incentives matter. He suggests that more 
comprehensive HIV policy responses are more likely where taking political action on AIDS 
is a positive-sum game, where action is less costly than inaction.  
 
Variation in political histories has also been examined to try and explain differing HIV/AIDS 
policies. Baldwin (2005) argues that path dependency is an important factor, suggesting that 
the best predictor of how a country will respond to HIV/AIDS is to look at the way it 
responded to previous infectious diseases, such as syphilis. Also examining political histories, 
Parkhurst and Lush (2004) find that the way in which a country experiences a liberation 
struggle and transitions to democracy leads to important distinction in its HIV/AIDS policy 
implementation structures.  
  
Another study that is related to types of government was done by Bor (2007), where he finds 
press freedom to be one of his most significant predictors of good HIV political responses. 
Press freedom may also be logically associated with more democratic systems of 
government.     
 
In addition to those who argue democracies are better policy-making regimes, and those who 
argue that authoritarian systems are, Amy Patterson (2006) argues that variables in state 
governance and their HIV/AIDS policies show no clear connection – one way or the other – 
at all. She recognizes that the effectiveness of states varies greatly across the Africa 
continent, saying that “the development of multiparty elections, legislatures, judiciaries, and 
sub-national governments has had an uneven impact on state actions on AIDS. The 
underdevelopment of these institutions has facilitated inconsistent representation and 
accountability in AIDS policymaking in Africa’s new democracies” (Patterson, 2006, p. 21). 
However, after examining the potential connection between governance variables and 
HIV/AIDS policies in studies of Zimbabwe, Uganda, Swaziland and South Africa, Patterson 
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In terms of governance models, there has also been a significant body of work done looking 
into how political decentralization affects HIV responses (Blaauw et al., 2003; Coovadia, 
Jewkes, Barron, Sanders, & McIntyre, 2009; Lieberman, 2011; McIntyre & Klugman, 2003; 
Schneider, Blaauw, Gilson, Chabikuli, & Goudge, 2006; Schneider, Coetzee, Dingie, and 
Gilson, 2010). These authors suggest that issues of coordination, as well as the rise of non-
state service providers in this context play a role in how HIV policy is designed and 
implemented.    
 
Others have looked at more nuanced governance factors, delving deeper than testing the 
relationship between democracy and AIDS. UNAIDS and the International AIDS Society 
have a ‘Thinking Politically about HIV’ mantra aimed at better understanding the political 
circumstances that affect HIV policy and health outcomes. Under the auspices of this 
initiative, Lieberman’s (2011) research in South Africa shows that the personal views of 
those in power are a stronger driver in favor of one policy over another, than are the 
epidemiological realities of their constituents. This seems to suggest that politics is much 
more important than epidemiology in determining AIDS policies, and that the previous 
slogan from UNAIDS to ‘know your epidemic, know your response’ is not really the way 
policy-making works. The political factors that guide the HIV response are also emphasized 
by Altman and Buse (2012), who argue that we need better political scaffolding of how 
governance factors are related to HIV/AIDS. 
 
Lieberman (2009) also further unpacks concepts of political variables and how they may help 
to explain variation among HIV policies. He says says that political and social boundaries 
that divide groups have impacted HIV policy-making; if a country has strong boundaries that 
divide people, the epidemic is understood in ethnic terms, which creates a certain kind of 
policy response. Lieberman also indicates that culture is an important variable to examine.   
 
Both the lack of consensus and the call from others to further develop the understanding of 
this structural variable strongly justify the need to continue testing the extent to which 
political variants can help explain or predict different HIV/AIDS policy responses and 
infection rate outcomes. In addition, in the past, others have made connections between 
governance and HIV prevalence, but very little evidence exists for a connection between 
governance and HIV policy-making (Menon-Johansson, 2005; Chirambo, 2008; Patterson, 
2006). This is further rationale for selecting political institutional variables as an explanatory 
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Epidemiological Trends  
 
While impact of policy on infection rates is not one of my main questions, it is still an 
important implication of this research which deserves a brief literature review. Though I 
cannot conclusively show that policy compliance is connected to epidemiological changes, I 
do provide intriguing initial tentative evidence in Chapter 7 that aims to inspire future 
research. For this reason, it is necessary to provide literary background for this implication.   
 
There is a vast literature which debates which policies have, or have had, greater impact on 
reducing the HIV prevalence and/or incidence, with little conclusive evidence. HIV 
prevalence in the general population is a measure of the estimated number of people (15-49) 
living with HIV divided by the adult population of that year. HIV incidence in the general 
population is a measure of the estimated number of people (15-49) newly infected with HIV 
in that year, divided by the adult population of that year (UNAIDS, 2010). Often, this data is 
collected from women attending antenatal clinics (UNAIDS, 2013). In measuring the impact 
of policy on HIV prevalence and incidence, there is also uncertainty about what kind of time 
lags to include. In other words, how long does it take for a new policy to start having an 
impact on infection rates? The debate around how to measure policy impact and the 
importance of accounting for time lags is discussed in Chapter 7. Here, I will present a brief 
literature review on those who have previously measured the impact of HIV policy on 
epidemiological trends to demonstrate why it was important to include a discussion around 
policy’s relationship with HIV infection rates in this thesis.       
 
Ades et al. (1999) investigated the connection between HIV prevalence rates and the policy 
on HIV screening in pregnant women. While they concluded that there is no link, their work 
provides a basis for further investigation in the possible links between epidemiological trends 
and corresponding HIV/AIDS policies. However, most studies examine the causality in the 
opposite way. Instead of testing how epidemiological factors affect policy, most work looks 
at how certain policies affect infection rates. Many of studies have attempted to draw 
connections between the emphasis of certain HIV/AIDS policies and the subsequent (or 
simultaneous) changes in incidence or prevalence rates. Asiimwe-Okiror et al. (1997) 
strongly indicate that the declining rates of prevalence in HIV in Uganda in the mid-1990s 
correspond to policies for an increase in condom use, especially among young people. The 
same conclusion was reached by Ahmed et al. (2001) in a study conducted in Rakai district of 
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infection rates and that the implication for policy is clear: “Programs must emphasize 
consistent condom use for HIV and STD prevention” (Ahmed et al., 2001, p. 2171). Cohen 
and Tate (2005) also firmly argue that condom promotion is a far superior policy than 
abstinence or delayed first sex programs in Uganda.  
 
On the other side of the debate about how policy affects epidemiological outcomes are those 
that think policies on partner reduction are much more efficacious than condom promotion. 
While Halperin et al. (2011) recognize that Thailand’s 100 percent condom policy was the 
main driver responsible for that country’s success in combating the spread of HIV, they also 
strongly believe that these kinds of policies would likely prove less effective in the more 
generalized epidemics of Southern Africa. Similar arguments have been made by Feder and 
Kerrison (1992), who feel condom promotion is not an effective policy for combating HIV 
since condoms are not one hundred per cent effective, and giving them out implies that you 
can do whatever you want so long as you use one. Even Dr. Malcolm Potts, one of the 
inventors of the lubricated condom, has said that advising a person who engages in high-risk 
behaviour to use a condom “is like telling someone who is driving drunk to use a seat belt” 
(Feder & Kerrison, 1992, p. 126).  
 
Low-Beer and Stoneburner (2004) are chief among those in the camp that find partner 
reduction to be a much more effective policy than condoms for reducing HIV infection rates. 
Contrary to the findings of Asiimwe-Okiror et al. (1997) and Ahmed et al. (2001), they find 
that that partner reduction, and the ‘Zero Grazing’ policy was responsible for this 
epidemiological change in Uganda. Epstein (2007) also makes this argument, faulting those 
who believe condoms policies were responsible for the prevalence decline, since the 
timelines of policy and epidemiological effects do not line up, according to the time-lags 
employed. Timberg and Halperin (2012) concur, citing arguments that support the idea that 
partner reduction in Uganda was equivalent to a social vaccine of around 80 per cent efficacy. 
 
The debate about the effects on policy of infection rates goes beyond the condoms vs. partner 
reduction dispute in Uganda. Halperin et al. (2011) draw a direct connection between 
Zimbabwe’s prevention policies helping achieve the country’s 13 per cent decline in HIV 
prevalence. Specifically, they note that the Zimbabwean government’s early emphasis on a 
policy for home-based care accelerated behavior change which helped curb the epidemic. The 
logic behind this contention is that if people see relatives and loved ones die at home, they are 
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(Low-Beer & Stoneburner, 2004). Informed by these conflicting contentions, the objective of 
this project is to contribute towards the debate about which policies are more effective in 
combating HIV prevalence. However, most research focuses on one policy or intervention to 
demonstrate efficacy. More narrowly still, the bulk of the research on policy efficacy is on 
what happened in Uganda (Hogle, 2002; Parkhurst, 2005; Green, 1988). Despite this narrow 
focus of the research, there is a large consensus that locally devised policies (as opposed to 
those coming from Washington and Geneva) are more effective, yet there is very little 
scientific mapping that examines this mainstream idea. As such, the contribution of this 
study’s systematic policy data analysis to the debate on how HIV/AIDS policy affects disease 




To complement and inform the quantitative data on the degree to which countries comply 
with or diverge from Global Fund Policy, I conducted 82 key informant interviews. 
Interviews were conducted in person in Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as with the Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva, 
Switzerland. In each of the African countries, interviews were conducted with key informants 
who sit on the respective Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCM) for the Global Fund, as 
well as some other key stakeholders such as Global Fund principal and sub-recipients.  
 
CCMs vary in size, with 19 members in Botswana, 23 in Malawi and Namibia, 29 in Zambia, 
37 in Swaziland and 40 in Zimbabwe. The South African CCM is currently not functional as 
it is undergoing a re-structuring. These members are mandated by the Global Fund to be 
representative, and must include members from local civil society, government, international 
NGOs, multi-lateral and bi-lateral organizations, the private sector and key affected 
populations. They are elected by their various constituencies and meet four times a year 
(usually) to review proposals from in-country applicants for Global Fund grants. CCM 
members were selected as key informants, since they have the closest first-hand experience 
with the way Global Fund policies operate in terms of granting funding, steering discussion 
and affecting local HIV policy. I selected a cross section of CCM representation, too, so that I 
could compare the perceptions of each interest group (civil society, government, international 
institutions, etc.). The interviews were very semi-structured, with a few guiding questions to 
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 How influential is the Global Fund in your policy-making process? 
 Do you think the Global Fund’s policies are effective? 
 How would you describe civil society strength in your country? 
 How would you describe the leadership of the Government in the HIV/AIDS response? 
 Do you think the wealth of your country plays a role in the kinds of HIV/AIDS policies that 
are developed?   
 Who writes your National Strategic Plans (government, consultants, etc.)? 
 In the past five years, with donor retreat, do you feel more or less freedom to create locally 
informed HIV/AIDS policy?  
 What do you think will happen as a result of the New Funding Mechanism of the Global 
Fund? Will this result in more or less local-decision making? 
 
Interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and transcribed at a later date. Verbal 
consent was requested at the beginning of the interview, and signed formal consent was given 
after the meeting. This was so ensure that informants had two opportunities - one before and 
one after - to opt out of having their insights used in the dissertation.  A list of all the key 
informants can be found in Appendix G. 
  
Reliability and Validity of Data 
 
The research methodology employed here is based on King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) 
Designing Social Inquiry. In their book, they make a case for how studies of a relatively 
small number of cases can be designed in such a way so that principals of scientific inference 
are met. In other words, research questions about a small number of cases, such as the one I 
ask in this project, can achieve the same scientific standard as more quantitative research if 
statistical logic is applied to qualitative problems. While applying an ordinal scale of 
evaluation helps to increase the precision of my measurement and robustness of my 




Even though each value has a relatively strict set of criteria, it is still a somewhat subjective 
measurement upon which this project rests quite heavily. In order to combat this limitation, 
two mitigating tactics were employed. Firstly, King, Keohane and Verba recommend to 
“check reliability ourselves by measuring the same quantity twice and seeing whether the 
measures are the same” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p.25). In order to judge the 
reliability of my coding, I followed King, Keohane and Verba’s advice and repeated the 
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was repeated 6 months later in April 2012. Any discrepancy between the two rounds of 
coding was then reconciled and reflected in the final values. This reliability rate was higher 
than 90%. In addition, I  also utilized multi-coder reliability tests for one policy. The National 
Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS Response in Namibia (2010/11 – 2015/16) was also 
coded by an academic peer. The result yielded a reliability coefficient of 85 per cent, which is 
deemed acceptable (Krippendorff, 1980; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 
1998). 
 
Limitations of Correlation Analysis 
 
In this project, I use scatterplots and bivariate correlations as my principal method to test for 
relationships between variables. Linear correlation is limited in that it cannot reflect certain 
non-linear dependencies that undoubtedly exist between many variables in the real world 
(Blyth, 1996; Shaw, 1997). For instance, perhaps HIV/AIDS policy compliance and wealth 
do not correlate in a linear fashion, but rather that there is a wealth threshold that a county has 
to reach before it is able to exercise freedom over its domestic policies. A linear r value tends 
to obscure this relationship. As such, it is important to recognize this limitation in linear 
correlations (Embrechts, McNeil & Straumann, 1999). However, it is a standard to test for 
linear relationships unless there is a good theoretical reason to look for a non-linear 
relationship. Quite often, this occurs in follow-up studies that build upon the initial studies 




UNAIDS data is collected based on guidelines in the UNAIDS Estimation and Projection 
Package (EPP). This package helps with the estimation and short-term projection of the HIV 
epidemic. The trouble with this is there have been five versions of the EPP (2001, 2003, 
2005, 2007 and 2009), with each subsequent version adapting its data collection methodology 
based on previous experience (Brown et al., 2007). As a result of these frequent adjustments 
to the way HIV prevalence is estimated, it is understood that early prevalence data, especially 
in Africa, were likely to be gross over-estimates (Cameron, 2005; Epstein, 2007). Some 
suggest prevalence estimates were twice as high as the reality of the epidemic. As such, it is 
difficult to make a logical case for comparing UNAIDS prevalence data from 2001, with data 










Page 61 of 210 
 
Another very relevant factor to consider when comparing earlier estimates of incidence and 
prevalence data is the introduction of ARVs. Along with using different EPPs, ARVs also 
likely had a large impact on changes in infection rates. The availability of anti-retroviral 
treatment in a country means that more people with HIV will be able to live much longer and 
healthier lives. This can influence HIV prevalence levels since prevalence is calculated as the 
number of people living with HIV divided by the total population. With treatment, the 
numerator becomes larger than it otherwise would be, as people living with HIV do not fall 
sick or die. The advent of ARV treatment also has an effect on HIV incidence. When an HIV 
positive person is on treatment, they are much less infectious as their viral load is supressed, 
often to undetectable levels. This means that those on treatment are less likely to pass HIV to 
their partners. In addition, using ARVs for post-exposure prophylaxis can also prevent new 
infections. Therefore, the availability of ARVs likely contributed to changes in incidence and 
prevalence rates in a very significant way, which is worthy of consideration when analysing 
epidemiological trends.   
A third limitation with UNAIDS data is that the EPPs are designed to work for all epidemics 
across the globe. There are data reliability issues with this, especially in four types of 
epidemics where country data does not fit well with the EPP: (1) countries where prevalence 
falls to zero in the near future; (2) countries which show a steep decline in prevalence, 
followed by a levelling off; (3) countries with a long and steady decline in prevalence; and 
(4) countries with prevalence rates that steadily rise for many years on end (Brown et al., 
2007).  
Fourthly, this model is somewhat unreliable because it assumes all parameters are constant 
over time. In other words, things like behavior change are not adequately accounted for in 
UNAIDS’ data collection model (Brown et al., 2007).  
Fifthly, independent of the UNAIDS EPP method, the very availability of data that UNAIDS 
has to work with in order to generate these numbers is often very problematic. In many cases, 
data for generalized epidemics is extrapolated from surveillance data on pregnant women, 
collected from antenatal clinics. This clearly entails a number of assumptions which further 
cloud the reliability of UNAIDS epidemiological data. For instance, testing pregnant women 
means you are starting with a sample population that is having unprotected sex. This means 
measurements of prevalence are taken from a high-risk group, which might inflate the 
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In addition to the reliability of HIV prevalence rates, there are also limitations with HIV 
incidence data, too. UNAIDS (2013) is open about the fact that estimates of HIV incidence 
(new infections) are difficult to make. UNAIDS says that “In theory, assessing progress in 
reducing the occurrence of new infections is best done through monitoring changes in 
incidence over time. However, in practice, prevalence data rather than incidence data are 
available” (UNAIDS, 2013, p. 38). What this means is that it is extremely difficult to capture 
reliable data on how many people became newly infected in the last year, but that fairly 
accurate estimates can be drawn using annual prevalence data among certain populations. 






In sum, I tried to be as systematic as possible in categorizing, ranking and measuring the key 
concepts of HIV/AIDS policy influence and change. My method aims to uphold what 
Alexander George calls a method of ‘structured, focused comparison’, whereby the same 
information is collected systematically, using the same variables, across decisively selected 
units (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 45). The ordinal rankings of policy compliance are 
then measured against two sets of explanatory variables, which help explain whether a certain 
set of qualities indicate the degree of freedom or constraint that a country feels in designing 
its policies. Lastly, policy changes are measured against epidemiological change, making 
causal inferences about policy efficacy.  
 
This data is complemented by a series of semi-structured interviews, conducted face-to-face 
in Southern Africa and telephonically with Geneva. The information gathered from these key 
stakeholders serves to uncover the more idiosyncratic elements of HIV/AIDS policy 
compliance. The interview information also helps to distinguish between systemic and 
random phenomena. Contradictions between policy compliance datasets and informant 
responses may also reflect a disjuncture between perceived and actual Global Fund policy 
influence. As such, while I cannot say with absolute certainty why policies change and the 
effects that that might have had on the epidemic, I can offer important arguments about which 
countries comply with Global Fund policies and which do not, and why this might be the 
case. I also make a reasonable inference about whether my data show domestic or 















Findings Part I: Aggregate Trends in Policy Compliance  
 
 
“Disease is neither global nor merely a local phenomenon.  




The location of HIV/AIDS strategies between the global and the local, as Seckinelgin (2008) 
suggests, is the main objective of this dissertation. The lack of consensus on this subject 
makes the findings in this chapter all the more relevant in their contribution to the discourse 
on HIV/AIDS governance.  
 
Recall that one group of scholars finds that global institutions and Western financial aid is 
what governs HIV/AIDS policy in Southern Africa (Ainsworth & Teokul, 2000; Howell & 
Pearce, 2001; Agg, 2006; Bendaña, 2006; Petra & Veltmeyer, 2001; Wood, 1997; Cohen & 
Tate, 2005). On the other hand, there is an equal and opposite school of thought that argues 
that domestic dynamics and national governments play important roles in the HIV/AIDS 
policy-making processes in affected countries (Parkhurst, 2005; Baldwin, 2005; Epstein, 
2007; Low-Beer & Stoneburner, 2004). Most of the policies promoted by the Global Fund are 
extracted from the UNAIDS core indicators (15 UNGASS indicators and 25 additional 
recommended indicators) and thus represent internationally accepted policies. Compliance or 
divergence with these policies will therefore indicate whether the global or the local has more 
influence over HIV/AIDS policy-making in Africa.  
 
In light of the new global politics of HIV/AIDS detailed in Chapter 1, the Methodology in 
Chapter 2 was employed to answer the question of who governs? In an effort to contribute to 
the debate on whether global institutions or domestic dynamics are more important in the 
HIV policy-making process, this chapter illustrates the findings of this project. I will begin by 
presenting some aggregate results, including overall trends in policy compliance, as well as 
overall compliance by policy domain (prevention, treatment, etc.) and policy indicator. Next, 
I will outline the major patterns and observations that these aggregate results reveal, followed 
by the relationships and generalizations they uncover as well as the exceptions or anomalies. 
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work. Lastly, I will revisit my original hypothesis and detail the new knowledge and 
understanding that my findings contribute to the field.  
Aggregate Result 
 
The aggregate results of scores – averaged across all 34 policies in this project’s framework – 
are displayed below in Table 3.1. To restate, these scores represent rankings on a scale of 0 to 
4, with higher numbers indicating greater Global Fund policy compliance. The findings show 
that while Botswana and South Africa have shifted their National Strategic Plans away from 
Global Fund compliance since 2008, the rest of the countries in the Southern African region 
continue to move their National Strategic Plans more closely in line with Global Fund 
policies.  
Table 3.1     Total Aggregate Global Fund Policy Compliance Scores  
 
Country   Before 2003 Between 2003 and 2008 After 2008 
Botswana 1.412 2.588 1.676 
South Africa 1.059 3.118 2.353 
Zambia 1.588 2.441 2.529 
Zimbabwe 1.353 2.206 2.618 
Swaziland 1.059 2.235 2.765 
Lesotho 1.265 2.147 3.088 
Malawi 1.265 1.912 3.118 
Namibia 1.382 2.147 3.382 
TOTAL 1.298 2.349 2.691  
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It is clear from these results that the average policy compliance in high burden countries is 
increasing. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show the average scores for all eight countries over time. 
It is also clear that the change in compliance before 2003 to the period between 2003 and 
2008 (T1 to T2) was a steeper change in compliance than the change from before 2008 to 
after (T2 to T3).  
From this aggregate data, there are two initial major conclusions: (1) There is an overall 
increase in the compliance of Southern African HIV/AIDS National Strategic Plans with 
Global Fund policies, from before 2003 to after 2008, and (2) there is large country variation 
around the mean. Following this, it is then worthwhile to look at what is happening in each 
individual country, to see which areas are driving this regional policy alignment.  
 
After 2008, (at T3), Botswana’s National Strategic Plan is the least compliant with Global 
Fund policies, and Namibia’s is the most compliant. There are also three relatively distinct 
clusters of countries at T3. First, since 2008, Botswana and South Africa have clearly moved 
their National Strategic Plans away from the Global Fund’s policy framework, focusing more 
on locally informed objectives and less on the international policy priorities of the Global 
Fund. Second, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland have moved further towards greater 
compliance with Global Fund policies, though not drastically. Lastly, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Namibia have made more significant movements to align their NSPs with Global Fund 
policies since 2008.  These clusters are easily identifiable in Figure 3.2.  
It is also telling that some of the largest policy shifts occurred in the countries at the richest 
and poorest ends of the country spectrum. During the period between 2003 and 2008 (T2), 
the NSPs out of Botswana and South Africa – the two richest countries in the region - were 
the most compliant with Global Fund policies. This information is particularly clear in Figure 
3.1. These two countries also exhibit some of the biggest changes in alignment from before 
2003, to period between 2003 and 2008.  This may be partially explained, at least in South 
Africa, by political circumstances before 2003. At this time, President Thabo Mbeki’s rule 
involved some very unorthodox policies on HIV/AIDS, originating a denialist standpoint. His 
personal dissident views were very much are engrained in the NSP of the time, and are 
clearly at odds with the Global Fund’s policies. However, in the period between 2003 and 
2008, it is quite intriguing to see that South Africa had the most heavily Global Fund-aligned 
NSP, while Malawi (the poorest country in the region) had the least. The movement for these 














Figure 3.2    Total Aggregate Global Fund Policy Compliance Scores for NSPs 
 
As Figure 3.2 shows, most of the high prevalence countries in the Southern African region 
(six out of the eight) have moved their HIV/AIDS policies further in line with Global Fund 
objectives, during the time periods above. Given these extreme policy compliance swings, it 
is useful to further disaggregate the country-specific scores, delving into the individual policy 
categories, as well as individual policies, themselves. The Global Fund M&E Toolkit groups 
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Collaborative Activities, (5) Supportive Environment and (6) Outcome Indicators.
12
 While a 
full list of the Global Fund indicators used as the independent variables in this study can be 
found in Table 2.3, it is useful to briefly explain how these M&E indicators relate to 
HIV/AIDS policies and how the National Strategic Plans of African countries can therefore 
be assessed based on their compliance with these indicators.  
 
The indicators in each of these six categories are associated with certain HIV/AIDS policies. 
For instance, Prevention indicators on the number of condoms available for distribution are 
related to policies that promote condom use. Further, since the Global Fund M&E toolkit has 
indicators for both procurement of male and female condoms, policies that promote female 
condoms are also measured in this study. For Treatment, indicators on the number of people 
receiving ARVs are related to policies on universal access. Collaborative Activities indicators 
measure the number of people who are tested and treated for HIV/TB co-infection, which are 
related to policies for integrated service provision for these two diseases.  
 
The indicators which fall under the Global Fund’s category termed Outcome Indicators are 
perhaps the most unclear. While the Global Fund calls this category “Outcome Indicators” 
these indicators are primarily related to policies of behavior change. For instance, Outcome 
Indicators on the number of women and men who had more than one sexual partner in the 
last year are related to faithfulness policies. Other Outcome Indicators measure the number of 
youths that have had intercourse before they were 15 years old, which are related to policies 
on abstinence.  
 
Measuring trends in country policy compliance with these individual categories sheds more 
light on how policies are changing overall. A good example is shown in Figure 3.3, where 
policies movements connected to indicators from the Collaborative Activities category and 
the Supportive Environment category are really driving the overall increases in regional 
compliance levels, especially since 2008 when compliance with these policies rose 
dramatically. Compliance of African NSPs with other Global Fund indicator categories, such 
as Care and Support, Prevention and Outcome Indicators have not changed much since 2008 
and are therefore not the key policy areas that are changing in recent years.    
 
                                                          
12
 There is a seventh category called “Impact Indicators”, but these were excluded from this project since they 
are all epidemiological in nature. In other words, where all the other indicators in the M&E Toolkit are related to 
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Figure 3.3 Aggregate Policy Compliance Scores for Categories of Policy  
 
It is also useful to disaggregate policy compliance by country for individual indicators. In 
terms of treatment (Figure 3.4) Botswana was the only country to have shifted away from 
Global Fund treatment policies after 2008. It also emerges that Lesotho has always been one 
of the least compliance high prevalence countries with Global Fund treatment guidelines, and 





















































































Figure 3.4    Global Fund Policy Compliance Scores for Treatment Policies in NSPs 
 
When we further disaggregate the treatment policy category further, one of the Global Fund 
policies is to state the percentage of Health facilities that offer prescriptions and/or provide 
clinical follow-up for antiretroviral therapy (HIV-T2) (Global Fund, 2009). Here, in Figure 
3.5, it is apparent that with individual policies, the trends are not at all linear, as they appear 
with the aggregate compliance scores in Figure 3.1. There are some countries like Botswana, 
whose national policy moved towards Global Fund policy on health facilities providing 
treatment from T1 to T2, and then moved away from T2 to T3. On the other hand, South 
Africa’s national policies did exactly the opposite, moving away from Global Fund policy 
from T1 to T2, then sharply complying from T2 to T3. Differently still, some countries have 


































































































Figure 3.5 Compliance Scores for Global Fund Policy (HIV-T2) on Health Facilities 
Providing Antiretroviral Treatment  
T1 (<2003) T2 (<2008) T3 (>2008)
Botswana 0 2 1
South Africa 1 0 2
Zambia 1 3 4
Zimbabwe 0 4 4
Swaziland 1 4 4
Lesotho 0 3 3
Malawi 0 0 4
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Major Patterns and Observations 
 
To summarize once more, the broadest pattern suggested in this data is that National Strategic 
Plans of all high burden countries moved towards compliance with Global Fund policies from 
pre-2003 (T1) to pre-2008 (T2). In six of these countries (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia) policy compliance levels continued to increase even after 
2008 (T3).  However, since 2008 (T3), Botswana and South Africa moved away from the 
Global Fund’s policy paradigm. Instead, these countries elected to design more locally 
informed National Strategic Plans which focus on policies like pre-teen sex education, 
alcohol abuse and intergenerational sex, for which there are no Global Fund policies.  
 
When looking at which countries were complying with which policies and when, it is 
important to contextualize the time periods. At T1, before 2003, many of these National 
Strategic Plans were written long before ARV treatment was a realistic option in their 
countries. For obvious reasons, African policy compliance with the Global Fund’s treatment 
indicators during this time is low. In the same vein, without viable treatment options, the 
focus of donors and African governments during T1 was on prevention programs as well as 
care and support. During T2, between 2003 and 2008, there were massive increases in 
funding available for HIV in Africa. The Gl bal Fund was established in 2002 and PEPFAR 
began in 2003, two massive global funding institutions which created a very different time 
period for African HIV/AIDS responses. There was a great deal of debate during this time 
about what kinds of prevention strategies worked better than others, as donors and 
governments analyse the successes and failures of T1. Then, in 2008 (T3) things shifted 
significantly. The financial crisis hit and priorities of donors changed. Funding for HIV 
decreased dramatically before slowly stabilizing again. During this time, the focus of donors 
moved towards biomedical interventions (male circumcision, CD4 count tests) that can more 
easily show results, partly as African implementing partners feel added pressure to 
demonstrate successful results to donors. With these three different time periods in mind, it is 
interesting to see how country policies changed and adapted to these shifting circumstances.     
 
Recall that the Global Fund’s HIV/AIDS M&E Toolkit has six policy domains: (1) 
Prevention, (2) Treatment, (3) Care and Support, (4) Collaborative Activities, (5) Supportive 
Environment and (6) Outcome Indicators. The degree of compliance or divergence within 
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on which policy domains influence countries to comply more than others. For a complete 
dataset on all country compliance levels per policy domain over time, see Appendix F.   
 
Firstly, over time, prevention policies are most closely aligned with Global Fund policy 
language in South African NSPs. Secondly, treatment indicators in Swaziland are the most 
aligned with Global Fund policies in this domain. Thirdly, the NSPs from Botswana, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe are most closely aligned with Global Fund policy on Care and 
Support indicators. Fourthly, averaged over time, the Global Fund’s collaborative activity 
policies (combined HIV and TB programming) have had the most heavily influence over the 
NSPs in Lesotho and Namibia. Fifthly, supportive environment policies from the Global 
Fund were the least influential in all countries in the period from 2003 to 2008, yet countries 
moved towards greater compliance after this period. Lastly, outcome indicators (recall, these 
speak to abstinence and faithfulness) from the Global Fund have had the most impact on the 
NSPs from Zambia and Lesotho. These country-based policy domain results may point 
towards a variation in which kinds of donors are funding certain country programs, or 
differences in local priorities or absorptive capacities.   
 
Another way to draw out trends in policy influence, instead of looking at influence by policy 
category, is to look at what certain time periods reveal about the degree to which the Global 
Fund’s policies exert influence over Southern African NSPs. Before 2003 (at T1), Global 
Fund’s care and support policies exercised the most influence over National Strategic Plans 
in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This is the same set of countries that align 
with Care and Support indicators averaged over time (T1 to T3), which suggests that this 
prioritization is not symptomatic of the new politics of HIV/AIDS, but rather, a longer-
standing relationship between African policy makers and objectives in this area. The same is 
true of Namibia and Lesotho, which also most heavily align with collaborative activities at 
T1, as well as over time. However, at T1 collaborate activities is also South Africa’s most 
strongly aligned group of indicators, which shifts towards prevention when we look at the 
average influence across time. In the same vein, Swaziland’s chief policy alignment at T1 is 
different from its average alignment over time. At T1 in Swaziland, Supportive Environment 
policies (workplace programs, human rights networks for anti-stigma) are the most parallel 
with Global Fund M&E indicators, whereas treatment indicators are the most heavily 
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During the period from 2003 to 2008 (T2), Botswana, Malawi and South Africa and 
Zimbabwe were most closely aligned with the Global Fund’s policies on care and support. 
This represents stability for Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe who were in this same position 
at T1, but a shift for South Africa, which was more aligned with collaborative activities at T1. 
Additionally, treatment indicators are equally well-aligned as care and support indicators at 
T2 for Zimbabwe, which is another shift. At T2, Namibia and Lesotho also remain as they 
were at T1, aligning most strongly with collaborative activities. Both Zambia and Swaziland 
have shifted at T2 in terms of which category of policies are most closely aligned with Global 
Fund objectives. At T2, Zambia shifts from care and support indicators to outcome indicators 
as its most influenced set of policies, where previously it was care and support. Swaziland 
also moves its most focused alignment from supportive environment indicators to prevention.  
 
By T3, most countries are aligning with either treatment indicators or collaborative activities. 
This is a significant policy influence shift, beginning at T3 in during the New Global Politics 
of HIV/AIDS. The only countries that are aligning with other sets of indicators at this point, 
post-2008, are Lesotho which focuses on Outcome indicators, and Zambia which is split 
between Care and Support and Supportive Environment.  
 
What this all suggests is that policy emphasis, or put differently – policy influence from the 
Global Fund – shifts over time, with some groups of policies gaining traction at certain points 
in time compared to others. These variations indicate the need to better understand the 
contextual factors that may be leading to these different policy influence levels.  
 
There are clearly structural and institutional explanations for these disparate levels of policy 
influence, since trends have emerged with respect to which countries internalize Global Fund 
policies more than other. It is also useful to disaggregate these policy influences to trace when 
countries are influenced by different objectives at different times, since this may also help 
point to which policies are working and when. For instance, if a country witnesses large 
drops in incidence during an era of heavily aligned Prevention policies, this could provide 
insight into the causal mechanisms behind these epidemiological outcomes.  
 
Relationships and Generalizations 
 
In addition to the major patterns and observations, there are also some more general 
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there are certain clusters of countries that emerge out of the results. Three clusters emerge, in 
particular, in terms of overall policy alignment behaviour: 
 
CLUSTER 1 Botswana and South Africa are clearly in one group, as the only two 
countries to diverge from Global Fund policies after 2008 (T3).  
CLUSTER 2  Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe form the second cluster, since these 
three countries continuously align with Global Fund policies over time, 
but at a relatively flat and steady rate. In other words, the difference 
between compliance scores at before 2003 (T1) and after 2008 (T3) are 
not that great.  
CLUSTER 3  The third cluster is made up of Lesotho, Malawi and Namibia. These 
three countries have increased very steeply in terms of their National 
Strategic Plan alignment with Global Fund policies from T1 to T2.  
 
Initial speculation suggests that structural, institutional and social variables may help to 
explain these clusters of policy compliance. Botswana and South Africa are the two richest, 
most democratic, countries in the project and they are the ones who deviate from Global Fund 
policy.  
In addition, the two countries which comply the most with Global Fund policy – Namibia and 
Malawi – have the lowest HIV prevalence rates. Further, countries with similar levels of 
freedom and democracy seem to behave similarly, on both ends of the spectrum. As stated, 
South Africa and Botswana have the two highest levels of freedom, according to Freedom 
House International (2010). The middle cluster – Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland – have 
the lowest levels of freedom, and all behave similarly in terms of their policy compliance. 
Other trends, clusters and outliers might also be logical explained by sets of explanatory 




For the most part, these clusters initially seem to correspond with shared characteristics. 
However, the one extreme outlier in this whole analysis is Namibia. This is a fairly rich and 
well-governed country that does not behave like its peers, Botswana and South Africa. In 
fact, it behaves exactly the opposite, by being the country that is most compliant Global Fund 
policies. Since variables in economic and political circumstance do not seem to shed light on 
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explain its anomalistic behaviour. These kinds of variables will be explored through key 
informant interviews, which are discussed in Chapter 6.    
 
In the same sense, while not necessarily an exception, Botswana is also a rather extreme 
outlier. Referring back to Table 3.1, Botswana behaves radically differently than other 
countries in the region after 2008. This was not previously the case, as its NSP compliance 
scores before 2003 (T1), and between 2003 and 2008 (T2) are fairly similar to the rest of its 
neighbours. However, Botswana shifts its policy focus quite drastically after that. Therefore, 
while most countries behave in a similar fashion, the two major outliers are Namibia and 
Botswana:  
 
Agreement and Disagreement with Previous Work 
 
The emerging results of this study presented in this chapter appear to confirm some previous 
research in the field, but also contest and dispute the findings of others. The fact that most 
countries in the region continue to align their policies closely with Global Fund polices (save 
Botswana and South Africa) corroborates the previous mainstream idea that donor agendas 
shape local policy to a large extent in Southern Africa. However, one could argue that the two 
exceptions also work to refute these arguments. For instance, Colleen O'Manique (2004) 
broadly suggests that neo-liberalism has created a top-down approach to AIDS policy-making 
in, which leaves African governments relatively irrelevant in the decision-making process: 
 
 
[T]he main institutions involved in formulating policy take as a given that states should have 
a minimal role in the provision of health services, and that the private and voluntary sectors 
are best equipped to mount the proper response (O’Manique, 2004, p. 9). 
 
 
Some of the data in this study suggests the opposite. Certainly, before the new global politics 
of HIV/AIDS there was a high degree of external control over HIV/AIDS policy making in 
the region, as all countries moved their policies further in line with Global Fund policies from 
T1 (before 2003) to T2 (between 2003 and 2008). However, with substantial shifts in the 
political and economic climate of HIV/AIDS funding and policy-making, this is no longer 
true. Additionally, the low levels of Global Fund policy compliance at T1 in most Southern 
African countries might be explained by what Attaran and Sachs argued in 2001. They put 
forward that the World Health Organization’s Global Programme on AIDS endeavoured to 
provide technical and organizational assistance to national aids programs in the mid-1980s, 
but that this funding was cut in 1990 and the initiative never really reached its potential 
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of the large increase in policy compliance – in all countries in this study – which takes place 
during T2 (after 2003 and before 2008). 
 
The results can also be brought to bear on the research literature within each country. For 
instance, in Botswana, some others accurately traced the circumstances which led to a 
movement away from Global Fund Policy influence over National Strategic Plans. Allen and 
Heald suggest that the Government of Botswana was following a fairly exclusive Western 
model, with respect to its AIDS policy, in the early decades of the epidemic (Allen & Heald, 
2004; Heald, 2006). This is indeed confirmed by my data. Botswana’s 1993 National Policy 
on HIV/AIDS was one of the most compliant in the region at the time, second only to 
Zambia.  
 
However, Allen and Heald (2004) suggest that by the mid-1990s, most international donors 
had pulled out of Botswana, with the understanding that the wealth of the country would self-
sustain its AIDS programming. At the same time, they point to the changes in government 
policy accompanying the beginning of President Mogae’s first term in 1997, citing reasons 
such as increased engagement from the executive office. According to my hypothesis laid out 
in Chapter 1, I would have expected these changes to result in a movement away from Global 
Fund policies. This was not the case. In 2003, Botswana had become more aligned with 
Global Fund policies, despite donor withdrawal and increased in-country political ownership. 
But, Allen and Heald argue that the real leadership shift, with Mogae’s self-stated aim ‘to 
make Batswana face up to the disease’ did not really begin until 2003/2004, which might 
corroborate why the increased domestic policy influence, as compared to Global Fund M&E 
influence, only began to show up in Botswana’s policy at T3, in the country’s Second 
National Strategic Framework released 2010. Allen and Heald also conclude at the end of 
their piece that Botswana used to follow a more accepted line in HIV intervention which 
more closely mirrored global norms, which has now changed. They suggest that now (after 
T2, when the article was written), the country is following a different set of HIV/AIDS 
protocols that are facing intense opposition from international organizations. 
 
The results of this research also speak to previous work on specific policies. Allen and Heald 
(2004) argue that condom promotion in Botswana was a heavy policy focus in the early days 
of the AIDS response, but that this initiative was not well-received by the community and 
was largely ineffective. My policy analysis of Botswana’s 1993 National Policy in 
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public condoms both scoring 4/4 for alignment with the Global Fund policy, and the notion of 
private sector condoms scoring a 3/4. Since 1993, the emphasis on condom promotion across 
the four condom policies has decreased. Heald (2006) points to ARVs, as well, as a policy 
that gained traction at the turn of the millennium in Botswana. My results also corroborate 
this notion, since at T2 Botswana’s HIV Strategic Framework for 2003-2009 scored 4/4 for 
the antiretroviral policy. It was also one of the few countries at T2 to include mention of CD4 
count machines in its National Strategic Plan. My data also corroborates previous work from 
other countries, including Malawi. Ngwira, Bota and Loevinsohn (2001) suggest that the 
government in Malawi has a tendency to leave grassroots programs and activities to NGOs. 
This argument is supported by my data which show a high level of external influence of 
Global Fund M&E policies on Malawi’s local HIV policy.  
 
In 2004, Jones (2004) writes that international policy influences skew local agendas towards 
the prevention side of HIV/AIDS programming, with much less focus on treatment and care 
(which, in his view, is a more effective approach). This seems initially true, when you see 
that out of the 34 Global Fund policies used in this project’s framework, 20 are prevention 
policies and only 3 are treatment policies. However, the data findings of Part 1 of this thesis 
do not entirely support Jones’ contention. For instance, at T2, when Jones wrote this article 
“When ‘development’ devastates”, Zambia’s 2006-2010 HIV Strategic Framework was much 
more compliant with Global Fund policies on treatment than it was on Global Fund policies  
on prevention. This indicates that international donors were influencing treatment policies to 
a greater degree than they were influencing prevention policies, in Zambia at the time. The 
same is true of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia, which were also more strongly influenced 
by Global Fund policy prescriptions in terms of treatment policies than they were for 
prevention policies, at T2.  
 
It should be mentioned that certain countries do follow Jones’ assertion about Global Fund 
influences that favour prevention. In the era before the new global politics of HIV/AIDS (pre-
2008), Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and South Africa were all heavily weighted towards 
prevention policy alignment in their National Strategic Plans much more strongly than 
compliance with treatment policies. For instance, at T2 in Malawi, the 2003 National HIV 
and AIDS Policy scored a 2.150/4 for its average over prevention policies. There are quite a 
few sections that emphasize behavior change communication and PMTCT. By contrast, its 










Page 78 of 210 
 
ARVs, no mention of facilities for CD4 count, and only one sentence mentioning of ARV 
treatment programs in the whole policy.  
 
Jones (2005) wrote another article a year later, on South African HIV/AIDS policy and its 
influencing factors. In his piece “A Test of Governance: rights-based struggles and the 
politics of HIV/AIDS policy in South Africa”, he cites commonly held criticisms of South 
African policy at T1 (HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000-2005) for not 
living up to expectations. He says that a lack of consideration for training NGO involvement 
is a key error of omission. McKerrow (2002) also critiques this policy for lacking treatment 
guidelines. The findings of this project do support these ideas, with an overall score of 
1.059/4 for alignment with Global Fund policy. McKerrow is also accurate, since treatment 
policies in this policy scored 0.667/4 in terms of cooperation with Global Fund precedent at 
the time. Anthony Butler’s work on South African HIV/AIDS policy is also bolstered by the 
results of this project. Similar to McKerrow, Butler (2005) says that South Africa’s first 
Strategic Plan in 2000 left out the specifics on timeframes and commitments, though it was 
based on a United Nations policy template. This is evidenced in the data from the policy 
analysis, which shows most of the Global Fund policies  in South Africa are adhered to on a 
base level, but very few score higher than a 2/4 since, for the most part, they are missing age 
ranges, timeframes and percentage data.  
 
The New Global Politics of HIV/AIDS: Revisited 
 
Now that the major patterns and trends in the data have been identified, and their relevance 
for previous work has been outlined, it is important to return to the original question 
presented in Chapter 1: Who Governs? Have the recent financial, rhetorical and political 
changes in the global politics of HIV/AIDS resulted in African policy movements away from 
global influence?  
 
The answer is a partial yes. Since 2008, HIV/AIDS policies in Botswana and South Africa 
are less compliant with Global Fund policies. For the rest of the countries in this study, 
(Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) this is not the case, and they 
continue to further align their national plans with Global Fund objectives. These changes may 
be related to many different political and/or economic factors, which will be explored in 
Chapter 5. The implications for the epidemic are tentatively explored in Chapter 7, with an 
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The data outlined in this chapter might be the very beginning of a new emerging trend away 
from Global Fund protocols. On the other hand, the tightening of resources from the West 
could also just be having the opposite effect. For poorer countries, like Malawi and Zambia, a 
decrease in available funding from the West might incentivize policy-makers to vie even 
harder for the affection of international donors, dressing up their policies in Global Fund 
M&E language even more intensively than before.  
 
Nevertheless, we do not as of yet why some countries diverged and others complied with 
Global Fund policies. Nor do we know what the consequences of such policy-making 
decisions are or will be. These two questions will be answered in next chapters of this thesis. 
These questions, answered in the second half, will explore potential causes of the patterns 
identified in this chapter. The initial hypothesis for the explanatory variables was that richer, 
better governed countries might be in a better position to break from Global Fund policy-
based policies in pursuit of more culturally-tailored approaches. From the results of this 
chapter, it seems that this may be confirmed. However, it will take mapping against data sets 
of explanatory variables to say, more robustly, that this is true across the entire project. The 
question about the impacts that policy has on disease outcomes was hypothesized in a fairly 
mainstream manner. The consensus among most scholars is that locally devised, culturally 
relevant, policies are more effective at combating infection. From the literature, I have also 
adopted this line of reasoning. However, it will be interesting to see if there is an association 
between trends in policy change and trends in infection rates, which could follow a trajectory 
that supports this thinking.  
 
New Knowledge and Understanding 
 
There are five major discussion points to take away from the findings in this overview 
chapter on aggregate results. First, the most recent National Strategic Plans from Botswana 
and South Africa show a movement away from compliance with Global Fund policies.  
 
Second, the countries in this study appear to behave in three distinct clusters: (1) Botswana 
and South Africa diverge from Global Fund policies at T3; (2) Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe continuously align with Global Fund policies over time, but at a relatively flat and 
steady rate; and (3) Lesotho, Malawi and Namibia have increased very steeply in terms of 
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Third, overall, from before 2003 to after 2008, Global Fund policies concerning care and 
support have had the most influence over Southern African National Strategic Plans. These 
Global Fund policies had the greatest influence in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. However, Lesotho and Namibia have always been more closely aligned with 
Global Fund policies on Collaborative Activity policies (combined HIV and TB 
programming). South Africa’s alignment has always been Prevention and Swaziland’s most 
heavily influenced policy area has been Treatment.   
 
Fourth, while the Global Fund’s care and support policies have had the greatest average 
impact, since 2008 other policy focus areas have taken the spot of having the greatest 
influence over Southern African National Strategic Plans. After 2008, most Southern African 
countries shifted the focus of their National Strategic Plans to be aligned most heavily with 
either treatment policies or collaborative activities (combined HIV and TB programming).  
 
Fifth, these findings disrupt previous arguments that all African countries are tightly bound 
by global policies and agendas, since some countries are beginning to demonstrate 
movements away from compliance with Global Fund policies. Particularly, previously held 
ideas about the large impact of Western donors’ “imperialistic” control over the design of 
HIV prevention programs (Cohen & Tate, 2005; Epstein, 2007; Pisani, 2008) are challenged 
since Global Fund prevention policies have not been overwhelmingly influential in the 




These aggregate trends reveal that my original hypothesis was incorrect: countries have not 
been moving away from Global Fund policy compliance in the post-2008 period. In fact, 
overall, high burden countries continue to align their policies with Global Fund agendas, even 
after the new global politics of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the face of reduced political and 
financial influence coming from Western donors. When we disaggregate overall policy 
compliance, it also becomes clear that different global policies (i.e. prevention, treatment, 
care and support, etc.) have different levels of influence over African National Strategic 
Plans. Further, individual policies from these categories can further illuminate the subtleties 
of policy change in the region. The next chapter delves one level deeper to illustrate the 














Findings Part II: Illustrating Individual Policy Changes    
 
 
“The language of international [HIV/AIDS] policy frameworks has an important impact on 
the people who are targeted by these policies” (Seckinelgin, 2006, p. 1). 
 
Introduction 
In addition to looking trends in the aggregate policy compliance in high burden countries, it is 
equally important to focus on the more micro-level elements of policy making, that is, how 
and why the specific shifts of individual policies occur within countries. Seckinelgin (2006) 
has shown that examining language is important for understanding how people identify 
themselves in relation to policies, which in turn affects policy implementation. Others have 
demonstrated that health policy language is heavily connected to dominant meanings and 
assumptions, which is highly significant for the way in which policy is operationalized by the 
implementers (Iannantuono & Eyles, 1997). In this chapter, I examine a selection of 
interesting examples which highlight what policy change looks like, and how shifts in 
compliance with Global Fund policies are often the result of subtle written changes over time. 
This chapter is organized differently from the last, as it aims to display a different element of 
the policy compliance results. While Chapter 3 looked at aggregate trends, highlighting 
limited examples of compliance within a certain policy, this chapter will lay out what 
compliance looks like within each of the Global Fund’s six policy categories that are 
examined in this project: (1) Prevention, (2) Treatment, (3) Care and Support, (4) 
Collaborative Activities, (5) Supportive Environment and (6) Outcome Indicators.     
Prevention 
 
Of the 34 policies analyzed in the framework used in this project, 20 are related to 
prevention. Yet, HIV prevention policies are perhaps the most widely contested in terms of 
their political motivations and epidemiological efficacy. Where few would dispute that 
support for orphaned children is a beneficial AIDS policy, prevention strategies such as 
behavior change communication and voluntary testing and counselling have been hotly 
debated by doctors, policy-makers and academics alike.
13
  
                                                          
13
 This project’s policy framework (the Global Fund 2009 M&E Toolkit) categorizes abstinence and faithfulness 
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Justin Parkhurst (2008) notes that in order to show that certain prevention policies were 
responsible for declining HIV prevalence, a chain of different types of evidence are required: 
first, prevalence decline must connected to incidence decline, which must also be connected 
to behavior change, intervention, and finally, policy. However, he suggests that in many 
cases, there is no conclusive data for these various linkages, citing the example of the 
continuing debates over which prevention policies were responsible for HIV prevalence 
declines in Uganda. Parkhurst says prevention policies are usually the subject of intense 
debate because people often misunderstand the evidence required. Despite these challenges, 
rigorous understanding of HIV prevention policies (and policy changes) is an important first 
step towards satisfying the evidence needed to measure policy impact.          
 
Behavior Change Communication 
 
According to the Global Fund, behavior change communication (BCC), focuses on “Young 
women and men aged 15–24 who both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual 
transmission of HIV and who reject the major misconceptions about HIV transmission” 
(Global Fund, 2009, p. 72). The Global Fund’s policy framework also targets “Most-at-risk 
populations reached with HIV prevention programs (percentage).” To track performance, the 
data is disaggregated into different most-at-risk population, such as (1) Young women and 
men aged 15-24, (2) injecting drug users, (3) men who have sex with men, (4) sex workers 
and (5) young people aged 10–24 years. As a result, there are five BCC-related policies 
measured in this study (HIV-PI and the four sub-categories of HIV-P4a).   
 
Table 4.1 Botswana’s Behavior Change Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
BCC Mass Media  HIV-P1 3 4 3 Towards Then Away 
BCC Community Outreach for Injecting Drug Users HIV-P4a 0 2 1 Towards Then Away 
BCC Community Outreach for Men Who Have Sex With 
Men 
HIV-P4a 0 1 1 Towards Then Static 
BCC Community Outreach for Sex Workers  HIV-P4a 0 3 2 Towards Then Away 
BCC Community Outreach for Young People (10-24) HIV-P4a 2 3 1 Towards Then Away 
 
The majority of Botswana’s BCC policies have become less compliant with the Global 
Fund’s policies in their latest National Strategic Plan. At T2, the National Strategic 
Framework for HIV/AIDS (2003-2009) cites the objective to “Design and provide airtime for 
appropriate HIV/AIDS programmes targeting [...] drug users" (Government of Botswana, 
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"Proportion of MARPS [most-at-risk populations] utilizing HIV Prevention services" remains 
the relevant indicator, yet the definition of MARPS is "sex workers, truck drivers, seasonal 
farm workers, and construction workers but can be expanded" (Government of Botswana, 
2010, p. 37). There is no outright mention of drug users – injecting or otherwise – in this 




The same trend is true for sex workers. In 2003, the NSP said that the Department of 
Information and Broadcasting (DIB) should "Design and provide airtime for appropriate 
HIV/AIDS programmes targeting [...] commercial sex workers" (Government of Botswana, 
2003, p. 69). Additionally, there was a whole section devoted to "Mobile populations [such 
as] Commercial Sex Workers" (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 33). In 2010, however, all 
of this language disappears and the only attention given to sex workers is the inclusion into 
the current definition of MARPS.  
 
Lesotho’s emphasis on BCC mass media prevention in youth provides a good example of 
increasing Global Fund policy compliance over time. Recall that the Global Fund policy 
language is “Young women and men aged 15–24 who both correctly identify ways of 
preventing the sexual transmission of HIV and who reject the major misconceptions about 
HIV transmission” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 72). In 2000, the Lesotho policy read that there 
would be "Television and radio air-time slot for HIV/AIDS increased to at least 3 times a 
week for 15 minutes by August 2000" (Government of Lesotho, 2000, p. 23). In the 2006 
NSP, Lesotho’s national policy became more compliant with the Global Fund, including a 
target age-bracket and providing baseline data, as the Global Fund indicator requests: "To 
increase the percentage of men and women who have correct knowledge about the prevention 
of sexual transmission of HIV infection to 80% by 2011" with "98 % of population aged 15-
49 exposed to HIV/AIDS media" (Government of Lesotho, 2006, p. 51). Yet, the policy was 
not completely compliant with the Global Fund policy, since it measures knowledge for the 
general population (15-49) instead of youth (15-24). By 2009, Lesotho’s policy reads "% of 
                                                          
14
 It is important to note that in some settings there is no significant population of injecting drug users and hence 
this may not be related to the epidemic. However, the Global Fund does suggest that countries with generalized 
heterosexual epidemics may want to consider collecting data on this indicator: “Countries with generalized 
epidemics may also have a concentrated sub-epidemic among one or more most-at-risk populations. If so, 
calculating and reporting on this indicator for these populations would be valuable” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 86). 
They also include “countries with concentrated sub-epidemics within a generalized epidemic” in the 
applicability for the injecting drug use policy. However, in this chapter, it is not the aim to suggest which 
policies should and shouldn’t be included in African NSPs. Instead, it is discusses changes in the policies in so 
far as they comply or deviate from the Global Fund M&E Toolkit (2009). Potential causes and consequences of 
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key populations at risk who both correctly identify ways of preventing sexual transmission of 
HIV and who reject major misconceptions about HIV transmission is increased from X in 
2009 to 50% in 2011" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 40). It also says "The % of men and 
women who have correct knowledge of HIV prevention increased from 23% in 2005 to 80% 
by 2011" as well (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 67). Lesotho’s policy shift on BCC mass 
media from 2006 to 2009 represents a further move towards compliance with Global Fund 
policy, since there is added language about the rejection of major misconceptions about HIV 
transmission, which matches the Global Fund indicator.   
 
Malawi also exhibits similar trends in its youth BCC policy. In its most recent NSP, its policy 
is essentially a cut-and-paste of the Global Fund policy: "% of young people aged 15-24 who 
both correctly identify ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV and who reject 
major misconceptions about HIV” (Government of Malawi, 2010, p. 47). However, what is 
more interesting here is the increased alignment with policies for drug users and men who 
have sex with men. The first mention of injecting drug users only appears in the most recent 
NSP, where it is stated that “"Injecting drug users" are in the resource needs budget, but there 
is no money specified for them (Government of Malawi, 2010, p. 50). Further, the increasing 
emphasis on men who have sex with men is a noteworthy point. In 2000 there was no 
mention of this population. In 2003 this changes, with one slight mention to suggest that 
"Vulnerable populations include [...] persons engaged in same sex relations" (Government of 
Malawi, 2003, p. 19). Moving further in line still, in 2010 the NSP includes men who have 
sex with men in the resource needs budget, with up to US$ 0.7 million specified for them 
(Government of Malawi, 2010). Additionally, the policy aims at "Targeting most-at-risk 
groups: sex workers, MSM and prisoners" (Government of Malawi, 2010, p. 21).  
 
Zambia is also moving in line with the Global Fund policy on BCC for men who have sex 
with men, admittedly in very small steps. At T2, in 2006, the NSP says that men who have 
sex with men are not a priority for the country because "It is estimated that less than 1% [of 
HIV infection] is through [...] sex between men" (Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 10). Then, 
in 2011, the policy indicates a sudden alignment with Global Fund priorities, noting that 
"Policies and programmes are, also, inadequate to address the specific needs of MSM" 
(Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 16) and that the country needs to "Create research 
environment that support evidence generation for vulnerable and marginalized populations 
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Zambia’s policy notes that "Despite some of the success that has been demonstrated with 
HIV prevention efforts with small populations, like sex workers, many of these lessons have 
not been taken to scale for the general population to have an impact on overall incidence" 
(Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 23-24). There is also one mention of the "the Corridors of 
Hope Programme [which] targets truck drivers and sex workers" (Government of Zambia, 
2006, p. 37). Then - again in a minor way - the 2011 NSP seems to suggest that sex workers 
are more of a priority than they were at T2. The language moves from saying that programs 
have not been expanded, to suggest that they should be: "Brothels and MSM are illegal, and 
as a result hidden and largely inaccessible to mainstream prevention programmes. The 
number and size of prevention activities addressing sex work is insufficient and most do not 
include clients of sex workers" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 16). (Page 16) and "Of 
these categories the informal sector and illegal activities such as sex work are targeted by a 
few implementing organisations for HIV interventions but not to the degree occurring in the 




In Namibia, almost all BCC policies are moving in line with Global Fund language, with four 
out of the five policy areas receiving a value of 4 (out of 4) in terms of compliance.  
 
Table 4.2    Namibia’s Behaviour Change Policies 
 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
BCC Mass Media  HIV-P1 3 1 4 Away Then Towards 
BCC Community Outreach for Injecting Drug Users HIV-P4a 1 0 4 Away Then Towards 
BCC Community Outreach for Men Who Have Sex 
With Men 
HIV-P4a 1 0 4 Away Then Towards 
BCC Community Outreach for Sex Workers  HIV-P4a 1 4 4 Towards Then Static 
BCC Community Outreach for Young People (10-24) HIV-P4a 1 2 3 Towards Then Towards 
 
 
The difference between policy compliance from T1 (1999) to T3 (2010) is stark. Admittedly, 
the Global Fund was not around at in1999, but certainly was in T2 – 2004 – and there are 
very low levels of policy compliance there too. For injecting drug users, men who have sex 
with men and sex workers, Namibia’s policy moves from one very indirect mention of 
‘vulnerable groups’ in 1999 (Government of Namibia, 1999, Appendix B, p.2), the following 
in 2010: "% of Most at Risk Populations who both correctly identify ways of preventing the 
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transmission increases by 20% between FY [Fiscal Year] 2010/11 and FY2012/13 and by 
50% between FY2010/11 and FY2015/16" (Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 36). This 
policy includes injecting drug users, men who have sex with men and sex workers because 
the NSP later states that "Most at risk populations (MARPS) [...] include mobile and migrant 
populations such as long-distance truck drivers, sex workers, men who have sex with men, 
disciplined forces (Army, Police, and Prison officers), inmates (prisoners) and injecting drug 
users" (Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 33). 
 
Swaziland’s BCC policies mirror Namibia’s, with all five areas (Recall: (1) Young women 
and men aged 15-24, (2) injecting drug users, (3) men who have sex with men, (4) sex 
workers and (5) young people aged 10–24 years) becoming more closely aligned with Global 
Fund policy language in each subsequent NSP. The most notable alignment occurs with the 
young people aged 10–24 years policy. In 2000, the NSP says there is an objective “To teach 
young people about human sexuality including HIV/STI/AIDS by Empower young Swazis 
(both male and female) with knowledge and skills that will enhance their self-esteem [...] so 
as to make informed decision on important areas of their lives and positively influence their 
peers” (Government of Swaziland, 2000, p. 82). This becomes more compliant with the 
Global Fund language in 2006, since it begins to include some age brackets: This policy 
identifies that "In terms of age group patterns, youth aged 20-24 and 25-29 have experienced 
the highest prevalence since 1996, followed by people aged 40 years and above" 
(Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 4). 
 
There is also a focus on the "Improvement of the capacity of all health facilities in public and 
private sectors to deliver child and youth friendly sexual and reproductive health services" 
(Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 22). Finally, at T3 in 2009, the policy is entirely in line 
with the Global Find policy for knowledge outreach in 10-24-year-olds, providing the same 
priority age bracket, and data to support the policy: "With regard to focusing on young 
people, prevention will target programmes that keep children in school, and address out of 
school youth where no formal opportunities exist to provide life skills" (Government of 
Swaziland, 2009, p. 29) and "More young people get information about HIV from their 
family members, as opposed to in the media or from friends: % of young people aged 10-24 
who cite a member of the family as a source of HIV and AIDS information is increased from 
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For South Africa, the emphasis on BCC for youth and injecting drug users is moving in the 
opposite direction, away from strict compliance with Global Fund policy language. In 2007, 
it was stated that the country would "Investigate the extent of HIV risk from injecting drug 
use (IDUs) and develop policy to minimise risk of HIV transmission through injecting drug 
use and unsafe sexual practices" with goals to "Continuously research and monitor the extent 
of IDU use and the relationship with HIV infection, Develop policy and guidelines for HIV 
prevention in IDUs and review annually [and] Establish public sector drug rehabilitation 
programs in all provinces" (Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 80). From there, in the 
most recent NSP in 2012 it is just noted that "Although Injecting drug use has not been 
identified as a key driver of HIV transmission, a pro-active stance will contain the emergence 
of IDU challenges in the context of HIV transmission" (Government of South Africa, 2012, 
p. 75). This might indicate a move responsive policy for South Africa’s needs, so should not 
necessarily be ill regarded, but it does, however, certainly depict a movement away from 
policy-focused policy based on the Global Fund’s priorities.  
 
Curiously, unlike the other countries that are similar to Zimbabwe in terms of wealth, most 
BCC prevention policies have moves away from the Global Fund policy language. In 2006 
there is one mention of injecting drug users in the NSP: "While the mainstay of prevention 
efforts will be aimed at unmarried young people and married couples generally, specific 
programmes will be developed targeting such at-risk and minority groups as [...] injecting 
drug users (IDU)" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 19), whereas in 2011 there is no 
policy language for this population. Similarly, in 2006 the policy on BCC for men who have 
sex with men was that "Other groups that have been identified as particularly vulnerable to 
infection include [...] men who have sex with men (MSM)" (Government of Zimbabwe, 
2006, p. 13) and "While the mainstay of prevention efforts will be aimed at unmarried young 
people and married couples generally, specific programmes will be developed targeting such 
at-risk and minority groups as [...] MSM" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 19).  
 
This is also noteworthy: "While homosexuality remains illegal in Zimbabwe, there can be no 
doubt that there are men who have sex with other men. They are at risk of HIV infection and 
passing on the virus to their partners, including female partners. Furthermore, international 
experience has shown that ignoring this group or adopting punitive approaches will only 
serve to drive MSM underground and reduce opportunities to dialogue with this group. An 
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and adequate public health interventions developed based on the findings" (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 20). However, in 2011, the policy essentially says this has not been 
carried out: "No size estimation or bio-behavioural surveillance on MSM as proposed under 
the ZNASP [Zimbabwe National AIDS Strategic Plan) has been done to date severely 
hampering opportunities to develop appropriate evidence based SBCC interventions for this 
population" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011, p. 8).  
 
Life Skills-Based Education 
 
In Lesotho, the policy on Life Skills Education first moved towards the Global Fund policy 
then moved away. The Global Fund policy (HIV-P5) language wants “Schools that provided 
life skills–based HIV education in the last academic year (percentage) (HIV-P5)” (Global 
Fund, 2009, p. 72). In 2000, Lesotho’s NSP does make one minor mention of the policy, 
saying "life skills programmes empower children, youth and adults to realise their human 
rights and develop skills to avoid risky behaviours of contracting HIV/AIDS" (Government 
of Lesotho, 2000, p. 9). In 2006, this policy becomes much more in line with the Global Fund 
M&E policy, stating that Lesotho emphasizes the strategy of "Promot[ing] Life Skills 
education in primary, secondary and tertiary schools and target out-of-school 
youth"(Government of Lesotho, 2006, p. 52) and sets the goal of "100 % of schools with 
teachers who have been trained in life-skills-based HIV/AIDS education and who taught it 
during the last academic year" (Government of Lesotho, 2006, p. 52-53). This was given a 
score of 3 out of 4, because ideally, according to the Global Fund, this percentage data should 
be disaggregated for primary and secondary schools. Then, at T3 in 2009, the NSP changes 
its language around Life Skills to say "The Mid-term review of the NSP noted that 
approximately 376,318 out of school youth were trained in life skills based HIV and AIDS 
education in 2006. This number increased to 388,741 by June 2007" (Government of 
Lesotho, 2009, p. 26). Additionally, "% of in and out of school youth aged 6 -24 years have 
had capacity building through life skills HIV and AIDS Education" at "Baseline 408,526 
(Sept 2008)" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 31).  
 
It is important to consider here how deviation from the Global Fund Toolkit can reflect 
increased country ownership of certain policies. The policy of life skills education is still 
included in Lesotho’s 2009 NSP, but the country has changed and adapted the data collection 
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2006. Perhaps collecting data on the number of students instead of the number of schools is 
something that Lesotho has found to work better for them as a country. If this is true, this is 
certainly suggestive of an improved response. It is also important to remember that when 
assessing policy later in this thesis, it is certainly not true that domestic policies are inherently 
better than global ones, or vice versa. However, for this chapter, the aim is not to suggest 
which policies ought to be complied with or deviated from, but rather to illustrate what 
deviation and compliance from Global Fund policy actually looks like in terms of the written 
NSPs in Africa.  
 
A similar trend to Lesotho’s deviation from Global Fund Life Skills policy is also occurring 
in Swaziland. In 2006, the Swazi NSP reads: "Percentage of schools with at least one teacher 
who has been trained in participatory life skills based HIV and AIDS education and who has 
taught it during the last academic year" and "Number of young people exposed to life skills-
based HIV and AIDS education in the last 12 months" (Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 
22). This is a fairly well-aligned policy, though it collects data on number of teachers and 
number of students instead of number of schools (similar to Lesotho). Then, in the 2009 NSP, 
the Life Skills language is significantly downplayed, noting only the objective to "Strengthen 
programmes for in- and out of-school children for life skills development" (Government of 
Swaziland, 2009, p. 73).  
 
The same is true of Zimbabwe. From 2006 to 2011 the alignment of the Life Skills education 
policy moved sharply away from Global Fund policy language. In 2006, the Government of 
Zimbabwe notes how "The country's 13 Teachers' and 11 Technical Training Colleges have 
each either a full time coordinator or a team of trained lecturers to teach the life skills based 
HIV/AIDS Education Programme in schools which all trainee teachers are required to take as 
part of their training since 1994" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 8). And, "The life 
skills education and HIV prevention and care components […] for OVC [orphans and 
vulnerable children] will be strengthened" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 14). Lastly, 
"There is need to consolidate and expand the in school life skills program. The HIV/AIDS 
and Life Skills Strategic Plan for the period 2006-2010 is being finalized by the Ministry of 
Education, Sport and Culture (MOESC). Its provisions will need to be widely operationalized 
to reach as many in-school young people as possible" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 
20). However, by 2011, the data collection in terms of number of schools and emphasis on 
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services through the In-school HIV and AIDS Life skills based education, tertiary institutions 
programme, youth groups, associations and organisations working with youths to improve the 
interest of the youth out of school" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011, p. 30). 
 
Conversely, South Africa, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia continue to prioritize Life Skills 
education, all aligning their most recent NSP with the Global Fund policy very heavily 
(scoring 4 out of 4). For instance, in 2000 in Malawi, the NSP notes that the country 
"Integrate life skills training in school curricula and youth development programmes nation-
wide" (Government of Malawi, 2000. p. 11). By 2003, the policy aligns itself further with 
Global Fund rhetoric, suggesting that "Government shall ensure that young girls and boys, 
both in and out of school, have access to life skills education"(Government of Malawi, 2003. 
p. 20) and "Government shall incorporate reproductive and sexual health education, including 
life skills and peer education, into the school curriculum as subjects of continuous 
assessment" (Government of Malawi, 2003. p. 21) and "Government shall ensure that young 
women and men who are approaching adulthood and are engaged in transactional sex, are 
supported through multidisciplinary interventions with life skills and sexuality education" 
(Government of Malawi, 2003. p. 22). Then, in 2010 the policy is completely aligned, saying 
that "Life skills education has been scaled up to all primary and secondary schools, now 
potentially reaching 3 million primary and over 250 thousand secondary school students. In 
2007 there were almost 7,000 Edzi Toto Clubs, one third of them out of school" (Government 
of Malawi, 2010. p. 21).Additionally, "% of schools that provided life skills based HIV/AIDS 
education within the last academic years" is at 6% baseline in 2002 (Government of Malawi, 




Chief among the contentious prevention strategies is the promotion of condoms. Helen 
Epstein (2007) points out how Uganda’s policies were not favourable of condoms in the early 
days of the country’s prevention efforts in the mid -1980s. She also notes how attitudes 
towards them tend to ebb and flow depending on funding from the US government. Epstein 
(2007, p. 54) notes too, how “as condom use soared, the HIV rate soared as well.” As does 
Edward Green, the engineer of the ABC [abstain, be faithful, use condoms] prevention 
program based on his research in Uganda. He similarly notes now condom use is often 
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However, the Global Fund M&E Toolkit has one overarching policy for condoms: HIV-P7 
“Number of male and female condoms available for distribution nationwide during the last 12 
months per person aged 15-49 years” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 93). However, the Toolkit also 
specifies that this policy is meant to be disaggregated into four sub-categories. As such, this 
project’s policy framework has four policies related to condoms: (1) Male Condoms, (2) 
Female Condoms, (3) Private Sector Condoms and (4) Free Condoms. The degree to which 
countries in this study internalize Global Fund policy on condoms is wide and varied. 
Additionally, the disaggregation of condom policy in four sub-policies helps to further shed 
light on national priorities in this regard.  
 
Table 4.3    Swaziland’s Condom Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Male Condoms HIV-P7 3 4 1 Towards Then Away 
Female Condoms HIV-P7 1 4 1 Towards Then Away 
Private Sector Condoms HIV-P7 2 3 1 Towards Then Away 
Free Public Condoms HIV-P7 0 3 1 Towards Then Away 
 
In 2006 (T2) in Swaziland, the NSP is entirely in line with the Global Fund policy language. 
It states that "While a total of 1,275,000 male condoms were distributed in 2000, six million 
two hundred and eighty six thousand eight hundred (6, 286, 800) were distributed in 2004" 
(Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 26) with an objective to "increase the number of 
available male condoms from 6,286, 800 in 2004 to 10,000,000 by 2008" (Government of 
Swaziland, 2006, p. 27). This received a score of 4 (out of 4) as is shown in Table 3.3, since 
the policy does exactly what the Global Fund policy prescribes. The same was true of the 
female condom policy in Swaziland in 2006: "In 2000, a total of 10,366 female condoms 
were distributed compared to 19,966 in 2004" (Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 26) with 
an objective to "To increase the number of available female condoms from 19,966 in 2004 to 
80,000 by 2008" (Government of Swaziland, 2006, p. 27).  
 
In 2009 (T3), the subsequent NSP in Swaziland was much less aligned with Global Fund 
policy on both male and female condom distribution. The only mention in the policy is that 
the "The NSF [National Strategic Framework] interventions will continue to increase and 
expand the availability and distribution of condoms, and focus on promoting increased, 
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This shift in condom policy in Swaziland from 2006 to 2009 represents a movement away 
from the Global Fund objectives since data is no longer included to show distribution levels 
in the last 12 months.
15
   
 
Table 4.4    Malawi’s Condom Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Male Condoms HIV-P7 3 3 4 Static  Then Towards 
Female Condoms HIV-P7 0 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
Private Sector Condoms HIV-P7 0 2 4 Towards Then Towards 
Free Public Condoms HIV-P7 0 0 4 Static  Then Towards 
 
Similarly, in Malawi, private sector and free public condom policy has moved heavily in line 
with Global Fund policies in the most recent NSP. In 2003, at T2, one note of private sector 
ones: "Government shall periodically review and revise fiscal and other measures to ensure 
equitable access to and affordability of socially marketed condoms" (Malawi, 2003, p. 14.). 
There are no mentions of free public condom policy in the 2003 NSP in Malawi. Then, in 
2010, the policy on private sector condoms reads: "# of socially marketed condoms 
distributed to outlets in the last 12 months (Retail shops, Health facilities)" at baseline 29 
million in 2004, going down to 14 million according to most recent numbers (Malawi, 2010, 
p. 48). This represents heavy alignment with the Global Fund policy requirements. The same 
is true of Malawi’s 2010 free public condom policy, which says "# of (1) free condoms and 
(2) social marketed condoms distributed to end users in the last 12 months" at 14 million in 
most recent data, with a target of 17 million in 2012" (Malawi, 2010, p. 48). 
 
In Lesotho, private and public condom policy also witnessed an increased alignment with 
Global Fund objectives, though not as heavily as Malawi. In 2006, Lesotho’s NSP made no 
mention at all of private or public condom distribution. By 2009, in the updated NSP, 
language was added to read "Additional condoms are available through commercial outlets 
including retail shops and pharmacies" and "Condoms are made available for free by 
government and through social marketing by PSI" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 35).  
Testing and Counseling 
 
There are three policies for testing and counseling in this project’s framework:  (1) “Women 
and men aged 15–49 years who received an HIV test in the last 12 months and who know 
                                                          
15
 Interview data from Swaziland revealed that this movement away from social and behavioral programming, 
such as behavior change and condom use, occurred because of the country’s increasing prioritization of 
biomedical policies, such as TB medication and male circumcision. This is connected to pressures by the new 
Investment Framework to be able to demonstrate tangible results from funding. For more detailed analysis of 
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their results (percentage) (HIV-P8a)” (2) “Most-at-risk populations who received an HIV test 
in the last 12 months and who know their results (percentage) (HIV-P9)” and (3) “Sexually 
active young women and men aged 15–24 years who received an HIV test in the last 12 
months and know their results (percentage) (HIV-P10)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 72). 
 
In Zambia and Swaziland, the NSPs tend to just focus on policy for testing the general 
population (women and men aged 15-49), not most-at-risk populations. In Zambia, there has 
never been any written policy for testing most-at-risk populations or for youth 15-24. 
However, since 2006, in the last two NSPs, testing for the general population has been a 
highly aligned policy area with the Global Fund’s policies. In the most recent NSP, the policy 
reads: "Percent of the general population aged 15-49 years receiving HIV test results and 
post-counselling" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 54). Baseline value in 2010 was 
1,763,896 with the following targets for the next 5 years 2,887,988 (2011) 3,450,034 (2012) 
4,012,081(2013) 4,574,127 (2014) and 5,136,173 (2015) (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 
54). In Swaziland, the case is the same. There have never been policy considerations for 
testing most-at-risk populations, and there have been minor policy focuses on youth. For 
instance, in the most recent Swazi NSP the youth testing policy exists just to note that 
"Provision of counselling and testing for children under the age of 12 years is not well 
articulated or supported by policy guidelines" (Government of Swaziland, 2009, p. 52).  
 
On the other hand, policy for testing the general population in Swaziland is heavily aligned to 
the Global Fund policies, just as the case is in Zambia. Swaziland’s NSPs have emphasized 
15-49 testing at a score of 4 out of 4 for the last two NSPs, the latest one reading: "By 2007, 
26.5% (37% women and 17% men) of the population age 15-49 had ever taken a HIV test 
and had received their results (Government of Swaziland, 2009, p. 57). By contrast - and 
curiously given President Mugabe’s strong stance against homosexual relationships - the 
Zimbabwean NSP does make greater policy provision for the testing of most-at-risk 
populations than its neighbors. In its 2011 NSP, Zimbabwe makes note that "The 
criminalisation of sex among MARPS hinders provision of HIV services because they are 
hard to reach. These groups operate underground for fear of arrest and victimisation. There is 
need for a policy to be developed on provision of HIV services to these MARPs given that 
they contribute a significant proportion of new HIV infections" (Government of Zimbabwe, 
2011, p. 91). The NSP also notes that the "% of key affected populations reached with HIV 
services" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011, p. 29). There is data for this at 50% and 80% in 
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Table 4.5    South Africa’s Testing and Counseling Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Testing and Counseling for Women and Men (15-49) HIV-P8b 2 4 3 Towards Then Away 
Testing and Counseling for Most-at-risk populations HIV-P8b 0 3 2 Towards Then Away 
Testing and Counseling for Young women and men 
aged 15–24 
HIV-P8b 2 4 2 Towards Then Away 
 
In South Africa the policy emphasis on testing and counselling, for all three policies, in its 
NSPs has become less in line with Global Find policies from T2 to T3. For the first policy, on 
testing for the general population, this represents an expansion of the policy. At T2, in 2007, 
the policy reads exactly in line with the Global Fund policy: "Percentage of women and men 
aged 15-49 who received an HIV test in the last 12 months and who know their results" 
(Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 136).  And "Around 30% of those aged 15 years and 
older report ever having tested for HIV in 2005, with a significant proportion having tested 
for HIV in the past year (e.g. 49.5% of 15-24 year olds)" (Government of South Africa, 2007, 
p. 136).  
 
Then, in the most recent NSP in 2012, the age bracket is shifted to start targeting children for 
testing starting at age 12: "A national HCT campaign was introduced in April 2010 with the 
intent of testing 15 million South Africans, with referrals to continued care. By June 2011 
more than 13 million HIV tests had been conducted – a significant increase over previous 
years, when less than 3 million tests were conducted per annum” (Government of South 
Africa, 2012, p. 14). The age bracket is "Universal HIV testing and TB screening refers to 
annual testing and screening of every South African (for HIV – 12 years and older, sexually 
active, with previous HIV negative test, or of unknown status)" (Government of South 
Africa, 2012, p. 43). The language becomes less in line with Global Fund policies for most-
at-risk populations, too. At T2 the policy reads: "Percentage of most at risk populations that 
have received an HIV test in the last 12 months and who know their results"(Government of 
South Africa, 2007, p. 136), which is a direct reflection of the Global Fund policy language 
(it got a 3 and not a 4 as a score because there was no actual data to go with the policy). Then 
in 2012 at T3, the policy for most-at-risk populations is less compliant, just noting that 
"Testing services must also take place at multiple settings to reach all at-risk populations, 
including homes [...] in workplaces, in schools and tertiary institutions, social grant 
distribution points, correctional services and through mobile services in communities [...] and 
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By contrast to South Africa, Namibia’s testing policies have become more in line with Global 
Fund rhetoric, across all three policies, from T2 to T3.  
 
Table 4.6    Namibia’s Testing and Counseling Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Testing and Counseling for Women and Men (15-49) HIV-P8b 3 3 4 Static  Then Towards 
Testing and Counseling for Most-at-risk populations HIV-P8b 1 0 1 Away Then Towards 
Testing and Counseling for Young women and men 
aged 15–24 
HIV-P8b 0 0 4 Static Then Static  
 
At T2 in Namibia, in 2004, the policy for testing the general population was that 
"Counselling and Testing (including routine and voluntary testing)" is #1 under the 
Prevention strategy (Government of Namibia, 2004, p. 8) with "In 2007 the target population 
is estimated to be 424,444 people while for 2012 it is 455,723 people based on the 2004 
prevalence rate. The coverage in 2005/06 was 25% of the target population. [...] The roll-out 
of public sector counselling and testing sites to 319 from the 250 in 2006" (Government of 
Namibia, 2004, p. 11). The only thing missing here is the age bracket, which gets added in 
2010 (representing the change in score from a 3 to a 4, in Table 3.6). In 2010, the Namibian 
NSP says "% of women and men aged 15-49 ever tested for HIV and received their results 
increased from 51% in 2007 to 80% in 2012/13 and 90% in 2015/16 for women and from 
32% in 2007 to 40% in 2012/13 and 75% in FY2015/16 for men" (Government of Namibia, 
2010, p. 29), which represents perfect alignment with the Global Fund policy language. 
Similarly, for the youth testing policy, those 15-24, there is no mention in any Namibian 
policy until 2010, when it gets included in the NSP. "Among young people 15-24 years, only 
31.3% women and 12.9% men had tested and received results 12 months prior to the survey" 
(Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 27). This also represents perfect Global Fund policy 
compliance.  
 
The final noteworthy observation is the movement of testing policy in Botswana for most-at-
risk populations. In 2003, at T2, most-at-risk populations were a fairly well-aligned policy 
consideration, which focused on "Targeting vulnerable groups with behaviour change 
interventions and promotion of voluntary counselling and testing services” (Government of 
Botswana, 2003, p. 55). Additionally, HIV testing is listed as a policy under MARPS such as 
"Mobile populations (Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs), Truck drivers)" (Government of 
Botswana, 2003, p. 33). Then, in 2010, this language is removed from the NSP. The focus 
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Global Fund policy language. In 2010 the general population language received a score of 4 
out of 4: "Proportion of persons aged 15-49 years who have tested within the last 12 months 
and know their HIV status" Baseline 41.2% in 2008 (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 37). 
 
Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) 
 
 
The Global Fund 2009 M&E Toolkit policies for Prevention of Mother-to-Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) are fourfold: (1) “Pregnant women who were tested for HIV and 
who know their results (percentage) (HIV-P11)”, (2) “HIV-positive pregnant women who 
received antiretrovirals to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission (percentage) (HIV-
P12)”, (3) “Infants born to HIV-infected women who receive an HIV test within 12 months 
of birth (percentage) [disaggregated into virological testing at <2 months or 2–12 months or 
antibody testing at 9–12 months] (HIV-P13)” and (4) “Infants born to HIV-infected women 
starting on co-trimoxazole prophylaxis within 2 months of birth (percentage) (HIV-P14)” 
(Global Fund, 2009, p. 73). For policies on PMTCT, most agree that when the science is clear 
on the benefits of the intervention then action should be taken to implement it. However, 
different countries still take different approaches in terms of how they incorporate Global 
Fund policies on PMTCT into domestic National Strategic Plans.   
 
Table 4.7    Lesotho’s PMTCT Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Pregnant women who were tested for HIV and who 
know their results 
HIV-P11 2 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
HIV-positive pregnant women who received 
antiretrovirals 
HIV-P12 0 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
Infants born to HIV-infected women who receive 
an HIV test within 12 months  
HIV-P13 0 0 3 Static  Then Towards 
Infants born to HIV-infected women starting on co-
trimoxazole prophylaxis  
HIV-P14 0 0 4 Static  Then Towards 
 
In Lesotho, both testing for pregnant women and antiretroviral treatment for positive mothers 
have steadily become well-aligned policies with Global Fund policies. In the most recent 
NSP, in 2009, the language for both these policies scored 4 out of 4, reflection perfect policy 
compliance. The policy includes language on the "Proportion of women attending ANC 
offered quality testing and counselling for HIV is increased from 91% in 2007 to 100% in 
2011" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 34). Additionally, "Among the key services being 
offered is counselling and testing for PMTCT" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 37). 
Similarly, for ARV treatment for HIV-positive pregnant women, the policy is equally 
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retroviral treatment to prevent mother to child transmission (PMTCT) was estimated to be 
3966. Available data indicate that PMTCT coverage increased from an estimated 5% in 2005 
to 56% in 2009. Antenatal care, post natal care (PNC) and PMTCT were being offered in 19 
hospitals and 116 health centres out of 167 public health facilities" (Government of Lesotho, 
2009, p. 25). The goal is to get to "80% by 2011" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 11). The 
policy for infant ARV treatment is also very heavily aligned with Global Fund language at 
T3: "The % of HIV positive pregnant women and infants who receive a complete course of 
ART [antiretroviral therapy] prophylaxis to reduce the risk of MTCT is increased from 56% 
(2008) to 80% by 2011" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 11). Additionally, "The ART 
prophylaxis is given to [...] infants during the first weeks of life" (Government of Lesotho, 
2009, p. 34). Malawi has also increased in its policy compliance with Global Fund PMTCT 
Policies, though not quite as heavily as Lesotho has.  
 
Table 4.8    Namibia’s PMTCT Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Pregnant women who were tested for HIV and who 
know their results 
HIV-P11 1 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
HIV-positive pregnant women who received 
antiretrovirals 
HIV-P12 1 4 4 Towards Then Static 
Infants born to HIV-infected women who receive 
an HIV test within 12 months  
HIV-P13 2 0 4 Away Then Towards 
Infants born to HIV-infected women starting on co-
trimoxazole prophylaxis  
HIV-P14 1 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
 
In Namibia, the 2010 NSP received scores of 4 out of 4, across all of the PMTCT policies, 
representing movement towards Global Fund policy compliance in all areas. In Namibia, the 
2010-2015 (T3) NSP notes that "Approximately 67% of pregnant women had also been 
counselled and tested during antenatal clinics," (Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 27), 
"During January to December 2008, 7,474 (63%) of HIV positive mothers received ARVs for 
prevention of infections of the child" (Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 44) and "% of babies 
of HIV positive pregnant mothers receiving Cotimoxazole increased to 75% by 2012/13 and 
to 90% by 2015/16" (Government of Namibia, 2010, p. 46). The NSP also makes reference to 
infant testing: "As part of strengthening the PMTCT programme, Namibia introduced HIV 
DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] PCR [polymerase chain reaction] in 2005 for early infant 
diagnosis of HIV from as early as 6 weeks. By March 2009, 202 health facilities were 
collecting and submitting Dried Blood Spot specimens for HIV PCR DNA test to the 
Namibia Institute of Pathology (NIP). A total of 13,067 babies were tested using PCR from 
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In Zambia, the PMTCT policies at T3 are almost as compliant as Namibia’s, except for the 
policy on testing pregnant women, which while heavily aligned at T2, received no mention at 
T3. However, Zambia’s 2011 NSP does have heavily aligned policy on treatment for HIV-
positive pregnant women: "Percent of HIV+ pregnant women receiving a complete course of 
ARV prophylaxis to reduce the risk of MTCT" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 63) at 
baseline 61% with 85% and 95% targets for midterm and 2015 respectively. There is also 
data on total numbers: "53,588" at baseline 2010 (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 62). It is 
also very compliant in terms of testing infants: "Annual no. of exposed infants (0-1 year) new 
infection [at] 11,782 baseline 2010" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 67). The same is true 
for treatment of infected infants: "Increased proportion of exposed infants who receive 
efficacious and complete ARV prophylaxis from 36% to 90%" (Government of Zambia, 
2011, p. 40). 
 
Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) 
 
The Global Fund policy for PEP reads “Health facilities with post-exposure prophylaxis 
available (percentage) (HIV-P15)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 73). The Global Fund rational for 
PEP, is also made explicit: 
 
[P]ost-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) reduces the probability of HIV infection after exposure to 
potentially HIV-infected blood or body fluids. For maximum effectiveness, PEP should be 
provided within hours after exposure. PEP may be provided following occupational exposure 
(for example, in health care facilities) or non-occupational exposure (such as after sexual 
assault). Within the health sector, PEP should be provided as part of a comprehensive 
standard precautions package that reduces staff and patient exposure to infectious hazards in 
health care settings (Global Fund, 2009, p. 73). 
 
Most countries in this study have moved their policy language in line with the Global Fund 
policies over time. Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe went from scoring a 0 at T1, 
to a 4 at T3. 
 
 
Table 4.9    Zambia’s PEP Policy 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Health facilities with post-exposure prophylaxis 
available 
HIV-P15 0 3 4 Towards Then Towards 
In Zambia, the policy on PEP was non-existent at T1, in 2001, then at T3 in 2011, the policy 
reads: "Increased uptake of PEP services by survivors of sexual and gender-based violence" 
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of sexual abuse" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 40), with "Percentage of health facilities 
providing PEP services" at 15% in baseline 2008 (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 69). 
Similarly, in Swaziland there was no mention of PEP at T1 in 2009 the NSP reads: "% of 
people reporting to be in need of PEP and have received PEP services as per national 
guidelines is increased to 50% in 2011 and 80% by 2014." Additionally, "PEP registers from 
the 22 health facilities which provide PEP services showed that 432 clients accessed PEP in 
2007" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 69). Lesotho’s most recent NSP in 2009 also makes 
note that its baseline PEP service provision is at 10% with a goal to have "All health facilities 
providing ART and PMTCT are providing PEP and Universal Precautions services by 2011" 
(Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 43). The leap from T2 to T3 in Zimbabwe is also a 
interesting observation. In 2006, there is just one minor mention or PEP: "Post Exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) will be made available for victims of sexual and gender-based violence" 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 2006, p. 17). Then, in 2011 the language moves very directly in 
line with the Global Fund policy language to say: "The percentage of health facilities 
providing post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) increased from 7.8% (122) to 100% (1560) by 
2015" (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011, p. 45). 
 
PEP remains a very absent policy in Botswana’s NSPs, with the only mention in any of its 
national policies being this one line at T3 in 2010: "Scale-up the provision of PEP services" 
(Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 21). 
 
South Africa is the only country to mention PEP in its T1 NSP, in 2000. Here, the policy 
language received 2 out of 4, as it was moderately aligned with the Global Fund policies. The 
2000 policy says it aims to "Develop policy and legislation relating to HIV/AIDS, 
commercial sex workers and sexual assault" with a strategy to "a) Develop criminal law 
mechanisms which protect the rights of victims of sexual violence b) Investigate the 
provision of PEP to the victims of sexual violence" (Government of South Africa, 2000, p. 
25). However, earlier in the document it says "Developing other national policies including, 
the Syndromic Management of STDs [sexually transmitted diseases] and post exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) following occupational exposure to HIV" (Government of South Africa, 
2000, p. 11), indicating this policy may be more directed at health care workers. This 
becomes even more compliant at T2 in South Africa, where the 2007 policy receives a score 
of 4, for very heavy Global Fund compliance (data included): "Increase the accessibility and 










Page 100 of 210 
 
(Government of South Africa, 2000, p. 11). And, "The availability of post exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP) services has also improved during the NSP 2000-2005. Policies are 
available; and the number of sites and drug availability has improved since 2000" 
(Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 47). Also, "Increase the proportion of facilities 
providing post sexual assault care that offer PEP to all survivors testing HIV negative" at 
30% 50% 60% 70% 90% over the next 5 years (Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 73). 
Then, curiously, in the 2012 NSP there is just one line on PEP: "Number of survivors of 
sexual assault/abuse receiving PEP within 72 hours" (Government of South Africa, 2012, p. 
45), where the data is no longer expressed as a percentage of total facilities as it was at T2, 
and as the Global Fund policy prescribes.  
 
Sexually Transmitted Infections 
 
The policy for Sexually Transmitted Infections in the Global Fund’s 2009 M&E Toolkit is: 
“Cases of sexually transmitted infections treated (number) (HIV-P16)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 
73). The Global Fund’s policy toolkit notes how: 
 
[S]imilar types of behavior put people at risk for both sexually transmitted infections and 
HIV. People with sexually transmitted infections may be at higher risk of acquiring or 
transmitting HIV infection due to the co-factor effect of an existing sexually transmitted 
infection. Services for sexually transmitted infections provide opportunities for 
comprehensive care that includes early treatment; counseling and communication about 
behavior change and information for sexual partners; access to testing for HIV infection; and 
an entry point into care programs for people living with HIV. Treating sexually transmitted 
infections quickly and effectively reduces the possibility of further transmission of infection 
(Global Fund, 2009, p. 106). 
 
For most of the countries in this study, treatment of sexually transmitted infections has been a 
heavily aligned policy from T1. In Swaziland and Namibia, NSP policies on treatment of 
sexually transmitted infections received a score of 3 out or 4 for Global Fund policy 
compliance for T1, T2 and T3. Lesotho, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe have all 
increased the compliance of their policies on sexually transmitted infections with the Global 
Fund policy language, though their initial scores were not very discordant to begin with. The 
only difference, for most of them, is the inclusion of data at T3. In Malawi, at T1, the 2000-
2004 NSP language aims to "Procure and equitably distribute adequate STI drugs and 
condoms to all health institutions, […] train health workers in counseling and syndromic 
management of STI's at all levels of health institutions,[…] adopt and strengthen syndromic 
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treatment in antenatal women in central and district hospitals" (Government of Malawi, 2000, 
p. 47). The difference from this, to the 2010-2012 policy is really just the inclusion of 
numbers, where STI management is in the resource needs budget, and there is some money 
(up to US$ 0.8 million) specified for them (Page 50) and "% of patients with STI [sexually 
transmitted infections], who are diagnosed, treated and counselled at health care facilities 
according to national guidelines" at 36% in 2004, 90% according to most recent data, and 
90% goal for 2012 (Government of Malawi, 2010, p. 7). 
 
The compliance for STI policy in two countries – Zambia and Botswana – did, however, 
diverge from Global Fund policy language from T2 to T3. Unlike the other six countries were 
data inclusions occurred at T3, in Zambia, there was data at T2 and then do data at T3. In 
2006, the Zambian NSP makes note of the "% of women and men with STIs at health care 
facilities who are appropriately diagnosed, treated and counselled according to national 
guidelines at 10% (2005), 30% (2007) 50% (2009/2010)" (Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 
58). Then, in 2011, the policy is strictly narrative, without data. There is language that aims 
to calculate the "Percent of clients with STIs who report having been diagnosed, treated and 
counselled according to national guidelines" (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 34), but no 
data reported to go with it. There is also mention in the policy that "Various interventions 
have been put into place to reduce sexually transmitted infections" (Government of Zambia, 
2011, p. 37).  
 
Perhaps most intriguing is Botswana, where sexually transmitted infections have decreased in 
emphasis in the NSPs from T1 to T2 to T3. At T1, Botswana’s 1993 policy makes strong 
mention of "The control of STDs [and] STD prevention and care" (Government of Botswana, 
1993, p. 7). At T2, this is less focused, just speaking about sex workers, truck drivers and 
data collection (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 33 & p. 60). Lastly, at T3 in Botswana’s 





The Global Fund M&E Toolkit prioritizes the policy of“Donated blood units screened for 
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South Africa and Botswana hardly make mention of this policy at T3, while they were 
heavily compliant before. In Botswana, in 2010, the policy just makes one reference to blood 
safely, calling it a "standardized formula" that needs redressing (Government of Botswana, 
2010, p. 20). In South Africa, there is no mention of this policy in its 2012 NSP. Perhaps this 
is because blood safety protocol has become such common practice in these countries, so 
they no longer feel the need to include it in their national policy documents.  
 
Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe all scored 4 out of 4 at T3 for 
this policy, with little discrepancy in the way this policy lines up with the Global Fund policy. 
As far as AIDS policies go, blood screening carries little political or bio-medical 





This project’s framework has adopted three treatment policies from the Global Fund’s 2009 
M&E Toolkit: (1) “Adults and children with advanced HIV infection (currently) receiving 
antiretroviral therapy (percentage) (HIV-T1)”, (2) “Health facilities that offer antiretroviral 
therapy (prescribe and/or provide clinical follow-up) (percentage) (HIV-T2)” and (3) 
“Facilities providing antiretroviral therapy using CD4 monitoring in accordance with national 
guidelines or policies, on site or through referral (percentage) (HIV-T4)” (Global Fund, 2009, 
p. 73). The Global Fund 2009 M&E Toolkit has two other treatment policies, one on stock 
outs and the other on picking up medicines in time. These were less policy-related, so were 
omitted from this project’s framework.   
 
In similar fashion to the sexually transmitted infection and blood safety policies, Botswana 
also diverges from treatment policies post-2008. In fact, it is the only country to do so, out of 
the countries examined in this study. At T2, Botswana’s policy says it will endeavour to 
"Increase the productivity of People Living with HIV/AIDS receiving Anti-Retroviral 
Therapy" (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 101) and it measured and "Number of people 
with advanced HIV infection eligible for therapy and receiving HAART [highly active 
antiretroviral therapy] in last 12 months" at 8000 in baseline 2002 (Government of Botswana, 
2003, p. 25). Then, in 2010 at T3, Botswana’s subsequent NSP says "ARV Therapy is one of 
the significant programmes” (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 10). Additionally, the policy 
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(Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 21). It also notes the "Proportion of HIV+ children and 
adolescents accessing a package of HIV/AIDS treatment, care and support" at baseline 22% 
in 2009 (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 40). This represents a departure from the Global 
Fund M&E policy, since the T3 policy language lumps treatment in with care and support, 
while at T2 the data is strictly treatment-related. Additionally, it only seems to speak about 
treatment for children and teens, not the total number of people (adults and children) and the 
policy prescribes. 
 
For the second treatment policy – health facilities providing antiretroviral therapy – Malawi, 
Swaziland and Zambia have moved their NSPs very strongly in line with this policy. In 
Malawi’s 2000 and 2003 NSPs, there was no mention of the number of health facilities that 
provided these services, then, in the 2010-2012 NSP, the policy is clearly aligned with the 
Global Fund’s M&E priorities, with a clear policy around the "% of health facilities with 
drugs in stock and no stock outs of more than 1 week" at 100% for ARVs (Government of 
Malawi, 2010, p. 48). Similarly, in Swaziland, the policy of health facilities with treatment 
available was not very heavily emphasized at T1, with the NSP just mentioning "Under the 
Care, Support, Treatment and Counselling Strategy, they mention an aim to "Strengthen the 
management of drugs and medical supplies" and to "Subsidise drugs" (Government of 
Swaziland, 2000, p. 28). Then, this policy language moves very much towards the Global 
Fund requirements by T3, in 2009, the policy states that "The number of facilities providing 
ART increased from 17 in 2005 to 29 public and private facilities in 2008. In addition, 40 
outreach sites were established and serviced by personnel from the 29 sites" (Government of 
Swaziland, 2009, p. 59).  
 
Lastly, in Zambia, the alignment of this policy with the Global Fund policy went from 
scoring a 1 at T2, to a 3 at T2 to a 4 at T3. At T1, in Zambia, in 2001, the policy does not 
mention the idea of health facilities carrying treatment, (hardly at all outside of PMTCT), but 
there are budget considerations for highly active antiretroviral therapy (Government of 
Zambia, 2001, p. 52). Then, at T2 in 2006, there is a Strategic Objective to "Provide 
Universal Access to ART including access to CCT [confidential counseling and testing] at all 
treatment centres" (Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 27) with a policy of "# of public and 
private health facilities providing ART services" (Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 61). 
However, there is no data reported. Finally, at T3 in 2011, Zambia’s policy on health facility 
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reading "The number of ART service centres for both private and public sectors increased 
from 107 in 2005 to 355 by March 2008. All the 72 districts continue to provide ART 
services" (Government of Zambia, 2006, p. 61) and "Percentage of health facilities providing 
ART" at 29% in baseline 2009, with 31% midterm goal and 35% for 2015 (Government of 
Zambia, 2006, p. 61).     
 
The third treatment policy – facilities providing CD4 monitoring - South African and 
Zimbabwe are the only two countries which are heavily compliant with this M&E objective 
at T3. South Africa’s 2012 NSP says that "Currently, all public health care facilities in South 
Africa provide antenatal care and CD4 testing services out of which 65% offer ARV 
prophylaxis for PMTCT on site" (Government of South Africa, 2012, p. 24). It also says that 
"Point of care tests for TB, HIV and CD4 should be available in every health facility by 2016 
(dependent on available appropriate technology)" (Government of South Africa, 2012, p. 42). 
Likewise, in Zimbabwe, while no mention of CD4 was present at T1 or T2, at T3 the policy 
states that the "Number of labs with capacity to run CD4 cell counts" at 74 baseline, with 85, 
95, 105, 115 and 126 targets for 2011 to 2015" (Government of Zimbabwe 2011, p. 49).  
 
Care and Support 
 
This project’s framework has adopted three treatment policies from the Global Fund’s 2009 
M&E Toolkit: (1) “Adults and children enrolled in HIV care and eligible for co-trimoxazole 
prophylaxis (according to national guidelines) currently receiving co-trimoxazole prophylaxis 
(number and percentage) (HIV-CS1)” (2) “Adults and children living with HIV who receive 
care and support services outside facilities (number) (HIVCS2)” and (3) “Orphaned and 
vulnerable children aged 0–17 years whose households received free basic external support in 
caring for the child (percentage) (HIV-CS3)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 74). 
 
Zambia, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe have all moved their most recent NSP policy 
language away from the Global Fund’s M&E policy on treatment for opportunistic infections 
(co-trimoxazole prophylaxis). At T2 in South Africa the 2007 policy notes an aim to 
"Increase percentage of TB/HIV co-infected adults receiving cotrimoxazole" at 20%, 25%, 
40%, 65% and 80% across the next 5 years (Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 87). There 
are two other mentions of this policy as well (Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 99 & 
100). Then, at T3, the policy language is less in line with the policy, mentioning a goal for 
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needs to be made available at primary care" (Government of South Africa, 2012, p. 50). Even 
more so, in Botswana at T2 the 2003 policy was very heavily in line with the Global Fund’s 
M&E objective for opportunistic infections: "Objective 2.3: Increase the number of skills of 
health workers (doctors and nurses) providing accurate diagnosis and treatment of 
opportunistic infections by 40% by 2009" (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 101). 
Additionally, the "Number of Health personnel trained in the proper diagnosis and treatment 
of opportunistic infections is 590 in 2002 baseline" (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 25). 
In 2010, at T3 in Botswana, there is no mention of policy for opportunistic infections at all. 
This is a significant shift in policy compliance with Global Fund policies.  
 
While Botswana has moved many of its policies away from an policy-based format since 
2008, its alignment with home-based care policies has always been heavily congruent with 
the Global Fund’s M&E Toolkit. At T2, Botswana’s 2003 NSP says Goal 2 is the "Provision 
of Treatment, Care and Support, and "Percent of households receiving home based care and 
support for PLWA" is 57% in baseline 2002 (Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 25). In 
2010, at T3, the alignment with the Global Fund policy has not wavered: "Proportion of 
HIV+ children and adolescents accessing a package of HIV/AIDS treatment, care and 
support" at baseline 22% in 2009 (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 40).  
 
Table 4.10    Swaziland’s Home-Based Care Policy 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
Adults and children living with HIV who receive 
care and support services outside facilities  
HIV-C52 1 2 4 Towards Then Towards 
 
 
In Swaziland, the NSP policy on home-based care increases in its compliance with the Global 
Fund policy from T1 to T2 to T3 (Table 3.11). At T1 there is a slight mention in the 2000 
policy to "Promote and engage communities and families in the caring and support of those 
infected and affected by HIV/AIDS" (Government of Swaziland, 2000, p. 71) but most of the 
care and support language it within ministries of companies: "Ensure the existence of care 
and support services within the respective works, transport and communication companies" 
(Government of Swaziland, 2000, p. 75). However, when compared to T3, the move to align 
with Global Fund M&E framework is clear: "There were 5,443 home based care clients of 
whom 40% were men and 60% women by the end of first quarter 2008" (Government of 
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For the policy on orphans and vulnerable children policy, Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana 
have aligned their most recent NSPs at a score of 4 out of 4 with the Global Fund M&E 
language. Lesotho’s T3 NSP says "This has been achieved by making primary education free, 
providing bursaries and supporting OVC with education needs such as books and uniforms. 
By 2008, 32% of OVC were receiving free basic support" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 
26).Similarly, Zambia’s NSP at T3 states that "Approximately 19.1% of the estimated 1.3 
million orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in Zambia receive external basic assistance" 
(Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 22) and "Percentage of OVC whose households received 
free basic external support in caring for the child (disaggregated by wealth quintile)" at 
53.2% in baseline 2007 with 10 and 15% more respectively for the 2 lowest quintiles at 
midterm and again by 2015 (Government of Zambia, 2011, p. 67). 
 
In South Africa, however, the alignment for this policy has decreased from T2 to T3. In 2007, 
at T2 in South Africa, the policy was that the "Percentage of Orphaned and Vulnerable 
Children (boy/girl) aged 0-17 whose household have received a basic external support in 
caring for the child"(Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 138) and "The second most 
expensive programme (7% of the total) relates to the support of orphans and vulnerable 
children thus emphasizing the importance of safeguarding families through delaying maternal 
and paternal mortality" (Government of South Africa, 2007, p. 140). In 2012, at T3, this 
language is much less rigid in terms of the policy, noting only that "The rising numbers of 
orphans and vulnerable children and youth need a comprehensive package of services to 




While the Global Fund’s 2009 M&E Toolkit has four TB/HIV collaboration policies, this 
project only uses one. The other three are heavily outcome based, and less policy-related. The 
policy that this project uses is “Adults and children enrolled in HIV care who had TB status 
assessed and recorded during their last visit among all adults and children enrolled in HIV 
care in the reporting period (number and percentage) (TB/HIV-1)” (Global Fund, 2009, p. 
74).The most interesting result of the collaborative activities policy comes out of the South 
African policies. At T2, the 2007 had a quite an aligned objective with the Global Fund’s 
HIV/TB policy above, suggesting that it would "Integrate sexual & reproductive health 
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natal care], STI, TB, ARV treatment services and vise versa in the public and private sector" 
at 30%, 40%, 60%, 70% and 80% of services over the next 5 years (Government of South 
Africa, 2007, p. 70). However, at T3 in 2012, the NSP switched the ‘integration’ language, 
saying that "Critical is the integration of services, ensuring all HIV positive people know 
their TB status and vice versa" (Government of South Africa 2012, p. 29).  Also, there is also 
a priority to "the development of innovative new approaches for the prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment and care, and mitigation of the impact of HIV, STIs and TB either singly or in 
combination" (Government of South Africa 2012, p. 86). The notion that these policy areas 
can be carried out separately (singly) is certainly a departure from the previous policy 
language, and from the Global Fund policy language. This is especially intriguing since the 




The Global Fund’s 2009 M&E Toolkit has three policies which focus on Supportive 
Environments, all three of which are also adopted into this project’s framework: (1) “National 
Composite Policy Index (HIV-SE1)”, (2) “Enterprises implementing an HIV workplace 
program (number and percentage) (HIV-SE2)” and (3) “Municipalities with at least one 
human rights network functioning (number and percentage) (HIV-SE3)”.  
 
Table 4.11    Botswana’s Supportive Environment Policies 
Policy  Code T1 T2 T3 TREND                          
NCPI HIV-SE1 0 4 0 Towards Then Away 
Enterprises implementing an HIV workplace program HIV-SE2 4 4 2 Static Then Away 
Reducing Stigma  HIV-SE3 2 3 2 Towards Then Away 
 
For these three policies, Botswana has decreased its alignment across all of them. At T2, 
Botswana’s 2003 NSP says it endeavors to "Develop and implement internal workplace 
programmes in all public and Private Sector institutions, including human resource 
management components (recruitment, retraining and re-engagement) and monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms for measuring absenteeism, sickness and death from HIV/AIDS" 
(Government of Botswana, 2003, p. 27). Additionally, it is mentioned heavily throughout the 
whole policy. Then, in 2010, the only line that speaks to workplace programs is to 
"Developing and implement HIV and AIDS specific workplace interventions" (Government 
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At T2 and T3 in Zambia, the 2006 scored 4 out of 4 for its workplace policy compliance with 
Global Fund policy language. The NSP says notes the "Percent of workplaces with 
HIV/AIDS policies and programmes [based on the WORKPLACE BASED SURVEY] is at 
80%" (Government of Zambia 2006, p. 7). There is also mention in the policy of the "# of 
workplaces, including line ministries, with developed workplace policies and programmes for 
HIV/AID" and "# of employees reached through workplace programmes" (Government of 
Zambia 2006, p. 58). The 2011 policy at T3 is similarly compliant, documenting the "% of 
public and private enterprise with workplace policies and programmes" with goals of Public - 
95% Private – 50% at midterm, and Public – 95% Private – 60% by 2015 (Government of 
Zambia 2011, p. 73). Also, "Data from the Companies’ Directories (NAC, 2008) indicate that 
the number of companies with written HIV and AIDS workplace policies increased to 101 in 
2008 from 560 in 2007" (Government of Zambia 2011, p. 25). These two policies are in sharp 
contrast with Zambia’s T1 NSP, which in 2001 just notes that "A number of companies have 
developed prevention and support programmes in the workplace. One example is the 
prevention and counseling programme set up by Barclays Bank for its staff members. Several 
other companied have initiative at varying stages of development. In the government sector, 
point persons were identified in each ministry with a view to coordinate HIV/AIDS 
programmes in their respective ministries" (Government of Zambia 2001, p. 17). There are 





The Outcome Policies section in the Global Fund 2009 M&E Toolkit is very ‘outcome’ 
heavy, as one might imagine. However, there are four outcome policies that this project 
deemed policy-relevant: (1) “Young women and men aged 15–24 years who have had sexual 
intercourse before the age of 15 years (percentage) (HIV-O1)”, (2) “Women and men aged 
15–49 years who have had sexual intercourse with more than one partner in the last 12 
months (percentage) (HIV-O3)”, (3) “Injecting drug users reporting the use of sterile 
injecting equipment the last time they injected (percentage) (HIV-O8)” and (4) “Current 
school attendance among orphans and among non-orphans (percentage) (HIV-O9)” (Global 
Fund, 2009, p. 75). 
 
The T3 NSPs from Namibia, Malawi and Swaziland have all become more aligned, for all of 
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countries. At T2 in Malawi the abstinence policy (young women and men aged 15–24 years 
who have had sexual intercourse before the age of 15 years) reads "Government and partners 
shall ensure that all counsellors, including career, traditional and faith based counsellors, are 
trained to offer counselling to youth on ways of protecting themselves from early sex" 
(Government of Malawi, 2003, p. 21). At T3, this policy moves much more closely in line 
with the Global Fund M&E policy. In 2010, the T3 policy has age brackets and data to go 
with the NSP objective: "Several strategies and plans have been developed, including the 
National HIV Prevention Strategy, and technical strategies for Abstinence" (Government of 
Malawi, 2010, p. 24) and "Median age at first sex among 15-24 year olds is 15 yr males, 15 
yr females in 2004, 18.1 yr males and 17.4 year for females at the most recent baseline, 19.0 
yrs and 18.0 yrs goal in 2010 and 19.5 yrs, 18.5 yrs goal in 2012" (Government of Malawi, 
2010, p. 47). This policy at T3 scores a 3 out of 4 for compliance, since it is measuring the 
average age at first sex, and no the percentage of youth who have sex before the age of 15. 
An example of a perfectly compliant policy with the Global Fund abstinence policy can be 
seen at T3 in Swaziland. In this 2009 NSP, the policy language is exactly in line with the 
policy prescription: "Young men and women wait longer before having sex (delay sexual 
debut): % of young women and men aged 15-24 years who had sexual intercourse before age 
15 years is reduced from 6.9% in 2007 to 6% in 2011 and 3.5% for women by 2014 and from 
4.8% in 2007 to 4% in 2011 and 2.5% for men by 2014" (Government of Swaziland, 2009, p. 
43). 
 
Unlike these three countries, Lesotho has become more aligned across all four, including 
injecting equipment. This is a rare case for Southern Africa, with most countries electing not 
to comply with that specific Global Fund policy. However, in Lesotho, at T3 (not before 
that), the NSP says "Further the universal precautionary measures which include the use of 
gloves [...] and use of properly sterilised and injecting and other skin-piercing instruments as 
well as their none-reuse, safe disposal should be provided to minimise the risk of acquiring 
HIV from work" (Government of Lesotho, 2009, p. 42). Now, this may be in a medical 
context and not for drug users, per se, but it is still a policy consideration that stands out from 
its neighbours in terms of compliance.  
 
Botswana’s most recent NSP is also very compliant with the Global Fund’s M&E policies on 
abstinence and faithfulness. While faithfulness has always been a heavily aligned policy in 
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increasingly congruent, moving from a 0 at T1, to a 3 at T2 to a 4 at T3. At T3, in Botswana 
2010 NSP "Adolescent and intergenerational sex" (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 8) is 
identified as one of the drivers of the epidemic. Also, ""Scale up comprehensive gender-
sensitive HIV and AIDS knowledge [...] abstinence programmes" (Government of Botswana, 
2010, p. 21). Additionally, "55% of the total population was initiated to sexual intercourse by 
19 years of age and around 8% had have sex by age 15" (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 
11).  Similarly, for the Global Fund’s Multiple Concurrent Partnerships (faithfulness) policy, 
Botswana’s 2010 NSP identifies "Multiple and concurrent sexual partnerships" (Government 
of Botswana, 2010, p. 8) as one of the drivers of the epidemic. It is also detailed on Page 11. 
"Scale up interventions for reduction of multiple and concurrent sexual partnerships" is under 
3.1.4 of implementation strategies (Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 21). They do track 
"Proportion of males and females who engage in MCP" at baseline 11.2% in 2008 
(Government of Botswana, 2010, p. 37). 
 
Both Swaziland and Botswana are very strongly aligned with these outcome policies, which 
are linked to behavioral policies. This may partly explain their large drops in incidence in the 




It is clear that the specific written policies, across all six Global Fund policy categories, vary 
greatly from country to country, as well as from policy to policy over time in one country. 
These shifts are minor in some cases, and quite significant in others. But how can they be 
explained and what are their consequences? While the individual background and orientation 
of the policy writer is certainly relevant, the broader structural and contextual factors in a 
country are also closely related to the way policies get written.  
 
The next chapter analyzes these structural and institutional variables and investigates the 
degree to which these contextual factors can act as predictors or explanations for the ways in 

















Exploring the Causes of HIV/AIDS Policy  
 
 
“Contextual variables and AIDS-related polices must be seriously addressed if we are to 
bring about effective HIV-risk reduction, and work on these broad structural factors should 
therefore be understood as centrally important in order to contextualize and design relevant 




Is it clear from previous two chapters that high-prevalence Southern African countries can 
sometimes take different policy approaches to HIV/AIDS, despite being confronted with very 
similar epidemics. How can this be explained? In many ways, HIV/AIDS might be better 
observed as a political challenge, rather than a public health issue. There is a wide literature 
that suggests structural and institutional factors affect the way an HIV epidemic looks and 
how policy is developed to combat it (Altman & Buse, 2012; Butler, 2005; Dinkelman, Lam 
& Leibbrandt, 2007; Epstein, 2007; Halperin et al., 2011, Lieberman, 2011; Menon-
Johansson, 2005; Nattrass, 2012; Parkhurst, 2011; Patterson, 2006). These popular 
explanations for HIV policy-making include a host of variables to do with government, civil 
society, economic strength, financial priorities, and more.  
The objective in this chapter is to use my data on HIV policy and policy change to perform a 
tentative initial investigation to see if the available evidence corroborates or challenges 
current thinking on the structural and institutional factors of HIV/AIDS policy-making. In 
putting arguments to the initial test, I explore two key sets of explanatory variables: (1) 
economic structural variables, such as a country’s overall wealth and spending; and (2) 
political institutional variables, such as the level of democracy and corruption.  
Causes of HIV/AIDS Policy  
 
The table below presents the correlations of all the variables I examined. Here, it is clear that 
some variables explain policy compliance very well, whereas others do not. These 
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Table 5.1 Correlation between HIV/AIDS Policy Compliance (post-2008) and 





Structural Economic Variables   
GNI per capita r = -0.55 
GDP (Billions) r = -0.28 
GDP per capita r = -0.52 
Net ODA  r = 0.30 
Net ODA per capita r = -0.13 
Domestic Public Spending on HIV r = -0.41 
Health Expenditure (Total) r = -0.64 
Health Expenditure per Capita r = -0.73* 
% of Funding Made up by the Global Fund/UN r = 0.54 
Institutional Political Variables  
 
Age of National AIDS Council r = -0.30 
Government Effectiveness r = -0.29 
Voice and Accountability r = -0.17 
Political Stability r = -0.11 
Regulatory Quality r = -0.28 
Rule of Law r = -0.18 
Control of Corruption r = -0.28 
Freedom r = -0.05 
Corruption Perceptions Index r = -0.52 
Year of Colonial Independence  r = -0.47 
% of Country Coordinating Mechanism Made up of 
made up of NGOs and Bi-Laterals /Multi-laterals  
r = 0.67 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
                                                          
16
 Pearson’s r correlations revealed significant results (p < 0.1) for just one of the indicators measured in Table 
5.1: Health Expenditure per capita (p = 0.062). This is likely due to the small n number in this study, as well as 
missing data for some indicators. However, some relationships have p values that are approaching significance. 
These moderately significant relationships include GNI per capita (p = 0.162), GDP per capita (p = 0.189), 
Health Expenditure (Total) (p = 0.122), % of Funding Made up by the Global Fund/UN (p = -.164) and 















The first set of variables that I examine have to do with a country’s economic situation. These 
include indicators of overall wealth (such as gross national product per capita, gross domestic 
product per capita, government revenue, etc.) and spending or budgetary patterns (such as 
resource allocations for health and donor funding).  
My hypothesis turned out to be largely true with indicators such as Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita, where richer countries are more likely to diverge from Global Fund policy 
preferences in favour of locally-informed HIV/AIDS strategies. The correlation coefficient 
for this relationship is r = -0.55. This relationship is also approaching significance, with a p 
value of p = 0.162. Further, it is not just the trends that we see that are significant, but 
sometimes the trends that we do not (Figure 5.1). In this instance, there are many poorer 
countries that comply relatively strongly with Global Fund policies, a couple richer countries 
that do (although South Africa has moved away from this adherence since 2008), and one 
rich country that does not. However, the shaded area in Figure 5.1 shows, among this 
collection of countries, there are no poor countries that fail to align their NSPs with Global 
Fund policy preferences. Perhaps there is a threshold of wealth (>$4000/GNI capita) that a 
country must reach before it has the freedom to choose the design of its HIV policies, without 
fear of detrimental retribution from overseas donors. 
 
Figure 5.1:  The Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund M&E Indicators and GNI per 
Capita (World Bank, 2010).  
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If the wealth of a country is related to how it directs its HIV policy, it stands to reason that 
the amount of development aid it receives also matters. However, compared with GNI per 
capita, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is not as strongly correlated with the degree 
to which a country’s policy internalizes Global Fund policies. Net ODA correlates with 
policy compliance at a relatively weaker r = 0.30. These findings provide support for 
previous work done by Bor (2007), Nattrass (2006), Putzel (2004) and Strand (2007) which 
has already indicated that donor aid and wealth are related to government HIV policy-
making. The results of this study also support Bor’s (2007) finding that wealth per capita is a 
stronger predictor of HIV policy decisions than donor aid.  
But what about HIV-specific aid? Domestic spending on HIV/AIDS programs (measured as a 
percentage of the total AIDS financing in the country) might explain trends in National 
Strategic Plans even stronger. As one might expect, the more money a country contributes to 
the total amount of AIDS funding in the country, the more it is able to steer its HIV policy 
away from donor-driven preferences (r = -0.41). Thus, if a country is contributing large sums 
of its own money towards HIV/AIDS, as is the case with South Africa, it is logically very 
invested in the policy-making and programmatic design of how that money will be spent. It 
will also have more control, since donor money comes with regulations and restrictions about 
how it may be spent. On the other hand, the percentage of HIV funding that a country 
generates domestically may also indicate that a country is not regarded favourably by bi-
lateral or multi-lateral donors. This can be said to be true of Botswana, where they have not 
received funding from the Global Fund since Round 2. As such, their domestic funding 
percentage looks large, only because they have not been receiving much in the way of 
international support.  
Apart from domestic funding, it is also relevant look at the explanatory power of the amount 
of external donor money received. As one might expect, the amount of money for HIV/AIDS 
that is provided by donor institutions is a highly relevant factor for how well a country 
adheres to global HIV policy recommendations; the more money for HIV that comes from 
the Global Fund and UN, the more likely that country is to internalize Global Fund policies 
within their national strategic plans (r = 0.54) (Figure 5.2). This relationship is approaching 
significance, with a p value of p = 0.164. Until now, all we had was a literature review from 
Biesma et al. (2009), analyzing articles and reports on the effects of Global Fund, PEPFAR 
and World Bank AIDS funding. Here, they find that these programs alter domestic policy by 
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verticalization of planning, management and monitoring and evaluation systems” (Biesma et 
al., 2009, p. 239).  Thus, my data provides support for the argument that policy can be 
warped by donor money. While my data is certainly not conclusive, it contributes evidence to 
the previously existing debate on foreign aid and HIV policy, which previously rested only 
on anecdotal evidence from civil society and government stakeholders.  
 
Figure 5.2: The Relationship between the Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund 
M&E Indicators and the Percentage of Funding Made Up by the Global 








While GNI per capita, domestic spending on HIV and donor funding all help to explain how 
strongly countries align their national HIV/AIDS strategic plans with Global Fund policies, 
the economic variable which shows the strongest correlation with NSP compliance is 
domestic health expenditure per capita (r = -0.73) (Figure 5.3). This correlation is also the 
only one that is significant, with a p value of p = 0.062. Curiously, general health spending 
correlates much stronger with HIV policy-making trends than does HIV-specific spending. 
Amongst these countries examined in this study, those that countries that more heavily 
prioritize health in general are more inclined to devise more locally informed and less Global 
Fund-based HIV/AIDS policies. There may be a spill-over effect, as health expenditure 
contributes more broadly to health systems strengthening. For instance, it has been shown 
that higher levels of health expenditure are associated with higher quality health 
infrastructure (Lambo, 1993). Additionally, increased health expenditure leads to higher 
staffing levels, which affords patients more time to get involved in making-decision around 
the care they receive (Valentine, de Silva & Murray, 2000).  
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Lastly, there is also a connection between health expenditure and overall wealth, which this 
chapter has previously shown to be a strong predictor of AIDS policy compliance on its own. 
Narayan (2007) demonstrates how a 1 per cent increase in health expenditure (per capita) can 
lead to a 0.6 per cent increase in per capita income. This external effect of health expenditure 
may help to explain why it is such a strong predictor of how compliant a country’s NSP is 
with Global Fund policies. Perhaps it is the strength of a health system in general that inspires 













Figure 5.3:  The Relationship between the Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund 




In addition to economic variables, there are also a number of political variables which help to 
account for whether a country’s NSP complies with Global Fund policies. The World Bank 
governance indicators (Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) have previously been 
shown to be connected to HIV prevalence (Menon-Johansson, 2005). Similarly, certain 
governance indicators also help to explain trends in HIV policy-making (Table 5.2). 
The explanatory variables from the World Bank’s governance indicators are weak, with the 
strongest being Government Effectiveness (r = -0.29) and Regulatory Quality (r = -0.28). 
According to the World Bank, the Government Effectiveness indicator “captures perceptions 
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of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi, 2009, p. 6). The indicator on Regulatory Quality captures “perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009, p. 6).    
At best, the negative correlations between policy compliance and the World Bank indicators 
suggest that more effective states with better regulatory quality are less likely to write NSPs 
that comply with Global Fund policies. These results provide support for previous research 
by Bor (2007) and Nattrass (2006) who both found government effectiveness to be related to 
HIV policy-making. My finding that political stability correlates very weakly with policy 
compliance (r = -0.11) also corroborate Bor’s (2007) finding that political stability is not a 
strong predictor of HIV policy decisions. Third, these results als  provide support for the 
work of Suzette Heald (2006), who has also postulated that while we might imagine Western 
aid to work in the hands of an effective government such as Botswana’s, in fact the opposite 
is the case for HIV/AIDS funding; strong states are more likely to reject these programs and 
devise their own instead.      
Table 5.2: The Relationship between the Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund 
Policies and Government Effectiveness (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010). 
Country  
Global Fund M&E 
Indicator Alignment of 
most recent NSP  
 Government Effectiveness 
Botswana 1.676  0.64 
South Africa 2.353  0.51 
Zambia 2.529  -0.67 
Zimbabwe 2.618  -1.70 
Swaziland  2.765  -0.70 
Lesotho 3.088  -0.26 
Malawi 3.118  -0.52 




r = -0.29 
 
In addition to government effectiveness, there is also a noteworthy link between how well a 
country complies with Global HIV policy and their Perceived Corruption Index (Figure 5.4). 
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higher numbers representing more favourable corruption perceptions. The correlation 
between global HIV policy compliance and corruption perceptions is r = -0.52, suggesting 
that countries that are perceived to be more corrupt, adhere more compliantly with Global 
Fund HIV policies in their NSPs. This is also the only governance indicator that is 
approaching significance, with a p value of p = 0.182.  
 
Figure 5.4: The Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund M&E Indicators and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011).  
The reasons for this relationship would appear to be as follows: The largest direct-
government donor for each of the countries in this study is the Global Fund, which means 
that appeasing these organizations is important for sustained funding. The Global Fund, in 
particular, has been known to have a ‘zero tolerance’ towards corruption, cancelling grant 
rounds after corruption scandals in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda Mali and Mauritania. While 
this indicator measures overall corruption perceptions – not strictly Global Fund grant 
corruption – it is still reasonable to infer that countries with higher general levels of 
corruption might want to compensate for this by tailoring their HIV national strategic plans to 
comply more strongly with Global Fund policy objectives. 
Another theory that has been advanced in connection with HIV/AIDS infection rates and 
policy-making trends is that of the colonial past of a country. Velayati et al. (2007) show that 
by the end of 2003, former British colonies had far higher HIV prevalence rates than all other 
African states. This mode of thinking might partially help to explain Namibia’s HIV/AIDS 
policy as the extreme outlier in all of the correlations, since it is the only former German 
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colony of the project. Another variable that is related to colonial past is independence. There 
is an interesting relationship here, where the number of years of independence from colonial 
rule explains its HIV/AIDS policy compliance at r = -0.48 (Table 5.3). This means that the 
longer a country has been independent, the more likely it is to deviate from Global Fund 
HIV/AIDS policies. The small number of cases examined and the small variation in the years 
of independence mean that this relationship should be interpreted with caution; however, the 
correlation between compliance and independence might be related to the state effectiveness 
argument, as countries which have been independent longer are arguably led by more 
experienced and established state institutions.  
Table 5.3: The Relationship between the Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund 
M&E Indicators and Year of Independence (Birmingham, 1995) 
Country  
Global Fund Policy Alignment 
of most recent NSP  
End of 
Colonial Rule 
Number of Years 
of Independence 
Botswana 1.676 1966 46 
South Africa 2.353 1931 102
17
 
Zambia 2.529 1964 48 
Zimbabwe 2.618 1980 32 
Swaziland  2.765 1968 44 
Lesotho 3.088 1966 46 
Malawi 3.118 1964 48 
















In addition to measuring the effects of political regimes and state institutions on NSP 
compliance with the Global Fund, it is equally important in this field to observe the effects of 
governance variables that reside outside of the state. For instance, one should easily imagine 
that the strength and capacity of civil society has a large impact on the way HIV/AIDS is 
managed by government. A strong example of this is the strength of civil society in South 
Africa. A history of active NGOs and social movements bolstered the efforts from groups 
such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in their successes towards a change in 
national policy on HIV/AIDS treatment (Friedman & Mottair, 2006; Ballard, Habib & 
Valodia, 2006). A similar situation is emerging in Brazil, where NGOs experienced a revival 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and are now able to affect HIV/AIDS policy by working 
alongside their with their government (Berkman et al., 2005).   
                                                          
17
 This Chapter recognizes that South Africa did not become a non-racial democracy until 1994, but technically 
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There are, however, significant challenges to measuring civil society strength. There is an 
index of civil society strength, developed by CIVICUS (2012), but there are not 
measurements available for all of the countries in this study. Instead, this project uses the 
percentage of NGOs sitting on the Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) as a proxy for 
civil society strength. The CCMs are elected boards of individuals who sit in-country and 
help to write Global Fund proposals and direct subsequent Global Fund financing and 
program objectives. They are made up of several different constituencies, including 
government, donors, academics, key affected populations, people living with HIV, the private 
sector and NGOs. Each CCM is different, with some that are very government heavy, some 
that are donor heavy, and others still that are largely dominated by civil society. The ability to 
garner a high number of seats on the CCM could reflect the relative strength (or will) of civil 
society in that country. It turns out that NGO presence on the CCM does have some effect on 
HIV/AIDS policy compliance with Global Fund indicators at r = 0.45. This means that the 
stronger a country’s NGO presence on its CCM, the more compliant the country is with 
Global Fund policies. What’s more, if we combine the presence of NGOs and donors on the 
CCM, you get a much stronger predictor of Global Fund HIV/AIDS policy compliance (r = 
0.67) (Figure 5.5). This suggests that political institutions that exist outside of the state may 








Figure 5.5: The Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund Policies and % of Country 
Coordinating Mechanism that is made up of NGOs and Bi-Laterals 
/Multi-laterals (Global Fund, 2011). 
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These various governance indicators also help to explain the outliers in this project. Namibia 
is an anomaly in this study, as it is has the most compliant HIV/AIDS policy, yet does not fit 
the rest of the trends of heavy donor influence in a weak state. However, there are a number 
of ways that these indicators explain Namibia’s position. For instance, among the countries I 
examined in this project, Namibia has the highest percentage of NGO representation on its 
CCM. Furthermore, both Namibia and Malawi have the highest percentage of donors (multi-
laterals/bi-laterals) on their CCMs, which also helps to explain why those two countries are 
also the two most compliant in terms of matching their NSPs with Global Fund policy 
preferences. It seems that the combination of civil society strength, along with donor 
presence, helps to explain Namibia’s extremely compliant policy, despite its relative strong 
political and economic standing in the region.  
 
Despite all of these governance indicators that do help to explain trends in HIV/AIDS policy-
making, there are many others, somewhat counter intuitively, which do not function as strong 
predictors of policy making behaviour. One of those indicators is democracy. Based on 
Amartya Sen’s premise that famines do not occur in democracies, the level of political 
freedom was tested to explain HIV/AIDS policy-making decisions. However, freedom levels, 
as listed by Freedom House International, only explain HIV/AIDS policy at a correlation 
coefficient of r = 0.05 (Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: The Relationship between the Compliance of NSPs with Global Fund 
Policies and Level of Freedom (Freedom House International, 2010).     
Country  
Global Fund Policy Alignment of 
most recent NSP  
 Level of Freedom 
Botswana 1.676  2.5 
South Africa 2.353  2.0 
Zambia 2.529  3.5 
Zimbabwe 2.618  6.0 
Swaziland  2.765  6.0 
Lesotho 3.088  3.0 
Malawi 3.118  3.5 
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Recall that there is scholarly disagreement around whether levels of democracy affects AIDS 
and/or AIDS policies. One camp says democracies respond better (Bor, 2007; Dionne, 2007; 
Parker, Easton & Klein, 2000), another suggests that authoritarian regimes are more effective 
(Chirambo, 2008), and a third argues that there is no clear connection between governance 
and HIV/AIDS policy and outcomes (Patterson, 2006). The data presented here provide 
support for this third stance, since a correlation of r = 0.05 shows no significant relationship 
in either direction. There is no clear pattern or relationship between levels of 
democracy/freedom and AIDS policy-making.  
 
From still another angle, there is an interesting relationship between public opinion data on 
AIDS and the policy responses of the government in this project. Afrobarometer data show 
that Batswana and South Africans consistently ranked HIV/AIDS as a more important 
problem than their neighbors do during the period covered in this study. In Afrobarometer 
survey Round 4, in 2008, 4 per cent of Batswana and 7 per cent of South Africans felt that 
AIDS was one of the most important problems facing the country that the government should 
address (Little & Logan, 2008). Compared to surrounding countries with similarly high 
prevalence levels, this is a noticeable difference. For instance, 3 per cent of Namibians 
surveyed felt the same way, 2 percent of Zambians and only 1 per cent of Basotho. It may be 
that Governments who deviate from Global Fund policies in their national strategic plans are 
responding democratically to public pressure to be more creative on HIV/AIDS policy 
reform. Despite these trends, other governance indicators that one might expect to explain 
trends in policy-making do not yield logical or intuitive results. For instance, voice and 
accountability is not strongly correlated with HIV/AIDS policy making. One might logically 
expect this indicator to be associated with a greater ability for citizens to direct their own 
culturally relevant policy making, but it has a very small correlation (r = -0.17). 
Similarly, scores on political stability do not help to explicate HIV/AIDS policy compliance 
either. It would be reasonable to expect this indicator to be related to state effectiveness and 
therefore explain policy-making control, yet it only correlates at r = -0.11. Perhaps the fact 
that most of these indicators do not explain HIV/AIDS policy very strongly is indicative of 
larger influencing factors in the policy-making process. It might be that AIDS policy is 
driven more by non-state actors/factors, such as civil society and donor presence, than it is by 
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Additionally, it is also important to recognize here that there are many potentially significant 
factors which have not yet been systematically quantified. For instance, many have suggested 
that HIV/AIDS policy decisions are most heavily influenced by the personalities of leaders. 
In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has been credited with developing Uganda’s initial ‘zero 
grazing’ prevention policy, the successes of which have largely been associated with 
Museveni’s open and early response (Parkhurst, 2005). Similarly important political 
leadership has been noted of former President Festus Mogae in Botswana (Renwich, 2007). 
On the other hand, personalities of decision makers have also been shown to affect HIV/AID 
policy making very negatively. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki and his Health 
Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang have been widely criticized for their dissident 
perspectives on HIV/AIDS, which ultimately shaped South Africa’s policy response in the 
early new millennium (Sheckels, 2004; Nattrass, 2007).  
Another factor that has been show to affect HIV/AIDS policy making is previous policy-
making decisions (Baldwin, 2005). Trajectory of policy-making can, in some cases, strongly 
affect future policies in the public health arena, yet this is not something that can be 
measured. So while, Baldwin (2005, p. 3) suggests that “each nation tailored its AIDS 
strategy largely to its long domestic traditions of public health”, there is no existing index of 
these kinds of path dependencies.  Many of these kinds of qualitative factors will be explore 





This chapter on explanatory structural and institutional variables provides data that suggest 
that economic and political contexts are likely related to how a country designs its HIV/AIDS 
national strategic plans and policies. While these initial tests cannot show causation, since the 
number of cases is very small and I have not controlled for third variables, the results do 
provide tentative support or corroboration for some widely held hypotheses on HIV/AIDS 
policy-making. Conversely, my data also reveal evidence that does not support, and thus 
challenges, other popular explanations.   
 
My initial tentative tests show that GNI per capita, official development assistance and 
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other words, there is correlational evidence that richer, less aid-dependent countries who 
contribute more of their own public funds to HIV/AIDS programs are more likely to deviate 
from Global Fund policies in their NSPs. However, health expenditure per capita is the best 
economic predictor of HIV/AIDS policy-making tested in this chapter. This shows the 
strongest relationship suggesting that the more a country spends on health care per person, 
the more it deviates from Global Fund policy preferences.  
 
In addition to economic indicators, governance indicators of state effectiveness and 
corruption correlate with policy making scores as well. Better governed states with lower 
levels of perceived corruption are more likely to write their NSPs in a way that deviates from 
Global Fund policies. The best political predictor of HIV/AIDS policy-making decisions, 
however, is the composition of the Country Coordinating Mechanisms, especially with 
respect to the presence of NGOs and donors. This indicates that non-state elements of 
governance, such as civil society and bi-laterals/multi-laterals, may be the most important 
factors in influencing the HIV/AIDS policy-making process.  
 
In addition to these popular explanations which my data do corroborate, there are also a 
number of arguments about HIV policy making that my findings fail to provide support for. 
For the economic variables, net ODA per capita showed a very weak relationship, which does 
not provide support for arguments that levels of general development assistance affect 
HIV/AIDS policy-making decisions. For the political indicators, political stability and rule of 
law both have very weak correlations with the levels of policy compliance for the countries in 
this study, challenging ideas that these elements of state governance affect HIV/AIDS policy-
making. The weakest relationship found in this investigation was the correlation between 
levels of democratic freedom and policy, but this actually works to support the work of Amy 
Patterson (2006), which previously argued that the two are not related.   
 
Building on the findings from this chapter, the next chapter provides interview data from 
seven of the eight countries in this project, in an effort to supplement and further explain the 
relationships presented in this chapter. Chapter 6 presents ‘insider’ perspectives on why the 
relationships from this chapter might be true, and what other factors might also exist to help 
















Explaining HIV/AIDS Policy Further: Interview Case Studies  
 
 
“Data accuracy is important, but politics is rarely about hard and fast numbers.  




As Patterson (2006) aptly notes, data and regression analysis can tell you a lot about 
relationships and trends in political science, but they cannot tell you everything. While 
economic and political variables presented in Chapter 5 do help to explain trends in 
HIV/AIDS policy-making in Southern Africa, there are also influences which lie outside of 
measurable indicators. These include factors such as relationships, personalities, leadership, 
attitudes, histories and perceptions.  
In order to tap into some of these more qualitative explanatory elements, 82 key informant 
interviews were conducted between April 2012 and June 2013 in Botswana, Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and at the Global Fund Secretariat in 
Geneva, Switzerland. Key informants were selected based on their experiences with the 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs), the Global Fund mandated national-level boards 
which manage the relationship between the Global Fund and the country program. Members 
of CCMs and fund recipient organizations were targeted since these people have intimate 
understanding of the politics between the Global Fund’s policies and how countries 
internalize these guidelines into their own proposal development, programmatic responses 
and domestic policy. In addition, as Key Informant N pointed out, “The CCM is really sort of 
a microcosm of the broader response. All the same stakeholders are there” (personal 
communication, September 18, 2012).  
An effort was made to interview as many of the different constituencies as possible, including 
multi-lateral and bi-lateral partners, government, international and local civil society, PLHIV 
and the private sector. A complete list of all 82 key informants can be found in Appendix E. 
While some respondents requested that their identity be kept confidential, this list includes 
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This chapter will be organized according to the explanatory themes presented in Chapter 5. 
First, I will outline perspectives on the effects of structural economic variables on HIV/AIDS 
policy compliance with the Global Fund. Here, interviews shed further light on the 
explanatory power of a country’s development rate, Global Fund spending and corruption 
levels. Second, I will discuss institutional political variables. For this category, respondents 
illuminated the impacts on policy from dominant institutions, political culture, National 
AIDS Commissions, the Global Fund country relationship and political decentralization.   
 
Economic Variables  
Development Rate 
 
A country’s development rate - often reflected in levels of wealth such as GDP or GNI per 
capita as discussed in Chapter 5 - was cited in Botswana as a contributing factor to its 
HIV/AIDS policy and the way in which Batswana engage with them. Key Informant B said 
that performance indicators, especially around things like maternal mortality, do not 
necessarily correlate with development. He noted how maternal mortality is worse in 
Botswana than in Malawi, for instance. While this is perhaps intuitively true due to the 
differences in HIV prevalence rates, his point was rather that there is a certain complacency 
that comes with development whereby people in Botswana do not think that these are 
problems that they should concern themselves with (personal communication, June 5, 2012). 
He suggested that this is a product of ‘developing too quickly’ or having an ‘overly 
developed perspective’. This prerogative could contribute to a deviation from Global Fund 
policy if the government of Botswana regards itself as having moved past issues like the ones 
emphasized in the Global Fund’s M&E Toolkit.  
 
Key Informant B’s analysis corroborates the work of Helen Epstein (2007), who suggests that 
one of the reasons why home based care is not a popular policy in Botswana is because it 
comes with an association of poverty. For Batswana, if you are sick then you go to the 
hospital, not stay at home. So, instead of focusing on the policies in the Global Fund Toolkit, 
Key Informant C highlighted how other policies are now being focused on in Botswana. She 
told me how “There was always an intervention to the cross-border issues of mobile clinics at 
border posts, so that people can access services,” an objective which the Global Fund does 











Page 127 of 210 
 
Development and wealth is also related to how donors may perceive a country as a desirable 
investment cite. Recalling from Chapter 5 that GNI per capita was negatively associated with 
policy compliance (the richer the country, the less compliant its policy is with Global Fund 
objectives). Interviews revealed that in addition to richer countries having more financial 
power to direct their own programs, wealth was also potentially a push factor for donors. 
Vulindlela Msibi with the CCM Secretariat in Swaziland suggested that “Most donors are not 
even in Swaziland because of that, they look at our GDP. And Global Fund is the same. They 
look at where you stand in terms of your income” (personal communication, June 10, 2013). 
In the same vein, Richard Cunliffe with the Global Fund in Geneva (Fund Portfolio Manager 
for Swaziland and Botswana) intimated that Botswana was unlikely to see any Global Fund 
money ever again, on the basis of the country’s own wealth (personal communication, April 
16, 2013). Once again, these interviews provide support for the previous findings of Bor 
(2007), Nattrass (2006) and Putzel (2004) which suggest wealth and donor aid help to explain 
why countries exhibit such variation in their government response to HIV/AIDS.       
 
Global Fund Spending  
Another explanatory variable explored in Chapter 5 was the amount of money that countries 
receive from the Global Fund. This factor also emerged as a trend in my interviews, but in 
more intricate ways than the raw spending data could convey.  
 
In Malawi, respondents were in consensus about the fact that the Global Fund is certainly the 
largest donor, both in terms of dollar amount and in terms of its influence over policy and 
programs. For instance, Key Informant G noted how the “Global Fund is almost the sole 
funder of our HIV/AIDS programme, and therefore has a lot of influence on our local 
programming” (personal communication, May 23, 2012). In agreement, Newton Kumwenda, 
with the University of Malawi, College of Medicine, suggested that “The Global Fund 
policies do have a lot of influence on Malawi’s local HIV/AIDS programming” (personal 
communication, May 23, 2012). As a result, those guiding the policy and programming 
response in Malawi feel a great deal of pressure to please the Global Fund. This has created a 
feeling of extreme domination over the country’s governance of its HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
helping to further explain Malawi’s policy compliance as the second highest in the region. 
Edith Mkawa, with the Malawi Global Fund Coordinating Committee Secretariat, 
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No matter how much you try to work on, say, they give you feedback, you work on 
something and they bring more feedback. So it’s like an ongoing battle between the country - 
the CCM or the implementers - and the Global Fund (personal communication, May 23, 
2012).   
Similarly, Key Informant H was very adamant that “It’s not a partnership with the Global 
Fund, you just have to do what they expect you to do, and then you qualify for funding, or 
you pass the test” (personal communication, May 23, 2012). Key Informant J said the same 
thing, in terms of making sure the Global Fund is happy. She said how “All we’re doing is 
ticking the boxes and saying we’ve done this. We’ve introduced life skills education courses 
in schools. Where’s the impact? How are you measuring behavior change and everything 
else?” (personal communication, May 24, 2012). There was also a sense that a lot of this 
disconnect between what the Global Fund wants and what Malawi feels it needs, stems from 
Geneva’s distance from the country. This is especially related to financial matters, referring 
to the OIG (Office of the Inspector General), an independent body which reports directly to 
the Global Fund Board on audits and investigations of county portfolios. According to Key 
Informant M:  
Much of what I am seeing is, top down. When I met the OIG group, I say, you know what, 
it’s easier when you are looking at something from a theoretical point of view, when in 
Geneva you can get a receipt for everything. But, transport yourself. Be in Malawi. If I have 
to tell my elder that I want a receipt for everything, you are actually questioning their 
integrity. You have people in Geneva all the time - they have never experienced the reality – 
that are busy making decisions and policies and everything, and they don’t have time to look 
at what is the practice and what is the reality on the ground, to make sure that they at least put 
in some flexibilities. They don’t. They don’t (personal communication, May 25, 2012). 
 
Key informant K also shared this perspective in Malawi, noting that “You have that 
disconnect between the theory and the actual practice (personal communication, May 24, 
2012). 
In Swaziland, too, there was a strong sense that the Global Fund’s expectations for 
documenting expenses were not realistic in the African context. Like Key Informant M in 
Malawi, Emmanuel Ndlangamandla with the Coordinating Assembly of Non-governmental 
Organizations (CANGO) said “If you go to a rural area, where do I get an invoice for buying 
food there?” (personal communication, June 11, 2013). He also voiced that the way the 
Global Fund sees financial accountability is nonsensical from his perspective: 
Nothing wrong has happened here, no one has eaten this money, you cannot trace it to 
people’s bank accounts. All these things are there, but perhaps the paper trail, or we ordered 
more than we were supposed to, because we said we were going to get 10 and we got 20 
because we got is cheaper, it became wrong because we did that so they say ‘bring our money 
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This notion that requirements are out of touch with practicality in Africa has led people to 
become frustrated with how policy and programming must be designed, even if it does not fit 
the reality on the ground or in their country. Key Informant F in Botswana said “Basically 
Global Fund processes and procedures are cast in stone. That’s what we have learnt, and we 
do it to the letter. If 45% percent goes to this, you do it exactly. And I think it got frustrating 
(personal communication, June 7, 2012). Similarly, Rudolph Maziya with The Alliance of 
Mayors and Municipal Leaders on HIV/AIDS in Africa (AMICAALL) in Swaziland aired 
how Global Fund preferences on spending leave no room for domestic knowledge or 
expertise: 
So it really doesn’t matter how you see your epidemic in your country. The people with 
money will come in and you will just be following the money. So my suggestion has been, let 
us not spend time on developing strategic plans. Let us just wait for people who are coming 
with money and follow the money. What else do you do? So it’s just a waste of time having 
these things that can never be funded by anyone. They will only be funded if you construct 
them in the fashion that the people who have money want them. Right now the Global Fund is 
telling us where they will put their money. So why do we need a strategic plan? Why don’t 
we just look at what they are saying and put proposals to do those things (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013). 
     
Hlobsile Dlamini with the Swaziland Rural Women’s Association felt the same:  
Donors come with so many requirements, you end up forgetting your sole agenda, you know, 
why you are actually here, because, you know, 80% of the time you are merely trying to 
respond to donor requirements. And you lose focus on what you initially dreamt of as an 
institution (personal communication, June 13, 2013).  
When I asked Key Informant L if he felt like there was a partnership between Malawi and the 
Global Fund he confessed “It wasn’t and it isn’t and I doubt it ever will be. Primarily because 
even when they talk about country ownership and everything else, there is still a donor-
grantee relationship that is going on there” (personal communication, May 25, 2012).  
In Namibia, too, there was a strong sense that ‘country ownership’ was not really happening. 
Zack Makari, with the Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations (NANASO), noted 
how his civil society organization feels a strong amount of pressure from the Global Fund to 
follow their agenda. When asked about Global Fund control over NANASO’s operations, he 
said the degree of influence was:  
Very much. There are very many limitations.  As much as someone will say ‘country 
ownership, country ownership’, you are really being dictated to do many things. Change this, 
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As a civil society Principal Recipient (PR), Zack proceeded to give examples of how the 
Global Fund influences civil society possibly to a greater degree than government PRs. He 
said that when NANASO became a PR, the Global Fund forced the organization to change 
their constitution, in line with Global Fund objectives (personal communication, September 
17, 2012). 
Following this discussion about country ownership, Key Informant L from Malawi said that 
sometimes Global Fund influence and control is not necessarily a bad thing because the 
inclusion of SOGI (sexual orientation and gender identities) groups is an important thing and 
that would not get consideration unless the Global Fund had significant control over this 
policy area. Key Informant L continues, “For me, that was a good outcome out of that 
interaction, even though if we just kind of said in the country that this were a full-owned 
proposal, then the country would go for  generalized, then ignore these other sub-populations. 
So that to me was a good outcome” (personal communication, May 25, 2012).  
This is an important insight since it reveals that Global Fund spending in a country, and its 
subsequent control over policy and programming, can have some very positive effects in 
terms of inclusion of certain populations. This is especially relevant since homosexuality is 
criminalized in all the countries in my study (except South Africa), yet inclusion of SOGI 
populations in policy and programming is extremely important since they are often placed a 
higher risk of infection than the general population. This adds depth to the findings from 
Chapter 5 that show that Global Fund spending is correlated with policy compliance. It is 
important to see policy influence from the Global Fund as a power that sometimes creates 
space and opportunity for improved responses. By contrast, Key Informant I voiced 
resistance to Global Fund policy influence around the inclusion of certain groups.  He linked 
this disconnect especially to policies and programming mandates that had to do with key 
populations such as MSM, women who have sex with women (WSW) and transgender 
communities. He said that “Geneva’s policies, such as the SOGI strategy, may be 
uninformed. They may have 25 gay people meet to discuss, but what they really need are 
local informants” (personal communication, May 23, 2012).  
Others, while acknowledging this, were not so clear on why the disconnect was so large. 
Robert Ngaiyaye, with the Malawi Interfaith Aids Association, noted confusion about why 
the Global Fund had previously rejected the countries proposals which were based on 
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(personal communication, May 24, 2012). It may be that Malawi has learned from this, and 
has really begun to align its proposals and national policies with the Global Fund’s agenda. 
Key Informant L, who was involved in the Global Fund proposal writing for Rounds 9, 10 
and 11, noted how Malawi is always trying to keep in tune with the Global Fund’s objectives. 
He said that “Then in round 10 there was always this kind of idea that you have to generalize 
the proposal” (personal communication, May 25, 2012). 
By contrast, while Malawi receives the highest proportion of Global Fund money in the 
region (making up 55% of the country’s total HIV/AIDS budget in 2009), Botswana receives 
the least. In fact, recall Table 2.2 which shows that in 2008 the Global Fund did not 
contribute anything to the country’s HIV/AIDS budget. In fact, Botswana has not been 
funded by the Global Fund since Round 2. While this certainly means little to no financial 
influence over the country’s policies, interview respondents indicated that this has also led to 
a wide disillusionment with the Global Fund in general. Dundu Macha, Executive Director of 
BONEPWA+ (Botswana Network of People Living with HIV & AIDS) explained how the 
relationship between the country and the Global Fund has unraveled over the years. She 
spoke about how CCM meetings are often called and postponed and members rarely show 
up: 
I think maybe they lost heart, in terms of the Global Fund, and say, we spend a lot of money 
talking and talking and talking. We are not getting the results of the talking. You know, 
people have other work to do (personal communication, June 8, 2012).  
 
She says most organizations they have begun to prioritize the aims and objectives of other 
donors, since the other ones are following through and Global Fund is not. She suspects this 
is the sentiment among government as well, to prioritize other financing avenues.  
The same frustration was brought up by Key Informant F with the European Delegation to 
Botswana and SADC (Southern African Development Community) who reminded me that 
“the truth is, if you remember very well the last time we were funded was for Round 2” 
(personal communication, June 7, 2012). When I asked her if they had applied for grants 
since then, she said “Enough times to last a lifetime. […] I think it got frustrating for the 
CCM, because you keep on applying for funding and you are always category 2. Where are 
you going wrong? Nobody says” (personal communication, June 7, 2012). Lefetogile 
Bogosing, with the National AIDS Coordinating Agency, expressed the same confusion 
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something that is beyond our control. CCM has been putting in proposals every Round, it’s 
only that we were not successful” (personal communication, June 8, 2012).   
So, while spending data shows that Botswana is not being funded by the Global Fund, 
interview data reveals insight into why this might be the case and what its effects might be o 
domestic policy changes; the country has largely given up on pleasing this donor, choosing 
instead to either source funds domestically or appeal to other funding partners.  
This same disillusionment with the Global Fund and a preference to move to other donors 
was raised in Swaziland by a number of people. Rudolph Maziya (AMICAALL) said “If I 
had funding elsewhere, I would not really bother myself with the Global Fund. There are 
some organizations on the country that have decided that they will not deal with the Global 
Fund” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). Likewise, Emmanuel Ndlangamandla 
(CANGO) echoed a preference for the style of other donors over the Global Fund: 
It’s just not easy working with Global Fund. Those who are working with Pact under USAID 
funding, they will not experience such glitches, because the system is supportive. The system 
tries to identify problems with you, you solve the problems, you go forward. It’s easy. They 
help you to build your capacity (personal communication, June 11, 2013).  
It was not just civil society in Swaziland that voiced wanting to remove themselves from 
involvement with the Global Fund. Vulindlela Msibi (CCM Secretariat) told me that 
NERCHA (The National Emergency Response Council on HIV and AIDS) is threatening to 
retire as Principal Recipient (personal communication, June 10, 2013). When I spoke with 
Khanya Mabuza, NERCHA’s Director, he said that the backlash at NERCHA as the sole PR 
after the recent negative OIG report has been immense. He said dual tracking would be 
optimal, but no one else has the capacity. He said “if you phase out NERCHA, this is how it 
is going to be phased out” (personal communication, June 11, 2013). He then suggested 
Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Planning should step in.  
Another element of Global Fund spending that became clear in my interviews was the nature 
of how Global Fund money is pooled and dispersed within a county. In Malawi, several 
respondents cited the relevant factor of the Global Fund’s recent move to become a discrete 
donor in the country. Until recently, the Global Fund used to add its funds into a larger HIV 
funding pool in the country, along with DFID, the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD), the World Bank, etc. Any funds that were dispersed were then non-
earmarked in terms of where they came from and where the funders felt they ought to go. 
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decided to pull out of this funding pool and become a discrete donor, where it is now a 
separate donor from this larger funding pot. Key Informant J and Key Informant K noted how 
pooled funding meant that implementers were now responsible for writing 40 different M&E 
reports. Speaking to this change from pooled to discrete funder, Key Informant K discussed 
how the new reporting processes for the Global Fund are a significant change in the country: 
Talk about conditionalities? [laughs] Compare their conditionalities to the World Bank and 
the IMF – I’d be willing to bet that things are a lot more onerous with the Global Fund than 
either of the others (personal communication, May 24, 2012). 
 
The Global Fund’s move from pooled to discrete donor in Malawi began three years ago, 
exactly as the new national strategic plan for 2010-2012 was being written (personal 
communication, May 24, 2012). With this massive change in how reporting to the Global 
Fund needed to occur in the country, this is a potential explanation for the way in which the 
national strategic plan adapted to line up with the Global Fund’s p licies. However, they did 
not pull out of the funding pool entirely, at first. Key Informant J detailed how this change is 
not happening all at once. They highlighted how: 
But at the same time, they’ve got a very different funding cycle, so they demand very 
particular deliverables before they can disperse their money. So it means that they are still 
discrete in that sense, they are still earmarking for money. With one foot in the pool and one 
foot out, they’re pooled when it suits them and then they’re not when they want to be 
dictatorial (personal communication, May 24, 2012). 
 
Then, in September 2011, Key Informant K noted how the Global Fund became an entirely 
discrete donor, making things a whole lot stricter in terms of following rules and regulations. 
Others did not feel that the Global Fund’s switch from pooled to discrete donor was as large a 
factor in Malawi’s policy alignment. Key Informant L said that this alignment has been a 
much more long-term institutionalized process born out of an ‘incestuous’ relationship:  
Nearly 70% of money in HIV in Global Fund money. So essentially, if you have such an 
incestuous relationship eventually you kind of know each other’s minds, so to speak, and that 
kind of aligns it in that way. Probably that progression is longer term rather than more drastic 
ones that you might see. But that’s why I say it wasn’t anything that wasn’t already in the 
works or under discussion (personal communication, May 25, 2012). 
 
Changes in Global Fund spending preferences were also highlighted in Swaziland. There, 
people voiced that there was a marked change from the early years to now, where the Global 
Fund became much stricter in terms of how money was spent and how it must be accounted 
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In the early days it was much, much easier to be on the CCM. Global Fund was more flexible. 
Then in 2004/2005 things became more structured. 10 years ago, we were told ‘go and 
spend’. Go and spend, our job is to save lives. Now, things are so nitty gritty. If you buy four 
cars for the money of one, you will be in trouble (personal communication, June 12, 2013).  
Emmanuel Ndlangamandla (CANGO) also voiced the feeling that the Global Fund has now 
prioritized fiscal management over programming and saving lives (personal communication, 
June 12, 2013). In agreement, Rudolph Maziya (AMICAALL) felt that “When we started 
with the first round, the idea was to get money out for things to happen. But all of a sudden 
it’s become rigorous like a bank” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). Commenting on 
this, Key Informant T, who represents the donor constituency on the Swaziland CCM, said 
that the backlash around the Global Fund’s demand for accountability was largely cultivated 
by the Global Fund in the early days, when organizations were given funding and were not 
responsible for demonstrating impact or for having up to date and accurate books (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013).  
Lastly, another way in which Global Fund spending patterns may have an influence on 
policy-making has to do with changes in classifications of countries in terms of their priority 
level. Key Informant J voiced the impact that this has had in Malawi, as the Global Fund no 
longer classifies the country as a high burden area. Key Informant J felt that “this is crazy” 
suggesting that this has had an impact on the rigid policy compliance of the country with 
Global Fund objectives, as it struggles to remain on the receiving end of large levels of 
financial support (personal communication, May 24, 2012). 
These perspectives highlight how institutional or strategic changes within the Global Fund’s 
spending and reporting framework can have a heavy impact on the way in which a country 
perceives the donor and the way in which its national policy may change as a result. This 
finding has especially timely relevance for 2014 and beyond, as the Global Fund implements 
its New Funding Mechanism (NFM), which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7.     
Corruption  
 
The third economic variable which my interview data illuminates is the relationship between 
corruption perceptions and HIV/AIDS policy making. In Chapter 5, this was shown to be a 
fairly strong predictor of HIV/AIDS policy compliance (r = -0.52), meaning that countries 
with higher levels of perceived corruption were more likely to comply with Global Fund 
policies. Many interview respondents spoke to this trend, indicating that corruption in their 
countries plays a huge role in the government’s ability to direct its own HIV/AIDS policy and 
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Corruption may have been a factor in Zambia, where in late 2010 it was discovered that the 
Zambian National AIDS Network (ZNAN) and the Ministry of Health, two Principal 
Recipients of Global Fund money, had misused approximately US$ 10.7 million of Global 
Fund money (PlusNews, 2011, March 14). As a result of the scandal, ZNAN is no longer a 
PR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is handing the Ministry of 
Health’s grants. The Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) is the second PR, 
which is now handling much larger grants than before since ZNAN is no longer sharing that 
responsibility. Chilambe Katuta with Youth Vision Zambia pointed out how even with the 
remaining two PRs, CHAZ is incredibly dominant with how the funds are managed. He said: 
[T]hey have allocated for Faith Based Organizations, for the next three years, they will 
receive about $42 million. Then, for the civil society organizations, they receive about $5 
million. So, when you look at the balance, it’s skewed more to the Faith Based Organizations 
(personal communication, April 19, 2012). 
In agreement is Key Informant Y, who voiced concern in CHAZ’s dominance, suggesting 
that “for them to say they can handle it all is even more worrisome when you look at the 
portfolio” (personal communication, April 20, 2012). As corruption leads PRs to be 
suspended from the Global Fund governing process, perhaps the connection between 
corruption and policy compliance has to do with less compromise in the policy and grant 
writing process. If one organization is chiefly responsible for all of the money, this may allow 
it to influence the policy making process more strongly, with a clear incentive for increased 
resources from the Global Fund.   
 
In this similar fashion, the Zimbabwean Global Fund recipient system is also coming off the 
back of a negative OIG report, where the UNDP is now the sole PR in the country. As is the 
case in Zambia, this circumstance is certainly relevant with respect to the way in which the 
current CCM can negotiate autonomous advocacy and decision-making within the larger 
Global Fund apparatus.  
Britone Chitakunye, with TelOne (representing the private sector on the CCM), suggests that 
the sole PR status of the UNDP, following misappropriation of funds, has significant effects 
on how decisions are made. He voiced how country ownership of those decisions is 
significant compromised without having Zimbabwe as PR:  
A number of decisions are outside of our control. Where to procure, for example. Where 
things might be available in Zimbabwe and where local public sector, or even private sector, 
could provide, the procurement system is done such that it is done elsewhere (personal 
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In agreement was David Zinyengere with HEDEC (Health Environment & Development 
Consulting). Confirming findings on Global Fund spending and corruption perceptions from 
Chapter 5, he also focused on how financial ownership and loss of PR status due to OIG 
mismanagement reports are intricately related to how much flexibility a country has to exert 
policy autonomy within a Global Fund partnership:   
 
There are times when we would feel certain things should happen in one way, and Global 
Fund wants them to happen in another way, but because we are recipients, and the fact that 
we are also not – Zimbabwe for instance – does not have PR status, it makes life very 
difficult. So we just aim to achieve that level where we say ‘at one stage we will be able to 
make the decision’ and that period will only come when our own contribution towards those 
particular programs is significant. (personal communication, May 4, 2012). 
 
In a final example, Maria Padkina, Fund Portfolio Manager for Mali at the Global Fund 
Secretariat in Geneva, spoke about how corruption in her portfolio in West Africa has led to 
similar suspensions and altered landscapes for Global Fund governance in the country:  
 
I work in Mali, and our CCM is pretty non-functional at the moment. There are no regular 
CCM meetings; it happens on an ad hoc basis. Because of the Malian context, as you know 
there was OIG investigation and there was an amount of money that was misused, we have 
most of our grants suspended. We are now signing new grants, but the CCM involvement is 
pretty much limited (personal communication, October 12, 2012). 
 
Perhaps the greatest testimony to how corruption perceptions affect country relationships 
with the Global Fund came out of interviews conducted in Swaziland. Key Informant R 
emphasized that the main context of the CCM right now is the fallout of the OIG 
investigation, which happened over the last couple years. This caused backlogs of money and 
distribution slowed significantly. If this hadn’t happened, social and political factors might be 
more important, but right now dynamics in the CCM are predominantly dictated by financial 
tensions as a result of misappropriated funds (personal communication, June 10, 2013).  
 
After the investigation, which had only just concluded during the time of my interviews in 
June 2013, Vulindlela Msibi (CCM Secretariat) noted that there were 30 sub-recipients which 
were there during phase 1 of the Global Fund Round 8 grant. Now, in phase 2, there are only 
8 left. Because of all the funding stoppages during the OIG investigation they dropped out or 
closed down (personal communication, June 10, 2013). As sole principal recipient, Khanya 
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We started to have problems with Global Fund, as NERCHA, as of 2009/2010. 2008. That’s 
when OIG came in. Things changed because OIG said they will not reimburse us advances 
and relationships in country and with the Global Fund stretched. So it took us about 7 or 8 
months, not even a penny coming from Global Fund, with the pressure from this side that 
money’s not coming. Some of these things we could not correct – they were beyond our 
capacity. So, we know that we then lost favor (personal communication, June 12, 2013).   
 
He continued, “It’s not worth the insults. Whatever you do, either you are on the wrong side 
of the fund, the Global Fund, or you’re on the wrong side of the SRs” (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013). This disillusionment as a result of 
corruption/mismanagement issues may be connected to why Swaziland’s most recent 
HIV/AIDS policy did not move as sharply in line with Global Fund objectives as other 
countries in the region. Since NERCHA is the National AIDS Council in the country, and 
they are feeling quite discouraged with Global Fund processes now, this could be an 
influencing factor that helps bring nuance and depth to the relationship between corruption 
and policy compliance which was presented in Chapter 5.  
 
Further, Dr. Kwame Amphomah with UNAIDS in Swaziland emphasized how the perception 
of corruption is an important factor, which also corroborates findings from Chapter 5. 
Speaking about the OIG report, he said corruption perception has impacted the way in which 
the Global Fund views Swaziland and views the repayment scheme (the initial US$ 5 million 
to repay has now been negotiated down to US$ 1.1 million). He said, “This is also a cite 
where you may not associate that level of corruption – the Nigerian levels of corruption – and 
that also helps” (personal communication, June 11, 2013).  
 
These perspectives from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Geneva all illuminate how 
corruption – and the perception of corruption – can be a significant explanatory variable in 
the degree to which countries comply with Global Fund policies in their NSPs and HIV/AIDS 
programs. By limiting the number of country PRs, often revoking the government’s recipient 
status in favour of the UNDP, OIG reports on corruption remove any leadership ability of the 
state with respect to Global Fund proposals and programming. This alters governance 
landscape which logically then has an effect on policy writing, with non-state actors having a 
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Political Variables  
Dominant Institutions  
 
In terms of political variables, an enormously relevant factor that emerged during my 
interviews was the nature of dominant institutions in the country’s HIV governance 
apparatus.  Richard Cunliffe (Fund Portfolio Manager for Swaziland and Botswana at the 
Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva) called the political context within which the CCMs “a 
power struggle” (personal communication, October 22, 2012). This power struggle was 
readily apparent during my in-country visits, with the dominant institution on each CCM 
varying depending on the political context.  
In Botswana, I got an overall sense from respondents in Gaborone – government and NGOs 
alike – that civil society in Botswana is generally weak. This political circumstance is 
reflected on the CCM, where Botswana has 11 per cent NGO representation, much lower 
than the regional average of 17 per cent (Global Fund, 2011). In addition, perspectives from 
CCM members were in agreement that the board is largely government-steered. Key 
Informant B with the Ministry of Health spoke about a lack of accountability in this regard. 
He especially mentioned how it is very hard to be fired from within government, unless you 
really embezzle large amounts of money. Otherwise, performance-based accountability does 
not really happen (personal communication, June 5, 2012). The notion of government 
dominating the policy and programing arena in the country was echoed by Thatayotlhe 
Molefe, with LEGABIBO (Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana) who said that “not 
too many people are reached, at the end of the day, ‘cause the government keeps the money 
to themselves” (personal communication, June 7, 2012). This notion of government control 
over AIDS financing was also heavily emphasized by Dundu Macha, with BONEPWA+ 
(Botswana Network of People Living with HIV & AIDS) as she said: 
I think in Botswana, the organizations are government heavy. All of them. It’s government. I 
mean people who are coming from outside can feel that they are really from outside, ‘cause 
there’s a lot of government presence, ‘cause the Government does all of things there, unlike in 
other countries where there is a strong civil society. There’s no strong civil society here and 
the government is too strong. This is why, maybe, BONEPWA doesn’t talk too much, 
because who gives us the money to talk? It’s government (personal communication, June 8, 
2012). 
 
Despite this general notion that government in Botswana feels very little pressure from civil 
society in terms of how it should write and implement its HIV/AIDS policies, it was also 
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inclusion of a Principal Recipient from civil society. This means that a portion of Global 
Fund money (should Botswana’s future proposals be successful) would go directly into the 
hands of an NGO. Right now, the only Principal Recipients in the country are government 
bodies - the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) and the Ministry of Health. 
So, with the Global Fund seemingly to have all but pulled out of Botswana, government has 
assumed control of the AIDS response in the country. Interestingly, many civil society 
respondents voiced that this makes for a rather difficult relationship, where all the money for 
programming comes from government, so civil society does not feel like it can readily 
challenge government on policy decisions.  
Similarly, in Swaziland the issue of government having almost sole control over funding 
(Global Fund or otherwise) was raised as a factor that constrained civil society’s ability to 
challenge the status quo. Key Informant R raised the problem that since government 
(NERCHA) is the sole Principal Recipient in Swaziland, civil society feels they do not get 
enough of the Global Fund money and often feel that government is letting them down. She 
said how this constrains civil society’s ability to challenge and debate with government, 
asking “How do you criticize government when they are your main funder as sole PR?” 
(personal communication, June 10, 2013). Khanya Mabuza with NERCHA was in agreement, 
noting that as civil society, “If 100% or 90% of your income is from government, surely 
speaking, are you not a government organization? You are” (personal communication, June 
12, 2013). This dynamic of government control over Global Fund money was certainly 
voiced by members of civil society. Rudolph Maziya (AMICAALL) spoke very strongly 
about this issue and how it leaves civil society feeling completely shut out of the process:  
You are talking to someone who is very disillusioned at this moment. I have been sitting on 
the CCM ever since the first proposal in Swaziland. I’m disillusioned because, having sat for 
so many years on the CCM, I have seen that is has really not worked for civil society in 
Swaziland, and let alone for groups below. We have moved back and forth between staying 
on the CCM or coming out, because it’s of no value. If you look at the amount of money 
that’s gone to civil society, at one point I don’t think it’s been more than 14%. You sit down 
and write proposals and at the end of the day most of the money goes to Government 
(personal communication, June 12, 2013).   
Zelda Nhlabatsi with the Family Life Association of Swaziland (FLAS) echoed this 
frustration, noting that “There’s a tendency to always put forward government initiatives to 
be THE ones that need to be done. When we [civil society] bring the activities, they are 
generally dismissed like they are nothing” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). While 
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allocation in any proposal is in favor of government” (personal communication, June 10, 
2013), respondents suggested that the reason for this is that civil society does not really have 
the capacity – or the strategic direction – to manage grants effectively. Khanya Mabuza 
(NERCHA) said that the CCM was set up and lead predominantly by government, and that 
“Civil society were coming in as people who want just to get the money, but were not fully 
involved in setting up the CCM” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). This sense that 
civil society just wanted money without having a clear understanding of what their role is and 
how that money would be spent on effective programming was also echoed by Key 
Informants, S, T and U, who represent the donor constituency on the CCM. According to 
Vulindlela Msibi (CCM Secretariat), it all comes down to a lack of capacity: 
 
I think our civil society’s weak. That’s my opinion. What normally makes civil society weak 
is issues of capacity. When they have to attend meetings, they are not there, when they have 
to get to meetings there’s a challenge with the means of getting there. Looking at their 
governance structures [laughs] it’s either you don’t have a board, or permanent board. You 
find their books of account are not up to date; they are not audited (personal communication, 
June 10, 2013). 
He continued to highlight how “In terms of advocating for some things, I would say they 
would be swallowed. Some of them are just too quiet and they take whatever it is that’s being 
put on the table because they didn’t read and they’re not prepared for the meeting” (personal 
communication, June 10, 2013). Alison End with the Clinton Health Access Initiative also 
noted how there is pressure to include civil society in discussions, but often civil society does 
not really have the capacity or the voice to really participate or to be involved early enough. 
From the side of civil society, there was agreement on this perspective, with Emmanuel 
Ndlangamandla (CANGO) confessing that “We even don’t know what should be our role at 
CCM. What is our role? What is our value of being at CCM? Because at the end of the day, 
we don’t see the value addition in terms of our voice, our issues, and stuff like that” (personal 
communication, June 11, 2013). This power dynamic between government and civil society 
within the context of the Global Fund in Swaziland may help to explain the country’s policy 
decisions. There is a relationship between state effectiveness and policy compliance which 
was presented in Chapter 5. This more in-depth understanding of how the Swazi state 
dominates the Global Fund grants and programming may provide a better understanding of 
how and why that relationship exists.  
Where government is clearly the dominant institution in the Global Fund governance in 
Botswana and Swaziland, this is not the case in Malawi. Here, CCM members described the 
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clear if you look at the membership composition of the CCM, which is 30 per cent multi-
lateral and bi-lateral seats (Global Fund, 2011). This is the highest donor presence in 
Southern Africa, and is almost twice the regional average, which is 17 per cent of CCM seats 
made up by multi-laterals and bi-laterals. Interestingly, here, if one looks at the actual 
membership breakdown, according to Global Fund (2011) data, it looks like there is 35% 
government representation, which is higher than Botswana’s. The composition of the CCM is 
a good proxy measure for influence in AIDS governance generally. It also tells us about who 
is making decisions for the Global Fund country program.    
However, while looking at composition alone does reveal certain power dynamics, interviews 
reveal ‘insider’ information on who actually shows up for meetings and who has a loud voice 
in terms of directing and steering policy and programming. 
 
Key Informant M revealed that in practice, “Government composition in the CCM is not 
much. It’s actually very limited in Malawi” (personal communication, May 25, 2012). 
Perspectives like these made it clear that the political def rence that people spoke of was 
much more often geared towards powerful donors than it was to other constituencies, such as 
government or the faith-based community. He pointed out how “in countries like Malawi, it 
is almost entirely run by DFID, UNAIDS, etc.” (personal communication, May 23, 2012). He 
also articulated that he thinks this is a good thing, as he heralded the CCM for allowing 
donors to enjoy even greater leadership in the country, saying that the “CCM also provides a 
good opportunity for WHO and UNIADS to provide greater stewardship in the response” 
(personal communication, May 23, 2012). Key Informant M also suggested how President 
Joyce Banda’s recent call to repeal gay marriage bans was “a political step to make the 
donors happy”; it is not to change behaviour (personal communication, May 23, 2012). In the 
same vein, Key Informant L spoke about Banda’s stance on gay marriage, joking about a 
political cartoon that came out shortly after the decriminalization announcement:  
There are two guys standing next to each other one. The headline says ‘Joyce Banda allows 
homosexuality’. This guy says ‘I thought we were a god fearing nation?’ and the other says 
‘no, we are a donor fearing nation’ (personal communication, May 25, 2012). 
With respect to this, Key Informant I stressed how “The CCM does the best it can to follow 
policy. Global Fund says it doesn’t make policy, but it does” (personal communication, May 
23, 2012). This indicates that Malawi’s policy-making is very much guided by donor 
agendas, even if these are not regarded as priority interventions in the country. This is 
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(MARPS) which are illegal in the country, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
communities. Key Informant L spoke about how and why Malawi chose to include men who 
have sex with men (MSM) for the first time in its Round 10 Global Fund proposal as well as 
its 2010-2012 National Strategic Plan. He illustrated how “Within the country, people were 
really realizing that to be able to access recourses then we really had to take into account the 
comments that we received from the Global Fund previously. We are responsible to a donor, 
right?” (personal communication, May 25, 2012). Key Informant H with the Malawi Global 
Fund Coordinating Committee Secretariat confirmed this, telling me about how the laws and 
cultural beliefs of the country are secondary to global policies, especially when it comes to 
including MSM in the national strategic plans: 
It is a big challenge to be seen to be advocating for something that is illegal in a proposal that 
is supposed to provide for national needs. For instance, if you talk about gay people, and the 
law says that is illegal, and then you produce a document that explicitly calls for interventions 
targeting an illegal group. I don’t think that would go down well. But, then there is a way that 
these are taken care of, for instance, through the frameworks, the national strategies, there 
provisions for these minorities. Even though they may not be very conspicuous there are 
interventions that are included (personal communication, May 23, 2012). 
Key Informant K also touched on this, noting how donor pressure has had a huge impact on 
what gets included in national policy: “And MSM is also explicitly in government’s national 
prevention policy, which was launched by the President. I don’t think he read it though 
[laughs]” (personal communication, May 24, 2012). He continued to put forward that this 
type of external control over policy may be a really detrimental thing: 
Realistically, what portion of the epidemic do they represent? Because, one of the things that 
we do very well in HIV is that we create lots of set-aside little fiefdoms – you have your seat 
and you have your seat and you have your seat – and those kind of cast or class reservation 
policies may or may not contribute to good decision making at country level, because they 
may or may not actually reflect the reality of the epidemic (personal communication, May 24, 
2012). 
Lastly, while Malawi’s dominant institution is certainly donor constituencies, like Botswana 
it is also faced with a rather weak civil society. In Malawi, there are two PRs - the National 
AIDS Commission (NAC) and the Ministry of Health. The CCM Secretariat would like to 
have more PRs, especially some from civil society. Ideally, most respondents felt that having 
some local civil society PRs would be advantageous, but so far the organizational or 
knowledge capacity to financially manage large grants has not been demonstrated by these 
organizations.  
The same is true in Swaziland, where many voiced the need for dual tracking (having both 
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strong enough. Key Informant R said that there has been progress in the last couple of months 
for CANGO to potentially be a sub-recipient, however, the Global Fund team fears there may 
not be time, since the Round 8 grant ends in December 2013 (before transitional funding 
begins in January 2014). However, her worry was less about time and more about capability. 
She said comparing CANGO to NERCHA is like comparing apples and oranges; CANGO is 
very small scope while NERCHA is huge. She said “You could easily crush CANGO with 
giving them too much, too soon” (personal communication, June 10, 2013). They have to 
start out small and grow incrementally. Emmanuel Ndlangamandla, Director of CANGO, was 
in complete agreement, voicing how previous experiences with Global Fund grants have been 
detrimental for his organization: 
It has created a loss of confidence in the whole set up and questioning amongst ourselves as 
civil society ‘is it worth it?’ because if you happen to get Global Fund money then it literally 
destroys your institution instead of building it up. Your staff loses morale, they are not paid 
on time, and you are just stuck with something that doesn’t work (personal communication, 
June 10). 
Organizations like Pact are helping to grow and support civil society in Swaziland, especially 
with an objective to help them become recipients of Global Fund money. Until they have that 
capacity it is likely that government will continue relatively unchallenged in Swaziland’s 
Global Fund program.  
Like Botswana and Malawi, civil society respondents from the Zambian CCM also voiced the 
political context of weak civil society. When I spoke with civil society key informants about 
the sources of HIV/AIDS funding and how different constituency influence factored in, there 
were mixes views. Carol Nawina Nyirenda, who was previously the civil society 
representative on the Global Fund Board in Geneva, noted that civil society in the country is 
really no match for the government or international NGOs. When I asked her if she felt local 
groups could raise their voices and speak in CCM meetings, she said:  
Frankly? No. You have the big NGOs and then you then have the government – they are very 
intimidating. People sometimes tread with care, even when they know what is happening is 
not good. They would know what they are doing is a disservice to their constituencies, but 
they don’t really have […] the information. Sometimes the people who come to represent 
people don’t even know who it is they really represent, or why they are there (personal 
communication, April 18, 2012). 
 
It seems that government in Zambia is one of the more dominant institutions in the 
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The CCM is a different jungle altogether. You could be a good speaker among your fellow 
youth, or you could be a good speaker among your fellow women, then you come to this 
group, and if you are not used to working with governments, it is easy to get intimidated 
(personal communication, April 18, 2012). 
She also said that civil society has greater power dealing with donors than they do with the 
Zambian government. When we spoke about governmental control on the CCM, and their 
control over resources, she said: 
For me, my personal view, if the money is coming from here is might even be worse, 
especially if the money’s from the government. They might say ‘this money is for this! Take 
it or leave it!’ Sometimes I feel, at international level, we even have more space as civil 
society than at country level (personal communication, April 18, 2012). 
 
The Zambian government also showed a level of willingness to stand up to Global Fund 
prescriptions, which is not as evident in other contexts. Edwidge Mutale, who is the 
Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office of the Gender and Child Development Division, 
said that:  
What I would want to believe is, for me, I don’t think I see any contradictions. The Global 
Fund, who have a generic kind of strategy, because it’s looking at a broader perspective 
worldwide, but then when it comes to the specifics, this is where now we should say, as 
Zambians, this is where we’ve got issues. This is where we need help. Because I think some 
of the issues that might be issue with us, might not be issues somewhere else (personal 
communication, April 19, 2012). 
 
Mutale continued to indicate that the Zambian government is willing to assert its dominance 
in policy priorities to the Global Fund, telling me that the country will not budge on its 
position on certain policy issues. When I asked her about HIV/AIDS policy for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) populations, she revealed that global policy would not 
affect local decision making in this regard: 
[T]hat issue…let’s talk about what is the position on that. In Zambia, legally, it’s illegal. 
Traditionally, it’s taboo, so we don’t even want to talk about it. From a religious point of 
view, this is a country that has got Zambia being a Christian nation embedded in its 
constitution, so again that is a no-go area. So for us that position is very clear. If they [the 
Global Fund] are going to use it as conditionality, then it’s unfortunate for us, because that’s 
our position. We cannot move from there” (personal communication, April 19, 2012). 
 
The relative strength of the Zambian state on the CCM and in relation to the Global Fund 
may help to explain how state strength is related to less HIV/AIDS policy compliance than 
other countries in the region. Next to Botswana and South Africa, Zambia HIV/AIDS policy 
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not explain its position in the region very well, the results of my interviews suggest that the 
state really is the dominant institution in Global Fund processes in Zambia.     
Similar to Botswana and Zambia, it appears that the government is also the dominant 
institution on the Zimbabwean CCM. Key Informant Z2 spoke to this notion quite directly, 
noting how: 
It’s always been led by the ministry, and their agenda. And not always the wrong agenda.The 
ministry wants activities that they can manage, and they want the funds coming to them. But 
most of what they have advocated for hasn’t been terribly wrong. It’s fairly well aligned. It’s 
not off the wall (personal communication, May 2, 2012). 
 
Sebastian Chinhaire, Zimbabwe Network for People Living with HIV, also said that Global 
Fund influence in the country is not really that strong, mainly due to government power. He 
said that “Global Fund policies have some influence over Zimbabwe's local HIV/AIDS 
programs, because of the guidelines on what they consider high impact interventions” 
(personal communication, May 3, 2012), but that this control is limited due to state 
dominance.  
Contrary to Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, interview data from 
Namibia highlights it as an example of a country with a strong civil society. Unlike 
Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia where government is a very dominant force, and unlike 
Malawi where donors influence policy and programming the most, Namibia’s civil society 
sector is a very strong component of their HIV/AIDS response. As briefly highlighted in the 
previous chapter, Namibia has the highly proportion of NGO representation on its CCM of all 
the countries in Southern African region. Where the regional average is 17 per cent NGO 
representation, this constituency on Namibia makes up 26 per cent of the CCM (Global Fund, 
2011). Along with having the highest proportion of NGO representation on its CCM in the 
region, Namibia also has the lowest proportion of government seats, at 26 per cent, 11 per 
cent below the regional average.  
Diane Cooper, with the University of Cape Town, School of Public Health, Women’s Health 
Research Unit immediately began to draw stark contrasts between her experiences with 
Namibian and South African policy-making. Having recently taken part in an Open Society 
of Southern Africa HIV Advocacy Agenda Setting Project she had some insight on these 
comparative processes. She noted how “For Namibia, there was an incredibly strong women 
living with HIV organization, and they’ve been doing fantastic advocacy work in Namibia” 
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effective civil society advocacy from the Namibian constituencies, which bolter the ideas in 
the previous section. Diane Cooper mentioned how: 
 
The guy who was from the LGBT constituency, from the gay men’s association in Namibia 
was unbelievably involved in lots of advocacy and getting their government to sort of account 
for what they were doing. Given the difficult legal situation, I was really impressed with how 
they’ve managed to get quite a few interviews with government, getting them to commit 
themselves to various things (personal communication, August 6, 2012). 
 
Recalling from Chapter 5 that the size of donor and civil society constituencies on the CCM 
were good predictors of how compliant a country’s HIV/AIDS policy would be with the 
Global Fund Toolkit, there are other ways in which CCM membership helps to explain policy 
trends. Interview data revealed that there are often alliances formed on the CCM, where 
certain constituencies will band together. In different countries, alliances are formed between 
different groups. These alliances may actually matter even more in terms of explaining why 
some countries are more compliant with Global Fund policies than others.  
Viviane Hughes-Lanier, Fund Portfolio Manager for Niger, told me in Geneva that “looking 
at the composition and actually being in a meeting is so different. Power dynamics don’t 
come through in numbers” (personal communication, April 16, 2013). She said representation 
and participation are two completely different things, and you have to get at who is 
participating and the quality of that participation in order to really understand who is 
influencing decision making in Global Fund processes. Similarly, Susan Amoaten, 
independent consultant on systems strengthening in Swaziland also emphasized that “The 
first and most obvious things that always ignored in CCMs is the power relations” (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013). While CCM alliances were clear in all countries I conducted 
interviews in, Swaziland was perhaps the most striking example.    
In Swaziland civil society groups such as CANGO, FLAS and AMICAALL all voiced that 
government and donors form a strong team on the CCM and this often leaves civil society on 
their own in terms of support from other constituencies. Emmanuel Ndlangamandla 
(CANGO) said “civil society is on their own and they don’t attract the voice from the others 
as allies, as government does” (personal communication, June 11, 2013). Zelda Nhlabatsi 
(FLAS) said the same thing, pointing out how the donors always seem to be supporting 
government or international groups rather than local civil society on the CCM:  
Eh, UN. We recently did some courtesy visits to just strengthen them. Sometimes you just 
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but…..that’s what happened. The UN and PEPFAR. PEPFAR for example, or USAID, are 
supporting these international organizations who hardly interact with the locals (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013).   
Similarly, Rudolph Maziya (AMICAALL) noted that the donor constituency has quite a lot of 
power on the CCM: 
The interest of donors on the CCM arises from the fact that they want to control the agenda 
because they want to direct not only their funds, but also the funds that we get though the 
global fund process, on interventions that they’re convinced on, not interventions as we see 
them as a country. So their power comes from money (personal communication, June 12, 
2013).   
Continuing, Maziya noted how donors on the CCM often use this power in support of 
government, rather than civil society. In reference to supporting the government’s proposed 
activities for the Transitional Funding Mechanism starting in January 2014, he said “The 
donors like PEPFAR, I’m sure, came on board” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). 
Interestingly, this perspective was shared by government as well. Khanya Mabuza 
(NERCHA) agreed with Nhlabatsi (FLAS) and Maziya (AMICAALL) that there are ‘camps’ 
on the CCM – donors vs. government vs. civil society. He said when these camps form, they 
are often able to influence decision-making: 
We know that some partners have very strong connections within the Global Fund. They can 
easily influence CCMs. When you disagree, the next day the Global Fund will be aware and 
they will take sides.  
When I spoke to the donor constituencies about this perception that funding partners and 
government band together on the CCM, Key Informant S said “it would seem that way”, but 
this is mostly because civil society’s capacity is so weak. She gave the example of the 
proposal for transitional funding. The Global Fund made it clear that you cannot propose new 
activities. What does civil society do? Come to the table with three new activities (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013). She continued to explain that donor and government 
cooperation stems from a frustration with civil society’s capacity: “Does civil society 
understand what’s required of them? No. They just want funding. Period (personal 
communication, June 12, 2013).  
So, when looking at CCM composition and participation of difference constituencies, it was 
clear that different countries were experiencing different power dynamics with respect to the 
dominant institutions (state, donor or civil society) and how those groups interact with each 
other, often forming political alliances on the CCM. These insights shed light on some of the 
trends from Chapter 5, which show relationships between government effectiveness, the age 
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the power dynamics that underlie these relationships helps to further elucidate why some 




In addition to the role of dominant institutions, the political culture of a country was raised by 
nearly all respondents, across all eight countries, as a contributing factor to the way 
HIV/AIDS policy is developed and who leads the process. Richard Cunliffe, who is the 
Global Fund Portfolio Manager for Botswana and Swaziland highlighted two elements of 
political culture that are relevant in Swaziland in particular. He began by saying that culture 
shapes who speaks and which what authority on the CCM. According to him, “although you 
might have people sitting, on the CCM, the cultural power dynamic is that the voice that 
women perhaps isn’t as strong. There’s definitely a very sort-of hierarchal system” (personal 
communication, October 22, 2012).  
However, Cunliffe noted that the more important political cultural context is that of the King 
and the monarchy. He said that “The context within which the CCM sits is that it is a very 
political CCM to the point where the chair of the CCM is also the advisor to the King, who is 
an absolute monarch. That’s always going to be a real challenge” (personal communication, 
October 22, 2012). He also said that the King picks and chooses CCM members, when they 
are really supposed to be elected by their constituencies. Commenting on this, Susan 
Amoaten (Independent Consultant – Systems Strengthening) said it is a strange dynamic to 
be sit in on CCM meetings in Swaziland, since the CCM is a system of democracy in a 
country that does not believe in that (personal communication, June 12, 2013). Key Informant 
R said the same thing, noting that “People do their best to be respectful of the King” 
(personal communication, June 10, 2013). Emmanuel Ndlangamandla (CANGO) felt very 
strongly that the Political Culture around the monarchy definitely influenced decision making 
around policy ad programming in the country:   
Some of the strategies that government may push might not be strategies that will bring 
results, as such, but it’s because they are politically correct. Because the King will be pleased 
to see you are using this structure or that structure, whether they work or not. There’s a lot of 
investment that’s been done in constructing infrastructure at the chiefdom level, but it’s not 
working. But politically it was correct to mobilize the chiefs to be part of the greater 
movement in fighting HIV/AIDS. Practically, not much has been done to use the facilities 
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Further, Zelda Nhlabatsi (FLAS) said influence from the monarchy extends, so it is “Not just 
the king, even the other influential people. So people they’re always making decisions, 
statements, based on ‘so and so would like to hear this’ so people are just not objective” 
(personal communication, June 12, 2013). 
In addition, interviews in Swaziland revealed more depth as to why the political culture of the 
King and the monarchy might affect HIV/AIDS policy-making. Susan Amoaten (Independent 
Consultant – Systems Strengthening) noted how the system of government limits civil 
society’s ability to act freely: “Here is particular the antagonism between civil society and 
government is extreme because civil society is seen as the root into political activism, which 
is obviously illegal in Swaziland. It’s illegal to criticize government. You’re put into jail for 
it” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). 
Hlobsile Dlamini (Swaziland Rural Women’s Association) said the same thing: “The moment 
you say ‘human rights’ you are deemed to be talking politics, and obviously when we’re 
speaking human rights there are a lot of issues we are going to touch on, that ordinarily we 
shouldn’t be interfering with according to politics” (personal communication, June 13, 2013). 
She says she gets challenged for being a political party the moment she speaks about human 
rights, and this gets her into trouble with the government.   
These results were very useful in terms of interpreting results from Chapter 5. The 
correlations from that chapter revealed that there was no association between levels of 
democracy and HIV/AIDS policy-making. These findings confirmed previous research from 
Amy Patterson (2006). However, it seems that in Swaziland, the system of government does 
matter. Perhaps this means that elements of political culture with respect to type of 
government are more nuanced than indicator data on levels of freedom or voice and 
accountability show, and are an important factor to consider when explaining HIV/AIDS 
policy-making trends.  
Other ways in which political culture affects HIV/AIDS policy-making were discussed by 
interviewees in Botswana. First, Key Informant B pointed out how the small nature of the 
country plays a large role in its politics; tenders from certain names carry more weight than 
others because everyone knows the big rich names in the country (personal communication, 
June 5, 2012). Lame Charmaine Olebile with LEGABIBO said the same thing. She said the 
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It’s about time that we take a softer approach. As you know, in Botswana, it’s like, I would 
now the attorney general, the next person knows the attorney general, the case is not the same 
in South Africa where there are a lot of people. There are only 2 million of us here. So, a lot 
of the times, the work that is done is just talking to people in parliament, because sometimes 
some of them are your Uncles! So we’re just doing a lot of negotiations in offices with 
government officials, and we try to avoid the whole ‘toyi-toyi’ and what not because it’s not 
our approach and it’s not working for us. The softer approach has helped a lot” (personal 
communication, June 7, 2012). 
 
Similarly, in Swaziland it was raised that the small and inter-connected nature of the country 
plays a significant role in the way in which people are able to enter into debate with each 
other. Susan Amoaten (Independent Consultant – Systems Strengthening) said:  
 
Here, in terms of the inclusion of different voices, Swaziland a huge total disadvantage which 
has nothing to do with the mechanism [CCM], which is that everyone is related to everybody 
else in one way or another. It’s a tiny country. Same problem in Lesotho. I gather it’s the 
same problem in Namibia where there’s very low population density, probably in Botswana.  
It’s a really fundamental problem here. You will be members of the same village community, 
you’ll be members of the same church, you will have gone to university together, you will be 
blood related or related through marriage. This makes it extremely difficult, therefor, to have a 
robust debate. And within that, of course, is the Swazi sense of pride in maintaining the status 
quo. This is a country that’s very proud of the fact it’s seen as traditionalist. And the hierarchy 
– I find it completely impossible to break through (personal communication, June 12, 2013).  
 
These perspectives confirm ideas in academic circles that Botswana’s political culture in this 
regard is fundamental in the way in which civil society engages and the way policy-making 
and policy-changing processes occur. Zibani Maundeni (2004) argues that the main reason 
why Botswana’s civil society is considered weak by some is because it stages very few 
violent clashes with government that lead to the reversal of policies. However, for Maundeni, 
this is a Eurocentric measure of strength that is inappropriate for the political culture of 
Batswana, one that emphasizes open discussions and dissuades violent behaviour. In 
agreement is Deborah Durham (1999) who says that when men fight in kgotla (chief’s court) 
it becomes the subject of general ridicule for days, even years. In support of this, Connie 
Scanlon (2002) quotes a member of the Working Group for Indigenous People in Southern 
Africa, a local non-governmental organization (NGO) in Botswana, as saying “you know you 
are not fighting, you don’t go and say bad things about your government.”  
Lame’s sentiments endorse these ideas, as she insisted that it was very important to consider 
the politics of Botswana in all of the advocacy civil society does with government. When she 
organizes marches with her friends, she says to them “remember, we are not South Africa. 
Our history is not the same. Some things, we really don’t need to do because people will not 
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communication, June 7, 2012). However, while this may be the political culture, informants 
from within government noted how this is not really the way things work. While it may be 
culturally and politically taboo to object or voice opinions in an emphatic manner, Key 
Informant B with the Ministry of Health reminded me that policy-making is very much a 
system driven by personalities, where the one with the loudest voice gets his agenda pushed. 
He said he did not think this was the way things ought to be, but it was the case (personal 
communication, June 5, 2012). 
The same sense of political culture was voiced in Malawi, where the culture of civil society is 
not to challenge those in power. Key Informant I noted how “Because of the culture, people 
are not going to piss off their peers to push an agenda” (personal communication, May 23, 
2012). Key Informant K agreed with this point, as did Key Informant J, who said “I think you 
go against the grain when you are a local organization and you’re raising it with parliament” 
(personal communication, May 23, 2012).  In another sense, Key informant K brought up the 
political culture of ‘equality’ in Malawi. He said that the reason why Malawi’s policy is so 
generalized is because of the cultural environment: 
 
In this recourse constrained environment, one of the things that a lot of us are pushing on is 
the fact that now you have to start making choices. What are you going to stop doing, so that 
you can take that money and put it somewhere else that will do more and be more useful. That 
kind of a discussion in Malawi doesn’t happen. If we can’t all have ten, then we all have 
three. But you don’t get six, and he gets two and I get nothing. No. We all get three. Equality 
in that sense, of making sure that everybody’s got the same, no one’s different, no one’s 
standing out. If you do a prioritization workshop, everything’s a priority. Nothing is a priority 
because everything is a priority. We don’t make choices (personal communication, May 24, 
2012). 
 
This might help explain why the most recent Malawian national strategic plan is so tailored to 
the Global Fund’s objectives. Perhaps it is not culturally viable to produce policy that is 
geared or aimed towards specific people or specific interventions at the cost of others. So, 
you end up getting quite a broad, generalizable document, just like the Global Fund’s M&E 
Toolkit.  
As in Malawi, in Zambia, too, a political culture of passivity is a factor among civil society. 
Key Informant Y (a representative from the NGO constituency on the CCM) suggested how 
Zambian culture affects the control from Geneva. He told me how “This instruction about 
removing the Ministry [of Health], it came as a recommendation from Geneva, but he 
basically phrased it as saying ‘well, it has to be done like this’” (personal communication, 
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recommendations as directives. He said that “it sometimes happens here. People will not 
necessarily challenge you on it” (personal communication, April 20, 2012).  
 
The same idea came out in Zimbabwe. Key Informant Z6 felt that while people might say 
they are in a partnership with the Global Fund, they do not have the inclination to challenge 
or engage. She says “The thing that is lacking is the skills of, how does a CCM member 
initiate with the Global Fund. The relationship currently is very much of donor/recipient” 
(personal communication, May 3, 2012). She continued to draw attention to the fact that:  
 
It’s not really a partnership, but, the CCM is responsible for defining where they want to 
funding to go at a country level. When the Global Fund gets to dictate, it says ‘cut money’, 
how much power does the CCM have to say ‘this is what we really want’?” (personal 
communication, May 3, 2012).     
Lastly, an interesting opinion on culture was voiced by Philisiwe Khumalo with the Elizabeth 
Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation in Swaziland. Aside from political culture, she felt it 
might even be more basic than that. She says: 
There must be something about Swazi people. Dig deep into our culture, is it poverty or 
what? I think there is something about Swazis that we are failing to understand. HTC is being 
provided. Condoms have been provided, all over the country. Everyone in one way or another 
can access them, but usage is still low. So what is it? (personal communication, June 12, 
2013).  
So, perhaps along with the context of the kind and of civil society’s weaknesses, there are 
other elements of culture that affect how decisions are made more generally. In Khumalo’s 
opinion, these more basic elements of culture are also important to consider at the policy-
making level. All of these key informants also provide support for Lieberman’s (2009) 
argument that culture is a simple yet powerful explanatory variable that is useful in 
understanding why country responses to HIV/AIDS differ.     
 
 
National AIDS Councils 
 
A fourth political variable that was exposed during my interviews is the importance of the 
National AIDS Commission (NAC) in shaping the country’s policy response. In two 
countries – South African and Namibia – the nature of their NACs is a very important 
explanatory factor in their HIV/AIDS policy-making.  
In South Africa, Maureen van Wyk and Marieta de Vos, with the Network AIDS Community 
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the South African National AIDS Council did. On 1 April 2012, the entire SANAC staff was 
fired, and South Africa’s governing structures with the Global Fund effectively dissolved. 
Maureen van Wyk noted this connection, indicating that the lack of a functioning CCM stems 
from the fact that “the whole SANAC structure was under-resourced”(personal 
communication, September 6, 2012).This all happened at exactly the same time as the 
country’s new National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (2012 – 2016) was being launched. She 
said that this resulted in an especially distant relationship with the Global Fund, both in terms 
of policy and implementation thereof (personal communication, September 6, 2012). 
She spoke about the ways in which the new NSP reflects this ‘clean slate’ feeling after the 
disbanding SANAC and the South African CCM: 
 
[T]he NSP’s got the same focus areas but with more emphasis on focus and specific areas and 
TB is also brought it. There was a need for the secretariat and the whole SANAC structure to 
change. There was strong lobbying for that from all side, from government from civil society, 
because it was just not working. The feeling was, we’re starting now, on a clean page with a 
new SANAC secretariat, SANAC structures, making sure we can implement the new NSP” 
(personal communication, September 6, 2012). 
 
This move for the South African NSP to focus on ‘specific areas’ is quite the opposite of 
what respondents in Malawi and Namibia spoke about, where they were aiming for a much 
more broad and inclusive approach. The broader the policy, the close its alignment with 
Global Fund objectives, since many of them are based on international indicators. After the 
CCM disbanded, Maureen van Wyk was a member of the ad hoc Resource Mobilization 
Committee (RMC). She said that even this governing body did not have very close 
engagement with Global Fund priorities, often meeting only twice a year. The RMC was 
chaired by the Ministry of Health, which she felt was also not a good thing, since this person 
was often too busy to manage the RMC. It functioned, but not very effectively (personal 
communication, September 6, 2012). Especially in terms of its understanding of Global Fund 
priorities and objectives, Maureen noted how “In the past, most of the RMC members were 
not really very informed about any strategy” (personal communication, September 6, 2012).  
 
Now, things are beginning to come together again, where Maureen van Wyk pointed out that 
“The whole SANAC structure has changed now with the new NSP and appointment of a 
CEO and a staff component. Previously SANAC was very under-resourced with ad hoc 
contract staff” (personal communication, September 6, 2012). Maureen van Wyk also 
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September 2012, they just have to nominate the members (personal communication, 
September 6, 2012). So, perhaps South Africa’s distance with the Global Fund will be 
remedies as these collaborative governing structures are mended. It will be interesting to see 
if this will affect policy-making in the future, or if South Africa will continue to deviate from 
Global Fund policy objectives.  
In a completely different way, the nature of the NAC in Namibia has a large impact on the 
policy compliance of the country. Namibia’s National AIDS Executive Committee (NAEC) 
is a government body, located within the Ministry of Health, which sits above the CCM. 
According to Key Informant N, with the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the 
NAEC is key in the development of the national policy and Global Fund proposals, 
demonstrating quite a tight-knit alignment between government policy prerogatives and 
Global Fund requirements (personal communication, September 18, 2012). She says “The 
secretariat of the NAEC, does want to present the Phase 2 renewal proposal [of the Global 
Fund Round 9 grant] to the NAEC for endorsement before it goes to the CCM for 
endorsement. Whether that’s right or wrong, I don’t know” (personal communication, 
September 18, 2012). Also speaking to this, is Sandie Tjaronda, with NANASO. He noted 
how the country integration with Global Fund processes is very closely overlapping in 
Namibia. He pointed out how the “NAEC is not part of the GFTAM, but proposals go 
through that in Namibia before it passes” (personal communication, September 17, 2012).  
In Chapter 5 it was found that the age of National AIDS Councils was related to policy 
compliance, with older NACs complying less with Global Fund policy since 2008, and newer 
NACs complying more (r = -0.30). But interview data show it is more complex, with 
elements of NAC politics in South Africa and Namibia uncovering why this relationship may 
exist for more intricate political reasons that just looking at the age of the structure. This 
helps to further explain how the politics of the National AIDS Councils may play a role in 
how compliant a country is with Global Fund policies. These findings provide support for 
Strand’s (2007) thinking on how elements of AIDS governance is likely the most important 
factor in explaining differing policy responses.  
 
Political Decentralization  
 
Lastly, the fifth political variable that was uncovered during my field interviews was the 
element of political decentralization. In South Africa, Maureen Van Wyk and Marieta de Vos 
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health. This decentralized governance makes it very difficult for a national level process – 
like the CCM and NSP policy making – to coordinate effectively.  Maureen Van Wyk cited 
how: 
 
Often when we discuss the set up, we really feel that where the work is done is in the 
provinces and that the sectors also need to focus on their provinces. Okay so you might have a 
women’s sector, but the women’s sector organizations are completely different in the Western 
Cape to what they are in Limpopo. The needs are different, everything is different (personal 
communication, September 6, 2012). 
 
She continued to focus on how “South Africa’s almost like nine small countries. They 
actually cannot coordinate because the country’s too big” (personal communication, 
September 6, 2012).  Marieta de Vos agreed, suggesting that “We feel that the representation 
has to be province based” (personal communication, September 6, 2012). This is, in some 
ways reflected in the Principal Recipients of Global Fund money in South Africa. There are 
five PRs in the country, one of which is the Western Cape Department of Health. NACOSA 
is also PR, which has its headquarters in Cape Town, Western Cape as well. This reflects the 
heavy emphasis on Western Cape politics in the policy and programming of Global Fund 
grants in South Africa. This might also be a factor which contributes to the nation’s deviation 
away from Global Fund objectives, if one province has a heavier influence over the AIDS 
response than others. It is also quite relevant that the Western Cape is the only province not 
governed by the African National Congress, which SANAC is part of. This is also likely why 
both the Western Cape Department of Health is its own PR, and not a sub-recipient of the 
National Department of Health. This political circumstance may certainly help explain recent 
HIV/AIDS policy choices in South Africa.  
Political decentralization in the South African context has been widely studied as a factor 
affecting its HIV response (Blaauw et al., 2003; Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders, & 
McIntyre, 2009; Lieberman, 2011; McIntyre & Klugman, 2003; Schneider, Blaauw, Gilson, 
Chabikuli, & Goudge, 2006; Schneider, Coetzee, Dingie, and Gilson, 2010). These studies 
suggest that issues of coordination, as well as the rise of non-state service providers both 
affect how HIV policy is designed and implemented. The interview data from Van Wyk and 
De Vos provides support for this, intimating that the issues of decentralized politics in South 
Africa negatively affect the coordination of the Global Fund country program.     
 
Quite contrary to South Africa’s intense decentralization and the effect it seems to be having 










Page 156 of 210 
 
of respondents there. When I asked about rural influence on policy and programs, or other 
areas aside from Lusaka, Key Informant Y told me the degree to which this occurs is: 
 
Not at all, but I think that’s a problem of Zambia to start with. Zambia is hugely centralized. 
The biggest problem with this country, in my opinion, is lack of decentralization. I mean, you 
go out to district level and people refer you back to Lusaka, cause they simply cannot make a 
decision, or don’t want to make a decision (personal communication, April 20, 2012). 
 
This element helps to explain why Zambia’s policies are more compliant than South Africa’s, 
but this distinction is relatively minor, since Zambia’s policy after 2008 is only slightly more 
compliant than South Africa’s (2.529 out of 4, compared with 2.353 out of 4). 
 
In Swaziland, too the idea that political centralization affected information flow was raised. 
Contrary to South Africa, Dr. Kwame Amphomah with UNAIDS in Swaziland said “It’s a 
system where information easily goes through from the top to the bottom and horizontally. 
It’s one people, one language, one culture, so communication from the governance level, the 
political governance level to the community level is probably very good” (personal 
communication, June 11, 2013). He continued to highlight how this is not the case in all 
setting, citing his native Nigeria as an example: 
  
In Nigeria, doing a national federal investment case for me is not very meaningful. Because 
you have the states, each state has its own governance system, it has its own budget, and each 
states HIV program is supported by  grant from the world bank, so that’s a very good entry 
point. You must do a state-by-state investment case, for each state. Then it is meaningful 
(personal communication, June 11, 2013). 
 
Centralized or decentralized governments are an explanatory variable for understanding 
national HIV/AIDS policy responses that are not captured in Chapter 5. The way in which 
information can be shared, and influence can be excerpted, is related to this political factor.  
 
Fund Portfolio Managers  
 
Lastly, the relationship between the Global FPMs in Geneva and the recipient countries was 
highlighted as a strong explanatory variable by respondents. When I asked Maria Padkina, 
Fund Portfolio Manager for Mail, about how often her team visit the country, she said:  
We should go there at least twice a year, if the security situation allows. And then it also 
depends on what we are doing within the country, if we have to sign a phase 2 or if there is a 
particular issue that needs to be discussed, for example, if the grant is supposed to be scaled 
down to essential services, this is something that is normally being done when we go in 
country. So, it’s on a needs basis – there is no rule, basically. And it very much depends on 
the FPM and the team leader. So, some FPMs are being more in touch with their countries, 
some FPMs are not willing to go there that often, it’s again, personal decisions sometimes 
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Viviane Hughes-Lanier (FPM for Niger) also said security issues prevent her from being 
present in Niger (personal communication, April 16, 2013). However, in corroborating what 
Pakina said about it being the personal decision of the Fund Portfolio Manager, Amy Clancy, 
Fund Portfolio Manager for Egypt has been visiting frequently and conducting a handover 
missions to the new FPM (personal communication, April 17, 2013).  
 
Based on these insights coming from the Global Fund Secretariat, it is clear that the 
personality of a country’s FPM can play a significant role in how the relationship between a 
country and Geneva is formed, which logically influences how policy and programming is 
subsequently designed and implemented. This explanatory variable sheds light on why 
Namibia may be such an outlier as the only rich, well governed country to comply with 
Global Fund policy. In Namibia, Key Informant N emphasized the element of Global Fund’s 
relationship with the country at great length: 
The relationship between Geneva and the country – the CCM - and Geneva is getting closer. 
And that varies in different countries, in terms of their relationship with the Fund portfolio 
manager and that country team there and how they engage with the CCM to manage the 
grants. But the relationship between Geneva and the CCMs is getting closer even in terms of 
the grants and the grant proposal process, in term of them wanting to be more closely 
involved. I think that’s a good idea, from where I sit; they could serve to be more engaged. 
Now, the balance though, is the issue around the country ownership that the Global Fund 
model has always, really, promulgated. The issue that CCMs are the local board, and they are 
managing the grants, and this is a new realm of this term ‘country ownership’, they are the 
model. But, having lofty goals and saying that you are going to do this type of thing doesn’t 
always play out the way you maybe want it to, so we’ve seen challenges with the Global Fund 
grants, sort of hand off approach, that doesn’t always worked with the grants. So, I think 
they’re trying to strike this balance with being more involved and giving more guidance, and 
continuing to support the country ownership approach. What you see in Namibia is, even with 
the renewal process, they’ve given more guidance, more explicit guidance about what they 
expect to see in the proposal in terms of re-programming. Some may say it’s too much 
guidance, it’s too prescriptive, and that they’re not technical experts, they’re grant managers, 
so how do they know if Namibia should go to B+ and PMTCT or condoms for social 
marketing purposed are relevant here. How do they know those things so how can they 
prescribe them. So, there’s that dialogue that happens and that sort of dynamic, but I think 
that they’re trying to say, and what they usually say when they come is, we’re not saying that 
your country strategy should be x, y or z, what we’re saying is what we’re gonna pay for, are 
these types of things, which is different, but tricky (personal communication, September 18, 
2012). 
She continued to elaborate on this facet of Global Fund involvement in Namibia’s HIV/AIDS 
policy and programming response, noting that the Global Fund seems to have chosen 
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Geneva - the country team - has been here twice in the last six months, which is unheard of, 
and they’ve come to manage ongoing grant challenges and issues with conditions precedent. 
They have engaged more, it is unusual. But Namibia is one of the first countries to go through 
a grant renewal process under this new Global Fund age, so, I think people generally see it as 
an opportunity (personal communication, September 18, 2012). 
The same is perhaps even more apt for Swaziland. Richard Cunliffe became new FPM in 
October 2012 and told me his plan is to visit the country every quarter. This has turned out to 
be even more frequent, as he was in Swaziland in June 2013, and was planning to return in 
July. Cunliffe indicated that in Swaziland: 
They’ve been rather lacking in Global Fund attention from a dedicated FPM [fund portfolio 
manager] for the last few months so I’m going to correct that. My intention is to be a bit more 
visible in-country, certainly over the next few months, to try and get back on track, really 
(personal communication, October 22, 2012).  
 
Vulindlela Msibi (CCM Secretariat) agrees, speaking about their history with other FPMs: 
“Where we were, we were coming from a period where we are hadn’t had a stable fund 
portfolio manager for quite some time. From a period of about 2-4 years we had people 
coming in and going out the next day” (personal communication, June 10, 2013). Khanya 
Mabuza (NERCHA) also spoke about this, saying that in the past, the lines of communication 
are hazy between FPM, PR and CCM. He said, “The team here, they don’t understand how 
they are supposed to be working with the CCM, with the secretariat, with the Global Fund. 
Those minefields, if not controlled, they are the ones that are normal causing problems on the 
CCM” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). However, in the last ten months, Cunliffe’s 
move to correct this is the result of his personal leadership decision-making. Mabuza 
(NERCHA) said the difference is stark, and that now “There is a feeling that the [Global 
Fund] secretariat does micro-manage” (personal communication, June 12, 2013). Hlobsile 
Dlamini (Swaziland Rural Women’s Association) speculated that this change might be 
related to recent fund mismanagement issues: “I think certainly things may have changed 
after the OIG report. They may have put new measures in place” (personal communication, 
June 13, 2013).   
The explanatory variable of Fund Portfolio Managers’ individual personalities and individual 
decisions on how involved they want to be in their country’s response is perhaps the most 
interesting result that came out of interviews in Geneva. It is clear that this element plays a 
significant role in how countries are influenced by Global Fund policies. This is also not a 
factor that can be captured in quantitative indicator, so was overlooked in the analysis 
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thesis may be most usefully applied in terms of making recommendations. This will be 
further explored in Chapter 7 as I make suggestions for the Global Fund’s New Funding 
Mechanism based on the findings of this research.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
Insights from the 82 key informants in Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and The Global Fund in Geneva help to inform some of the 
trends that emerged out of the quantitative policy data and correlation indicators in the 
previous chapters. For each country, a unique set of political and economic factors help to 
further explain trends in policy compliance. In Botswana, dominant government and weak 
civil society greatly affect the policy-making process, partly as a result of non-confrontational 
political culture and a small population. There is also a strong sense of disillusionment with 
the Global Fund since Botswana was last funded 10 years ago, despite submitting proposals 
at every Round. Lastly, Botswana’s fast development rate was cited as a potential factor 
which contributes towards the country’s deviation from Global Fund policies.  
Similar to Botswana, the political culture in Malawi leads to a very passive civil society. 
However, in this country, the bi-laterals and multi-laterals assume the majority of control 
over the HIV/AIDS governance process, much more than government does. The emphasis on 
the importance of the Global Fund as the country’s largest development partner also came up 
as a highly relevant factor, as did its recent shift from pooled to discrete donor, and its 
declassification of Malawi as a high burden country. All of these elements help to explain 
Malawi’s very high compliance with Global Fund policies.  
In Namibia, the most compliant country in the region, the level of oversight that the National 
AIDS Executive Committee has over Global Fund governance in the country was cited as 
relevant by several informants. The very high in-country presence of the Global Fund country 
team, which has visited twice in the last six months, was also cited as an unusual 
circumstance. Both of these contextual factors are anomalies which aid in explaining 
Namibia’s position as an outlier in the region – a high income, well-governed country that 
complies the most heavily with Global Fund policy agendas.  
In South Africa, the unusual circumstances of the disbanding of its National AIDS 
Commission and subsequent collapse of its CCM are also unusual contextual factors. Along 
with its intensely decentralized provincial politics, these factors help to elucidate why South 
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In Swaziland, the political culture of the King and the Monarchy as well as an extremely 
weak civil society were highly relevant, as well as the recent OIG report and the very close 
involvement of the FPM in country.  
Lastly, the informants in Zambia and Zimbabwe reported very little change over time and 
very little clash of views between their country and the Global Fund, corroborating their 
policy position as relatively stable and constant in their moderate policy compliance. All of 
these reasons why countries comply or deviate with Global Fund policies are relevant in how 
future policy is designed at the international level. The following chapter will explore these 
options.  
These findings help to further explain relationships between political and economic factors 
and HIV/AIDS policy-making that were tested in Chapter 5. They also provide evidence for 
other explanatory factors that help with a better understanding of why policy changes over 
time, and how the county-specific dynamics play a role in policy making and policy change.  
The next chapter concludes this thesis with a summary of the major findings of the research. 
Then, Chapter 7 outlines three major implications of the work, closing with a 

























Conclusions and Recommendations: Implications for the Global Fund’s 
New Funding Mechanism    
 
 
“This is not about politics. It’s about real people”  




Assertions about the extent with which developing countries chose to formulate their 
HIV/AIDS policies in line with the policies of international actors, or deviate from them, and 
the reasons behind this, have either been based on partial evidence, often supported by no 
more than selectively examples to illustrate whatever a particular analysis chooses to argue.  
 
In contrast, in this dissertation, I have broken new ground by using systematic methods to 
measure the actual extent of policy conformity/deviation for eight high prevalence countries 
in Southern Africa. Describing the extent of policy compliance is novel and I am the first one 
to measure this. While I only look at eight cases, they are arguably the eight most important 




Second, I have also operationalized and measured a range of variables to test arguments often 
cited in the literature that purport to explain why developing countries make these choices.  I 
have also conducted interviews with a wide number of donor, government and civil society 
officials involved in HIV/AIDS policy-making in each country to attempt to gather “insider 
evidence” with which to understand the trends revealed by the statistical correlational 
analysis.   
 
This research has generated evidence to support a number of important, though tentative 
generalizations (future research needs to test them against a larger body of national cases, as 
well as in different policy domains). 
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There are five major conclusions of this thesis: 
 
First, despite trends in decreased donor support and increased country ownership, most high 
burden countries in Southern Africa continue to move their strategic plans toward greater, 
rather than less, conformity with global fund policies.  As a result, my initial hypothesis is not 
supported by the available evidence. 
 
Second, two countries – Botswana and South Africa – do not fit this trend, as they have 
recently (2010 and 2012, respectively) written new national strategic plans that are less 
compliant with Global Fund policies than their previous national strategies.  
 
Third, disaggregating HIV/AIDS policy into more specific sub-dimensions, I have found that 
the Global Fund’s policies on care and support are adhered to most consistently in Southern 
Africa.  There are two exceptions, however: (1) In South Africa, the Global Fund’s 
prevention policies have been the most influential; and in Swaziland, the Global Fund’s 
treatment policies have been adhered to the most. 
 
Turning to hypotheses about the reasons why some countries deviate from global policies 
while others comply, the results demonstrate that national wealth matters.  
 
Fourth, countries in Southern Africa are more likely to comply with Global Fund policies if 
they are poor. Gross national income (GNI) per capita, health spending per capita, and the 
percentage of total HIV/AIDS funding which comes from the Global Fund are the strongest 
economic predictors of policy compliance. Countries with lower GNI/per capita and lower 
health spending per capita are more likely to comply with Global Fund policies. Similarly, 
countries with receive more money from the Global Fund, as a percentage of total HIV/AIDS 
funding, are also more likely to align their national policies with the strategies of the Global 
Fund. In addition, interviews with donor, government and civil society officials intimately 
involved in HIV/AIDS policy making suggest that wealth matters because the extent to which 
the Global Fund does or does not fund proposals - and the way in which they do - affects the 
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Fifth, the available evidence also suggests that governance matters.  High burden countries 
are more likely to comply with Global Fund policies if they have a weak political 
commitment towards HIV/AIDS. In-country Global Fund governance via the composition of 
the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanisms is the best predictor among the 
political variables examined. Countries with higher proportions of international non-
governmental organizations and foreign development partners (multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
organizations) are more likely to comply with Global Fund policies. However, World Bank 
governance indicators do not account for HIV/AIDS policy compliance very well. A 
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the weak state argument is moderately 
supported, but that components of “AIDS governance”, like the CCM composition, matter 
much more. Here, too, interviews shed light on how the attentiveness of the Global Fund 
Country Team, power of the National AIDS Commission and political culture matter a great 
deal in how countries write their policies.    
 
My insider interviews suggest that the reason that increased civil society presence on the 
CCMs results in greater policy conformity is because civil society in these Southern African 
countries is not very defiant and seems to align itself very closely with the donors. In 
addition, many of the NGO seats on the CCM are filled by large well-funded national and 
international organizations, which also certainly push towards compliance with donor 
identified policy norms. This confirms arguments in the literature that suggest donor funding 
creates a civil society that maintains the status quo, rather than challenging it (Hearn, 2001). 
These interviews also reveal nuances of how development rate, Global Fund spending and 
corruption affect policy-making, as well as how dominant institutions, political culture 
national AIDS commissions, political decentralization and the personalities of Fund Portfolio 
Managers play an important role.   
 
Based on these major findings, this chapter sets out three main implications for this thesis. 
First, this research has implications for previous and future knowledge and literature on 
HIV/AIDS policy-making. Second, there are implications for the Global Fund’s New 
Funding Mechanism and how it related to the UNAIDS Investment Framework. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, there are potential implications for measuring policy efficacy, 
which is the thrust of this project’s larger rationale. At the end of this chapter, I will present 
some interesting epidemiological trends to consider, in hopes of providing an incentive for 
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Knowledge and Literature Implications 
 
What do these findings mean for current knowledge and the literature on power in the 
international health policy-making arena? Essentially, they corroborate the mainstream idea 
that international donors exert heavy influence over locally designed polices in Southern 
Africa (Campbell, 2003; Poku, 2005; De Waal, 2003; Attaran & Sachs, 2001; Boler & 
Archer, 2008; Heald, 2006; Cohen & Tate, 2005). However, while they bolster this 
mainstream idea, the evidence in this thesis provides an empirical basis for these ideas to rest 
on, when they were previously largely based on anecdotal likelihoods. In other words, many 
others have postulated that donor influence over local policy was strong, but I am the first to 
have actually demonstrated it using systematic methods of collecting policy data. However, 
the findings of this study also challenge this thinking as far as it applies to Botswana and 
South Africa, since their policies deviated from Global Fund objectives after 2008.   
 
The findings of this research also provide support for why certain countries are more 
influenced by donors than others in the policy-making process. My findings demonstrate 
tentative relationships between economic and political variables and levels of HIV policy 
compliance, supporting many previous arguments about how structural and institutional 
factors affect policy decisions (Biesma, et al., 2009; Narayan, 2007; Epstein, 2007, Parkhurst, 
2011, Butler 2005; Wouters et al. 2010; Patterson, 2006; Lieberman, 2011; Altman & Buse, 
2012; Chirambo, 2008; Velayati et al., 2007).    
 
 
Future Policy Implications 
 
While my findings have a number of implications for knowledge and literature, they also 
have significance for the practical future policy developments within the Global Fund. 
Campbell (2003, p. 191) says that “there seem[s] to be little willingness among these 
powerful groups to consider the ways in which they themselves might need to change if the 
problem [is] to be addressed.” In 2003 this may have seemed to be the case, but in 2013 the 
Global Fund can hardly be charged with a lack of introspection on how its funding processes 
are designed. In November 2011, after the lack of contributions from supporting countries for 
Round 11, the Global Fund implemented the Transitional Funding Mechanism, as it designed 
a New Funding Mechanism for future grants, which would drastically recalibrate the way in 
which it disperses resources. Given the findings of previous research, bolstered by the results 
presented in this thesis, it is commendable that the Global Fund is now in the process of 
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This section will begin by detailing the environment of future grant-making policy under the 
new UNAIDS (2011) Investment Framework. Then, within this context, I will set out the 
processes under the Transitional Funding Mechanisms and New Funding Mechanism, and 
end with three major conclusions about how the New Funding Mechanism can maximize its 
effectiveness based on the findings of this research: First, the Global Fund should calculate 
its new ‘country bands’ to consider both economic circumstance; Second, it should also 
permit health systems strengthening concept notes to be submitted independently of the 
malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS grant applications; Third, the CCM composition 
recommendations should be revised to recommend fewer international NGO and multi-
lateral/bi-lateral seats.  
While the point of critical change examined in this thesis (~2008) can be characterized as a 
turning point of ‘donor withdrawal’, ‘donor retreat’ and ‘funding crisis’ for HIV/AIDS 
(Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010; Dickinson, 2010, June 25; Chipunza, 2010, 10 March), 
since then money for HIV/AIDS has stabilized and the funding landscape has evolved into a 
context of ‘value for money’, ‘money well spent’, ‘optimization’ and ‘return on investment’  
(Schwartländer et al., 2011; WHO, UNICEF & UNAIDS, 2012; Hutchinson et al., 2012; 
Cook & Seymour, 2013). Established by UNAIDS in 2011, the New Investment Framework 
for the Global Response to HIV aims to improve responses by demonstrating that money is 
invested in cost-effective ways that yield optimized results. The Framework sets out a defined 
set of six evidence-based programme activities: (1) Focus on key populations (sex workers, 
MSM, IDUs), (2) Elimination of new infections in children, (3) Behavior Change, (4) 
Condom promotion and distribution, (5) Treatment care and support and (6) Voluntary 
medical male circumcision (UNAIDS, 2011). This Investment Framework will be important 
to the Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism because countries will now have to 
demonstrate return on investment in proposed activities through monitoring and evaluation. 
In fact, in 2012 the Global Fund’s new strategy for 2012-2016 was released, entitled 
“Investing for Impact” (Global Fund, 2012). My recommendations for the Global Fund’s 
future grant making, which follow, are shaped by the importance of this new ‘investment’ 
context.            
Firstly, my findings suggest that in terms of country bands, the Global Fund should 
incorporate both wealth and disease burden into its calculations. Currently, as the New 
Funding Mechanism is still is the process of being finalized, is it proposed to be divided into 










Page 166 of 210 
 
burden, its per capita income, or some combination of the two. Currently, the Global Fund is 
considering four proposed methods for calculating country bands: (1) dividing countries 
based on economic indicators which will be calculated using gross national income per capita 
only, (2) disease-burden indicators, (3) a combination of economic and disease burden 
indicators, where the GNI per capita element makes sure that one country fits into one band 
only, and not in different bands for different diseases, and (4) an economic transition system, 
where countries can “graduate” from Global Fund support ad no longer be eligible for 
funding once they reach a certain level of economic development.  
 
My findings, however, suggest that GNI per capita is a huge driver of locally driven policy 
development (recall Figure 5.1). My evidence also strongly suggests that there is a key wealth 
threshold which allows countries to develop domestically tailored policies, which increase 
country ownership and may prove more effective. This wealth threshold looks to be 
approximately US$ 4000 GNI/capita (see Figure 5.1). For this reason, I would recommend 
that either the third or fourth proposed country band formula be adopted. The findings of this 
project especially support consideration of the fourth proposed formula – ‘graduation’ from 
Global Fund support – since it appears that there is a wealth threshold that countries pass 
(US$ 4000 GNI/capita) which then allows them to design domestically driven policies and 
programs on their own.  
 
The recommendation to the Global Fund to select country ‘bands’ based on both disease 
burden and economic indicators is also sensible in order to maximize effective performance 
within the UNAIDS Investment Framework. First, the Framework states that “To implement 
the investment framework, policy makers must make use of information on HIV incidence 
and prevalence” (UNAIDS, 2011, p. 7). This means that disease burden is closely related to 
which interventions a country should pursue under the new Framework. By the same logic, 
the grant-making system of the Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism should also take 
account of epidemiological factors during country dialogue. Similarly, the Investment 
Framework also says that countries need to have a “nuanced understanding of the scope and 
coverage of existing HIV prevention, treatment, care and support programmes as well as their 
costs” (UNAIDS, 2011, p. 7). The Framework continues to indicate that “In most countries 
this will mean changing investments in HIV and a re-programming of HIV efforts” 
(UNAIDS, 2011, p. 7). This means that the costs of programs as well as the ability of 










Page 167 of 210 
 
important element of successful implementation of the Framework. As a result, economic 
indicators in a country are closely linked with how this process will happen; countries with 
fewer resources may need to do a lot more reprogramming than those countries with greater 
government health budgets. For this reason, the Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism 
should also take into account the wealth of a country in its new grant-making process.     
 
Secondly, the proposed design of the Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism should allow 
for country concept notes to be submitted based on health systems strengthening (HSS) 
proposals, rather than attaching this component to disease specific applications. In the past, 
HSS grants have paled in comparison to disease specific grants. For instance in Round 5, 
only 5 per cent of total Global Funding was allocated for HSS programs. Specially, US$ 38 
million of the US$ 770 million total was dedicated to HSS grants (Global Fund, 2012b). 
Further, this US$ 38 million was only for 3 countries out of the 60 who received funding. 
However, Round 5, the first year when HSS funding was introduced, was unusual. Since 
then, all HSS funding has been integrated as cross-cutting requests within disease specific 
proposals. Applicants may divide this up however they chose (all HSS components may be in 
the HIV proposal, or they may be shared among three different disease-specific proposals) 
but HSS grants can never be a stand-alone application (Global Fund, 2008).  
 
The results of my study suggest the increased emphasis on HSS grants as a stand-alone 
funding opportunity. Since overall health spending per capita is the strongest predictor of 
increased country ownership of policy in this study (r = -0.73, p = 0.062), the New Funding 
Mechanism should promote this more heavily through increased funding allocated for HSS 
grants. Country ownership is clearly an important part of the Global Fund’s strategy for the 
New Funding Mechanism. A the Global Fund’s 26
th
  Board meeting (10-11 May 2012) it was 
stressed that the New Funding Mechanism must “reflect national ownership” and be based on 
“country-led formulation and implementation processes” (Global Fund, 2012c). To this end, 
factors that promote divergence from global indicators in favour of locally informed and 
nationally-devised policy should be promoted.  
 
The recommendation for the Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism to permit concept note 
submissions for stand-alone HSS grants also makes sense within the UNAIDS Investment 
Framework. One of the key areas of investment outside of basic program activities is 
something called “critical enablers”. These include things like strategic planning, program 
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HSS activities. The HSS grants through the Global Fund aim to provide linkages between 
health systems and outcomes for the three diseases. Therefore, in order to benefit from the 
Investment Framework, funding critical enablers though HSS grants is highly important. 
Further, while the Framework says that biomedical interventions have a much stronger 
evidence base than critical enablers, the results of this project demonstrate that overall health 
spending is a more strongly related to divergence from global indicators than HIV-specific 
program spending, potential providing evidence that spending on critical enablers has an 
impact on country ownership of policy.    
 
Third and lastly, the final recommendation that is supported by my evidence is that the 
Global Fund may be wise to revise its CCM composition so that bi-lateral/multi-lateral 
organizations and NGO composition is lower. If strong presence of these two groups seems 
to steer national responses in the direction of global indicator-based policies, balancing their 
presence with more seats for other groups may help to promote more domestically informed 
and nationally owned policy and programing. Other constituencies, such as the private sector, 
people living with HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria, and key affected populations seem to steer 
policy and programing towards a more locally tailored design. Bi-lateral/multi-lateral 
organizations and large international NGOs may have agendas that reside outside of state 
interests, since donors are pushing their own interests and NGOs have compromised 
autonomy since they too depend on international funding for existence. 
This third recommendation for fewer donor and international NGO seats might also be 
increasingly sensible in the context of the new Investment Framework. More constituency 
representation for key affected populations, such as MSM, IDUs and sex workers will 
improve the ability of the CCM to design policy, proposals and programs that achieve the 
Framework’s first basic program activity which suggests focusing programs for these 
populations. These groups may be represented by civil society on the CCM, but they are 
classified as “Key Affected Populations” in terms of their constituency, which is what was 
used to measure membership as an explanatory variable. Further, more representation for 
local civil society, as opposed to large international NGOs, might be the more salient need. 
This may help provide evidence for the Framework’s critical enabler of ‘local responses to 
change risk environment’ (UNAIDS, 2011, p. 3). Further, more seats for PLHIV may 
improve the ability of the CCM to effectively follow the Investment Framework’s 
recommended activity of “Treatment, care and support for people living with HIV” 
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in harmony with the Investment Framework, having more seats on the CCM for those most 
affected populations and those with expertise in critical enablers in the local context will 
catalyze the Framework’s aim to “Support more rational resource allocation based on country 
epidemiology and context” (UNAIDS, 2011, p. 2). 
Paraphrasing Peter Piot (2000), Campbell (2003, p. 194-195) says “An appropriate response 
to the epidemic is not just about best practice, but also about new practice.” It may be that 
this has now been the realization of the Global Fund, whereby its New Funding Mechanism 
will be a much more consultative country-driven process. This could be in an effort to move 
away from its previous indicator-based toolkit towards a new institutional model of country 
dialogue and locally designed interventions.  
 
To maximize the impact of the New Funding Mechanism, especially within the context of the 
new Investment Framework, Fund Portfolio Managers (FPMs) especially should act on my 
recommendations. They are responsible for assisting countries in developing concept notes 
for the NFM and work with the CCM secretariat on CCM membership and participation.  
 
It was clear from my interview research that Fund Portfolio Managers were hesitant to shake 
things up too much. Richard Cunliffe (FPM for Botswana and Swaziland) said “what power 
has the secretariat been given to challenge the thinking of countries?” (personal 
communication, April 16, 2013). Similarly, Vivianne Hughes-Lanier (FPM for Niger) said 
“As FPMs, are we equipped to have this kind of impact?” (personal communication, April 
17, 2013). She confessed she was not trained in public health. Similarly, Cunliffe is also not 
trained in public health; he has professional background as lawyer. Key informants in Africa 
also raised this issue. Susan Amoten (Independent Consultant, Swaziland) said that FPMs 
used to be more public health specialists, but now they are much more financially oriented. 
However, Mauro Guarinieri (Senior Specialist with the Global Fund) who used to be FPM for 
Nepal, said FPMs absolutely have the ability to change this landscape in country, it just 
depends on their will to do so (personal communication, 15 April, 2013). Linda Mafu (Head 
of the Political and Civil Society Department at the Global Fund) said more training for 
FPMs is needed, especially in relation to epidemiological issues and how FPMs engage with 
civil society outside of the CCM. If further training for FPMs could be implemented, then 
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Despite these issues, during my interviews with FPMs in Geneva I saw the beginning of a 
new willingness of FPMs to improve their engagement with African CCMs. Hughes-Lanier is 
pursuing a Master’s degree in Public Health to try and improve her knowledge of epidemics 
and the politics of disease management. In addition, Cunliffe stated that he makes an effort to 
meet with civil society on every single trip to Swaziland. He is also working to make sure 
there will be a seat for key affected populations on the next CCM. These are encouraging 
trends. If more FPMs could demonstrate action towards engaging with local stakeholders and 
improving domestic governance of Global Fund programs then the results of my research – 
and the research of my colleagues in the field – can help to maximize the success of the 
Global Fund’s New Funding Mechanism.    
 
Policy Efficacy Implications  
 
Recall that one of my final interests in undertaking this study is the need to measure “what 
worked” in terms of policy efficacy in a more robust manner. Since I cannot conclusively 
measure the impact of policy on the epidemic for a number of reasons (small sample size, 
inability to control for third variables) I have chosen to address this question in the form of 
some intriguing possibilities, providing an initial test of arguments and challenging future 
researchers to corroboration. 
 
To inquire as to whether changes in HIV policy compliance since 2008 have had an impact 
on the epidemic, I employ Justin Parkhurst’s (2008) five-step “working backwards” method. 
This method requires evidence, in the following order, for: (1) falling HIV prevalence, due to 
(2) falling HIV incidence, due to (3) changes in behavior, due to (4) behavior change 
interventions, due to (5) HIV prevention policies.   
So, first, Parkhurst says you must demonstrate that HIV prevalence rates are falling. Since 
2008, HIV prevalence fell by 0.1-2.7 per cent in all countries in this study, except for Lesotho 
where it rose by 0.1 per cent (UNAIDS 2008; UNAIDS 2012). But, declining prevalence 
rates can mean prevention of new infections, but it can also mean HIV-related deaths 
increased, hence driving overall prevalence down. Put differently: 
HIV prevalence declines can only be taken as a sign of ‘success’ if they reflect falls in HIV 
incidence, that is to say, if they follow from a decrease in new infections of HIV across the 
population (as opposed to stable incidence and increasing mortality rates, which may lower 
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Decreases in HIV prevalence as a result of increasing mortality rates is certainly not a desired 
policy outcome, so there is a need to unpack the nature of rising or falling prevalence rates 
further, as Parkhurst suggests.  
 
Therefore, step two of Parkhurst’s model, after examining prevalence rates, is to see whether 
falling prevalence is associated with falling incidence. The most recent data on new 
infections shows that HIV incidence rates have indeed also fallen in all countries in this 
study, again with the exception of Lesotho, where they are stable (UNAIDS, 2012). 
Therefore, it is likely that the falling HIV prevalence rates are a reflection of falling HIV 
incidence rates.  
 
Unfortunately, steps three and four or Parkhurst’s model – providing evidence for behavior 
change and behavior change interventions – are beyond the scope of this thesis. But there are 
a number of interesting considerations that my data do reveal, which may provide a first 
assessment upon which other researchers may improve and do a better job to satisfy the 
evidence requirements of these steps.  
 
While acknowledging that steps three and four are missing, we can use our data to proceed to 
step 5. This provides some potentially interesting relationships between falling HIV incidence 
and my data on policy compliance. For instance, there is a fairly strong positive correlation 
between the size of incidence rate decline and changes in policy compliance between T2 
(2003-2008) and T3 (post-2008) (r = 0.32). This might mean that those countries which 
complied less with Global Fund policy during this time also experienced fewer new HIV 
infections.  
 
Furthermore, looking only at prevention policies as Parkhurst suggests, this relationship 
becomes even stronger (r = 0.51). This suggests that the less compliant a country is with 
Global Fund prevention policies, the more HIV incidence declines (Figure 7.1). The 
correlation supports the idea that declining HIV incidence rates may be related to deviation 


















Figure 7.1: The Relationship between the Change in Policy Compliance on 
Prevention Policies and Change in HIV Incidence from T2 to T3 
(UNAIDS, 2010).      
 
Another hurdle that Parkhurst raises is the difficulty with measuring the time lags needed to 
accurately determine the point at which policies begin to impact infection rates. There is wide 
disagreement about how to measure the connection between policies and programs and their 
effects on epidemiological outcomes. Some believe that one ought to include a time-lag in the 
way policy and infection rates interact. Epstein (2007) says that if you want to observe a 
connection between policy and its effect on HIV prevalence, you need to point to behaviors 
that began changing long before declining prevalence is witnessed. Similarly, Campbell 
(2003) says it takes time for many community-level projects to bear fruit. She bases this idea 
on a UNAIDS (2000) review of best practices which suggest that it can take anywhere from 
four to five hears for HIV prevention interventions to show measurable impact. 
 
However, other studies measure policy change and disease outcome patterns as 
simultaneously changing phenomena. For example Asiimwe-Okiror et al. (1997), measure 
changes in behavioral policies and infection rates over the same period of time. In other 
words, if condom promotion is on the rise from 1990 to 1995, and HIV rates fall in that same 
period, the deduction is that the two are related. Like, Asiimwe-Okiror et al., Glick, Younger 
& Sahn (2006) also suggest that policy can influence epidemiological outcomes relatively 
simultaneously. In their study, they find that “coverage of maternal health and immunization 































































Page 173 of 210 
 
services can improve significantly in a fairly short period of time as a result of policy” (Glick, 
Younger & Sahn, 2006, p. 10). While they find differences in mortality outcomes from 1997 
to 2003 as a result of policy, they also find that the difference between 2003, 2002 and 2001 
outcomes are not statistically significant, meaning that the policy had begun to impact 
changes long before 2003. In addition, the policy they are measuring the impact of (the 
Basic/Linkages project) was first implemented in 1999. This means that the impacts of the 
1999 policy were already beginning to have an impact on 2001 epidemiological outcomes.   
 
This, in addition to not being able to provide evidence for step three and four of Parkhurst’s 
model, is another reason why my initial test of policy efficacy is in no way definitive or 
conclusive. However, the declines in prevalence, associated with declines in incidence are 
certainly worthy of further examination in so far as they might be the result of policy change 
in Southern Africa. In addition, I hope that the incentive provided here, with initial intriguing 
relationship between falling incidence and changes in policy compliance will lead to other 
researchers to re-examine this issue across a broader range of cases over a longer time period.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
The conclusion of this dissertation is that most countries in Southern Africa continue to align 
their HIV/AIDS policies with Global Fund objectives, except for South Africa and Botswana 
who have diverged since 2008. These compliance levels can be explained in part by structural 
and institutional variables, suggesting that wealth and governance are closely related to a 
country’s ability to move away from donor policies. My initial assessment of this impact on 
the epidemic supports mainstream thinking that divergence from globally prescribed policy 
makes for more effective interventions. As a result, there are three main recommendations 
that this final section outlines, based on the results of this project and the future implications. 
The first is the way that the Global Fund will calculate its new ‘country bands’, the second is 
the emphasis on health systems stregthening  and the third is the composition of the CCMs.  
 
However, given the small number of cases in my study, I put forward this conclusion with a 
degree of circumspection. I call for future researchers to use the tools I have developed (as 
well as improve upon them) and apply them to a broader number of cases to see if the 
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APPENDIX A – Global Fund Grants to Study Population 
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APPENDIX B – Total Global Fund Grant Amounts 
 
Table B1.1:   Total Global Fund Money Disbursed (Global Fund, 2012) 
 
 
Country Total Global Fund HIV/AID Grants19 
 
Botswana US$ 18,580,414 
 
Lesotho US$ 227,451,148 
 
Malawi US$ 563,075,534 
 
Namibia US$ 161,848,182 
 
South Africa US$ 352,798,800 
 
Swaziland US$ 154,925,426 
 
Zambia US$ 470,359,185 
 






                                                          
19
 These amounts do not include grants approved under the Transitional Funding Mechanism, which replaced 
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APPENDIX C– National Policy Documents on HIV/AIDS 
 
Table D1.1: List of National Policies on HIV/AIDS  
 
National Policies on HIV/AIDS  
Country  Policy  
T1 – Before 2003 
Botswana National Policy on HIV/AIDS (1993) 
Lesotho  National AIDS Strategic Plan (2000/2001-2003/2004) 
Malawi  The National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS (2000-2004) 
Namibia  The National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (Medium Term Plan II)(1999-2004) 
South Africa HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa (2000-2005) 
Swaziland  Swaziland  National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS (2000-2005)  
Zambia Strategic Framework (2001-2003) 
Zimbabwe  National Policy on HIV/AIDS for the Republic of Zimbabwe (1999) 
T2 – Between 2003 and 2007 
Botswana National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework (2003-2009) 
Lesotho  National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan (2006-2011) 
Malawi Malawi National HIV/AIDS Policy (2003)  
Namibia The Namibian National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (2004 – 2009) 
South Africa HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa (2007-2011) 
Swaziland  The Second National Multisectoral HIV and AIDS Strategic plan (2006 – 2008) 
Zambia National HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework (2006-2010) 
Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan (ZNASP) (2006-2010) 
T3 – After 2007 
Botswana The Second National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (2010-2016) 
Lesotho  National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan (2006 – 2011) (Revised April 2009) 
Malawi Malawi HIV and AIDS Extended National Action Framework (2010-2012) 
Namibia National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS Response in Namibia (2010/11 – 2015/16) 
South Africa National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS, STIs and TB, 2012-2016 
Swaziland  The National Multi-sectoral Strategic Framework For HIV and AIDS (2009 – 2014) 
Zambia National AIDS Strategic Framework (2011 – 2015) 
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Table E1.1 : Botswana Key Informant Interview Participants 
 
 




BOTSWANA (n=14)  
Name Organization 
Key Informant A  Private Sector  
Key Informant B  Ministry of Health   
Key Informant C  - 
Lame Charmaine Olebile LEGABIBO (Lesbians, gays and bisexuals of Botswana) 
Thatayotlhe Molefe LEGABIBO (Lesbians, gays and bisexuals of Botswana) 
Dundu Macha BONEPWA+ (Botswana Network of People Living with HIV & AIDS) 
Key Informant D BONEPWA+ (Botswana Network of People Living with HIV & AIDS) 
Key Informant E BONEPWA+ (Botswana Network of People Living with HIV & AIDS) 
Tshepo Kgositau Rainbow Identity Association  
Max Mabaka Rainbow Identity Association 
Lefetogile Bogosing CCM Secretariat, National AIDS Coordinating Agency  
Kabelo Ebineng Botswana Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS 
Diana Meswele National AIDS Council Ethics, Law and Human Rights Sector  
Key Informant F  European Delegation to Botswana and SADC 
MALAWI (n=13)  
 
Name Organization 
Key Informant G - 
Key Informant H Malawi Global Fund Coordinating Committee Secretariat  
Edith Mkawa Malawi Global Fund Coordinating Committee Secretariat 
Key Informant I  - 
Key Informant J - 
Ruth Mwandira DFID 
Key Informant K  - 
Roberto Luiz Brant Campos UNAIDS 
Robert Ngaiyaye Malawi Interfaith Aids Association (MIAA) 
Key Informant L  - 
Key Informant M  -  
Newton Kumwenda University of Malawi, College of Medicine  
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Table E1.4 : South Africa Key Informant Interview Participants 
 




Zack Makari  Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations (NANASO) 
Sandie Tjaronda  Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations (NANASO) 
Key Informant N President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
Key Informant O President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
Key Informant P President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
SOUTH AFRICA (n=3)  
Name Organization 
Diane Cooper  
University of Cape Town School of Public Health, Women’s Health Research Unit, 
South Africa 
Maureen van Wyk Network AIDS Community of South Africa (NACOSA), South Africa 
Marieta de Vos Network AIDS Community of South Africa (NACOSA), South Africa 
SWAZILAND (n=16)  
Name Organization 
Vulindlela Msibi CCM Secretariat  
Key Informant Q CCM Secretariat 
Key Informant R -  
Dr Kwame Amphomah UNAIDS  
Emmanuel Ndlangamandla Coordinating Assembly of Non-governmental Organizations (CANGO)  
Khanya Mabuza The National Emergency Response Council on HIV and AIDS (NERCHA) 
Zelda Nhlabatsi Family Life Association of Swaziland (FLAS) 
Rudolph Maziya The Alliance of Mayors and Municipal Leaders on HIV/AIDS in Africa (AMICAALL) 
Key Informant S - 
Key Informant T  -  
Key Informant U   -  
Philisiwe Khumalo  Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation  
Khanyisile Lukhele Ministry of Health  
Susan Amoaten  Independent Consultant – Systems Strengthening 
Hlobsile Dlamini  Swaziland Rural Women’s Association 
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Table E1.6 : Zambia Key Informant Interview Participants 
 
 






ZAMBIA (n=11)  
Name Organization 
Key Informant V University of Zambia School of Medicine 
Carol Nawina Nyirenda - 
Chilambe Katuta Director of Programmes at Youth Vision Zambia 
Chanda Katonga Youth Vision Zambia  
Edwidge Mutale Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office of the Gender and Child Development Division 
Key Informant W The World Bank 
Key Informant X  The World Bank 
Isaac Chanda Ndola Youth Resource Centre 
Key Informant Y  - 
Gershom Kapalaula Zambia Network of Religious Leaders Living or Personally affected by HIV/AIDS  
Elijah Ngwale Forum on HIV/AIDs for Persons with Disabilities 
ZIMBABWE (n=12)  
Name Organ zation 
Wisdom Masunda Traditional Medicine Practitioners’ Council 
Key Informant Z - 
Key Informant Z2 - 
Key Informant Z3 - 
Key Informant Z4 SAfAIDS 
Key Informant Z5 - 
Key Informant Z6  - 
Britone Chitakunye TelOne 
Sebastian Chinhaire Zimbabwe Network for People Living with HIV 
Rangarirai Chiteure Coordinator Zimbabwe CCM Secretariat for Global Fund 
Solmon Zwana  CCM Vice Chair  
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Table E1.8: Geneva, Switzerland, Key Informant Interview 
Participants 
 
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  (n=8)  
Name Organization 
Maria Padkona  The Global Fund, Fund Portfolio Manager (Mali) 
Richard Cunliffe The Global Fund,  Fund Portfolio Manager (Botswana & Swaziland) 
Viviane Hughes-Lanier The Global Fund,  Fund Portfolio Manager (Niger) 
Amy Clancy  The Global Fund,  Fund Portfolio Manager (Egypt) 
Linda Mafu The Global Fund,  Political and Civil Society Department 
Sara Davis The Global Fund,  Senior Specialist, Human Rights and Equity 
Motoko Seko The Global Fund,  Gender & Human Rights Specialist 
Mauro Guarinieri The Global Fund,  Senior Advisor, Community Systems 
Strengthening and Civil Society 
